Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interviews of D. B. Hardeman

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Maury Maverick, Jr., of San Antonio, Texas, Executor of the Estate of D. B. Hardeman, do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of personal interviews conducted on February 26, March 12 and April 22, 1969 at Washington, D.C., and on January 19, 1977 in San Antonio, Texas, and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

(2) The tape recordings shall be available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) Until May 15, 1998, the D. B. Hardeman Estate retains all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter, the copyright in both the transcripts and tape recordings shall pass to the United States Government. Until May 15, 1998, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts and tape recordings without express consent in each case.

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Donor: Maury Maverick, Jr.
As Executor only
May 11, 1988

Archivist of the United States

May 22, 1988
B: Would you begin by just briefly summarizing your background and career to give a kind of checkpoint?

H: Well, I was born in Goliad, Texas, and I went to the University of Texas, B.A. degree in English in 1933; then two years of graduate work in history and government. Then I went to work as a newspaperman. I had been editor of the *Daily Texan* at the university and worked at the State Capitol from 1935 until 1941. Then I went back to law school on a part-time basis in 1939-40, 1940-41, took the bar exams in 1941 and passed them. Then went into the army for a little over four years. Came back out of the army.

I had been active in politics as a manager of two statewide campaigns before the war and then came back after the war and managed the campaign of Dr. Homer Rainey for governor in 1946. Then I established a public opinion survey and public relations service which led me unexpectedly to North Texas, to Denison and Sherman, where we established a fishing and travel magazine. I had a public relations and advertising agency for roughly ten years. And I went to the legislature for two terms from North Texas.
In the meantime I had been working on national politics. I was organization manager for the state of Texas in the Adlai Stevenson campaign in 1952. Then in 1953 and 1954, I worked part-time for the Democratic National Committee under Chairman Stephen A. Mitchell and Speaker Sam Rayburn in trying to rebuild our shattered Democratic Party in Texas, the organization work and fund raising. So then I went to Europe, doing some writing and traveling in 1955, and when I came back, the Stevenson people asked me if I wanted to join the Stevenson staff getting ready for the 1956 convention, which I did. I spent most of my time before the convention in the South. Then during the campaign itself, after the conventions, I was an advance man for Stevenson.

I came to Washington and started work on a biography of Speaker Sam Rayburn. Eventually in 1957 I went to work for him, worked for him from July 1, 1957 until his death. Shortly after his death, I became administrative assistant to the Democratic Whip, Hale Boggs of Louisiana, and stayed there until July 1 of 1965, when I quit to start doing some teaching and hopefully to finish this Rayburn biography. I've been teaching on a part-time basis ever since.

B: Yes, a biography of Sam Rayburn is badly needed, I think.
H: Well, I think there are several people working in the field and I always told Mr. Rayburn that the more that could be written about him, the better for his place in history. I never felt any competition from anybody because no one can tell the whole story anyhow. And the more that is put on paper, the better for his reputation and his place
in history and also for the scholar and the reader. So I hope there'll be several biographies in the next few years.

B: In anticipation of your biography, we'll try to concentrate in this on Johnson and we'll talk about [what part] Rayburn plays in his relationship there, but that's not to exclude anything about Mr. Sam, for goodness sake. In this process, particularly in this involvement with Texas politics, when did you first meet Lyndon Johnson?

H: I don't know. I knew Lady Bird in school. I think I met Lady Bird probably about 1933, because I was going with a girl who lived in the same boarding house with her, and I knew all the girls in the boarding house. I did not meet Lyndon Johnson until after he came back as director of the National Youth Administration. I suspect it was not long after he came back because Austin was a small town in those days and those in the political world all knew each other pretty well. I know that I did not know him at the time that he was appointed for the reason that I needed a job and I made application to the NYA and I was not hired. I did know Dr. Wiley, Mary Margaret Wiley's father, an economics professor, and asked him to try to help me. But I did not know Johnson himself. I'm sure I met him shortly, I'd say within a few months after he came back to Austin. I'm not sure what month—the spring of 1935, I think.

B: While he had that NYA job, was it pretty generally thought around Austin that this was one of Franklin Roosevelt's bright young men, or did he attract that much attention?
H: Well, he attracted attention, of course, because this was a very important program through the college community, to the students. And he had a reputation for being a very energetic, a very able young man. I did not have any thought at the time that he was--I'm not sure that I even thought that he knew Roosevelt and I'm not sure that he did know Roosevelt at the time. No, the first identification with Roosevelt himself was after his election to Congress.

D: Did you participate or observe his first election to Congress when he ran for the vacant seat?

H: I didn't participate; I observed it; I was living in Austin at the time. And, as you know, it was a free-for-all. The state was very divided over the Court-packing plan, and he of course was outstanding because he came out all the way in support of the Court-packing plan, where most of the candidates were riding the fence on it. A few were firmly against the plan; most of them were trying not to say anything about it. But Tom Connally had come back to Texas and delivered a stirring speech in the House chamber that I heard, attacking the Court-packing plan and breaking with Roosevelt. So the state was very deeply divided over this issue. And the Austin district then was more of a New Deal district than most districts in Texas. I didn't watch too much of it; I read about it of course. And I don't recall hearing him speak in the campaign. I don't know whether I heard any of the speeches in that campaign or not. Probably radio speeches, but I didn't take any particular interest in it at that time other than follow it.
B: In the years after that, did you become better acquainted with then-Congressman Johnson?

H: Oh, yes, it was one of those gradual things. You know, I'd see him around town. As I said, it was a small political world. Austin then was divided into three groups: the downtown business and social group, the college group, and the Capitol political group. And I was still being a Mario Savio on the campus, although I was out of school. I was going back raising hell about the censorship of the Daily Texan and things. So I was still in the college world, but I was at the Capitol as a newspaperman and in the political world, so it was a gradual thing.

Then I can't remember the year, [but] the greatest amount of time I ever spent with Lyndon Johnson was either 1938 or 1939, probably 1939, maybe possibly 1940. He asked me, for a fee, to research and write I think eight articles on accomplishments in his district as a young congressman. And then he sent these out. I ghost-wrote the articles and he sent them out to all his papers under his own name. I remember I did one on the world's biggest REA. I remember I did one, my recollection is it was on Negro and Mexican public housing in Austin. I think there were about eight of them. I spent a great deal of time with him at that period, just in conversation with him, talking about his ideas and his dreams and things of that nature. And that's when I first really got to feel that I knew the man.

Then when he ran for the Senate in 1941, as soon as Morris Sheppard died, as soon as we got word, my newspaper partner Alex
Louis, who now has a public opinion survey business in Dallas—he was for many, many years equal partner with Joe Belden and they finally split up; we were correspondents for the Harte-Hanks chain of papers at the Capitol—said, "Now, this is going to be a very split-up race in this special election. And if Houston Harte will throw his weight completely of all his papers behind one man, he can elect him." So my recollection is that afternoon he called Houston Harte and told him what he thought. And Harte said, "I agree with you. I think we ought to do this." He said, "There are four people I can support. There's Dan Moody, former governor; Jimmie Allred, who was a former governor and then on the federal bench; Gerald Mann, attorney general; and Lyndon Johnson. I can support any of the four. You and D. B. find out who's going to run and what they're going to do, and do it quick."

So Alex went down and talked to Dan Moody, and as usual, Dan Moody couldn't make up his mind. You know, this is digressing, but the story was when Dan Moody was governor, they started building a building out west of the Mansion, according to this story. A fellow stopped and watched the carpenter and said, "What is this going to be?" "Well," he said, "This is going to be a 'Chic' Sale outhouse," and [the fellow] said, "Well, what is it going to be—a two-holer or a one-holer?" "Oh, my Lord, it's going to be one-holer because if it was a two-holer, before that Governor could make up his mind, it would be too late!" Well, Dan Moody proved this again in this case. Moody had been a New Dealer up to this time and later became violently anti-New Deal, but Moody temporized and did not run.
So Alex and myself drove to Houston and spent the night with Jimmie Allred. I had been a young man rather close to Allred, and we spent the night with him until two o'clock in the morning. And Jimmie finally got so fired up that he was walking the floor, making anti-O'Daniel speeches. It was obvious that [W. Lee] O'Daniel was going to be the man to beat. So we went to bed that night and we said, "Well, he's going to run." The next morning he knocked on our door—it was, I think, in April—and he said, "Let's go for a walk before breakfast." So we went out and walked around these graveled walks out in that suburb. And he said, "Well, last night when I left you I was prepared to resign from the federal bench and run. But Joe Betsy put her foot down flat." She said, "You're just about to get out of debt for the first time in your life, you have some security for your family, and you cannot do it." So he said, "That's it."

So we came back. I had been doing some work for Gerald Mann on old records in the Attorney General's office and was very close to Gerald Mann. He thought he was going to run for governor. I was not in any way committed to him, but I was on a very close personal friendship basis with him. So I was rather agonized about what to do. By that time it was clear that Johnson was going to run and that Gerald Mann was going to run. I was with Gerald Mann's administrative assistant upstairs at the Stephen F. Austin Hotel one afternoon and we came out of the side entrance, the 7th Street entrance of the hotel, and there was Ed Clark and Lyndon Johnson and, I don't know, Claude Wild and two or three others standing there. Apparently Lyndon
Johnson did not know Bill Cason [?], the man I was with. Anyhow he whirled around and saw me and said, "You little son-of-a-bitch, I've been looking for you. You're going to travel with me and handle my publicity." And he threw his arms around me. I said, "Well, Lyndon, that's very flattering, but I can't do that. I'm going to support Gerald Mann." And I never will forget the look on his face, you know. He took his arm down right quick and he said, "Well, you little son-of-a-bitch!" So I supported Gerald Mann. My partner Alex Louis supported Lyndon and traveled with him part of the time handling press relations on part of that trip.

B: How did the Harte chain come down in the election?

H: They came out all the way for Johnson. The Harte chain, the individual editors always had a great deal of leeway and Harte, perhaps in this race--they all supported Johnson. I'm not sure of that, but frequently, say, Paris and Wichita Falls would perhaps diverge, or maybe Abilene would diverge on a certain race. Harte, maybe, would carry six of his papers and two or three would go off in another direction.

B: Do you know how Harte ended up making the decision?

H: No, I don't know how the decision was made. I suspect--well, I shouldn't say this, because I have no facts to back it up--that Lyndon Johnson did a selling job and Gerald Mann probably did call him. He was very fond of Lyndon Johnson, but he was also very fond of Gerald Mann. But it was not a surprise to me that he supported Johnson.
B: That series of articles you talked about in 1938 and 1939, was that pretty obviously designed to be a preliminary for the senatorial campaign?

H: Oh, no, it had no connection. It was designed for his re-election to Congress.

B: To Congress. You said that to back up--

H: He had no dream, as far as I ever had any indication; as far as I can recall, there was no mention of the Senate because Connally was in, it looked like he was good for years, and Sheppard looked like he was good for years. And they were both unbeatable. He was ambitious, of course, but he was thinking about getting 51 per cent in that district because he had been elected with, what, 28 per cent of the votes, something like that. So he was trying to nail down his district.

B: To back that up a little, you said that at the time you talked to Johnson some and you talked about his dreams and what he wanted. Was he thinking in those days about becoming a House man? Staying in the House and--?

H: I don't know that we ever talked [about that]. I wouldn't have known what a House man was in those days. I knew nothing about Congress. We never discussed it as far as I know. But he was ambitious politically. He intended to make politics his career, but I suppose I assumed that he did intend to be a congressman the rest of his life unless something better came along.

B: That 1941 senatorial election was the one that Johnson lost.

H: That's right. It was stolen from him, I always thought.
B: Stolen?

H: Yes. Joe Belden did some very interesting surveys—I think the Johnson people paid for them—of some of the counties in East Texas. And I have always believed, and the Belden re-survey after the election seemed to bear this out, what happened—now, this is my feeling about it—Jim Ferguson didn't give a damn about O'Daniel, he had a great contempt for him, but he wanted Coke Stevenson, who was then lieutenant governor, to become governor. So he wanted to kick O'Daniel upstairs and get him on to Washington so Coke could become governor.

There were still some Ferguson machine counties in East Texas over generally in the Lufkin area. And my belief has always been, and the Belden survey indicated this, that they held the count out in about ten of those counties. Martin Dies of course was very popular in that whole area, some of those counties were in his district, and when it became obvious that he was a hopeless fourth, they took some of the Dies votes and put them over in the O'Daniel column. I couldn't prove that in a court of law, but that's what I believe. Of course, if Johnson had protested at the time, I think he would never have been senator, but he took it like a man because there were many people who felt that it had been stolen. But he didn't cry out and make a fuss about it. He took it on the chin.

B: You mean if he made a fuss that that would get the Texas political powers against him?
H: Well, I think the fact that he took his defeat with good grace just as Richard Nixon did in 1960 when he probably had some grounds to make a loud cry--I suspect that Nixon wouldn't be president today if he had made a fuss about the Kennedy election in 1960. Politically, you've got to learn to be a good loser and Johnson understood that.

B: Rather than have the image of a whiner.

H: That's right. Even though you may have all the grounds in the world for complaining, you better go ahead and take your lumps and hope for another day. And that's what Johnson did. He was a graceful loser in a very close election.

B: The war years intervene here next right after that election. I don't suppose your path ever crossed Lieutenant Commander Johnson's in early 1941 or 1941?

H: No, I'm sure I was gone. Oh, the early part of the war, I may have seen him on the street in Austin or something of that nature, but I don't recall it. Certainly then I was out of the country for a little over two years and I did not see him until the war was over.

B: Did you get back any kind of personal relationship with him immediately after the war?

H: Yes, a casual relationship. He was in the hospital out at Seton Infirmary, and I remember going out there one night, I think with Paul Bolton. I remember coming away from there with a very firm feeling, although he didn't say so in so many words, that he either had voted or was going to vote for Rainey. As I said, he didn't sign any statement to that effect, but what he said that night . . . . Then I
saw him, oh, a number of times after that, you know, but I was busy on the Rainey campaign and then in December of that year after the campaign was over, I went to Denison and lived in Denison and Sherman for the next ten years. So I'd see him, oh, at a banquet or something of that nature.

B: The Rainey campaign was a pretty bitter one, wasn't it?

H: It was the bitterest I've ever watched. It really separated the people. There's still bitterness in Texas.

B: I've heard about it. Did Mr. Johnson take any kind of open stand in that campaign?

H: No, he did not. Mr. Rayburn, also, with his family, all voted for Rainey. Because it was more or less a New Deal-anti-New Deal campaign underneath all the other more controversial issues. It was a straight liberal-conservative split. No, Johnson--of course, congressmen, as you know, don't normally take any part in the governors' campaigns.

B: Then, did you play any part in the election of 1948? The election that put Johnson in the Senate.

H: None whatsoever. He came into Denison and landed on the school grounds in a helicopter and I thought the rotor was going to cut off the heads of some of the kids. And I saw him there. I went to his speech, went out to see him, and I voted for him. But I was busy and I was traveling a lot at the time, and, oh, maybe I was telling, urging my friends to vote for him, something like that, but I had no contact with his headquarters.
B: Including after the election, did you have any part in the state machinery that was wrestling with the certification?

H: No, I got disgusted with the conventions and I didn't go to that state convention that year. I was new in Grayson County, was not in politics at all, I was nursing my bruises from the Rainey campaign. So I didn't have any part at all, and being away from Austin, I didn't know all the detailed maneuvering that was going on.

B: In 1952 you said you managed Stevenson's campaign in Texas?

H: No, Mr. Rayburn was the manager. The state officials, except for John White, either supported Eisenhower as [Allan] Shivers and Price Daniel did, or they ran for cover, they'd go to a hospital, couldn't reach them, or something. John White was the only statewide state official that came out for the tickety. So Mr. Rayburn had to come home and take the campaign over, nobody else to do it. Well, he'd never managed a campaign in his life, not even his own, knew nothing about it except just his own political horse sense, and he didn't know who to get to be sort of the detail manager, so.... We had had a big fight against the gas company, the pipeline companies, in the legislature in 1951. Our group, the Gashouse Gang, was very close friends.

So Maury Maverick, Jr. started bombarding Mr. Rayburn, "You must get Jim Sewell to manage the campaign; you must get Jim Sewell to manage the campaign." Jim is a blind man from Corsicana, had been the author of the Sewell notes, tax on pipelines. Mr. Rayburn, I suppose out of desperation--he'd never met Sewell--sent word to Sewell to come see him, and he just fell in love with Jim and asked him to be the--I
don't know what the title word was. Mr. Rayburn was the campaign director, I think Jim was the campaign manager. I had managed three campaigns previously, so Jim phoned me and asked me to come down and work on organization. So I was organization director; Jim was the campaign manager, and I think Rayburn was called campaign director. We lived in the Adolphus Hotel and did what little we could, which wasn't very much.

B: Was that the first time you'd been thrown into a close relationship with Mr. Rayburn?

H: Yes. I had met him and had voted for him up in the district, but I had never had any conversation with him. I had shaken hands with him two or three times in big receptions or something like that, but I did not know the man. But during the campaign, we became very, very close friends. I found him very easy to work with and always did find him easy to work with. And so it was out of that that my later relationship grew.

B: That campaign left some bitterness in Texas, too, particularly with Allan Shivers.

H: Yes. Because the Stevenson people felt that it was more than politics. It was a matter of honor involved in it. And the bitterness, of course, had been growing. I suppose the major factor of Rainey getting fired was Rainey's own part in the convention to select delegates in 1944, when you had a rump convention and Rainey walked out with the rump delegation. The national committee stupidly seated both delegates, you know, which didn't prove anything. And that was really
the first open split in the state along the liberal-conservative lines. And it got worse every year. It was a shorter campaign, for one thing, but the bitterness was nothing compared to the Rainey campaign, because the Rainey campaign had the very heavy undertone of not only anti-labor but anti-Negro. Because the Negroes for the first time were able to participate in the Democratic primary.

B: I was going to ask if--the Shivers' stand, at least publicly, was predicated on the tidelands issue, but were there other factors, too, race or anything else involved in it?

H: Oh, I don't think Allan cared a thing in the world about race--he could teach it flat or teach it round. I don't think he's racist at all. I think that Allan might conceivably have gone along in 1952, but his meeting with Stevenson was badly handled, as was the whole Stevenson campaign. It was an Alice-in-Wonderland performance except for Stevenson's own individual performance. Your intellectuals who knew nothing about politics all rushed to Springfield, and so you had the Arthur Schlesingers and the Dave Bells and the John Kenneth Galbraiths and fifty others moved out there and built a cordon around Stevenson and wouldn't let people through to him who knew something about politics. And Stevenson didn't know anything about politics. He later became pretty good at it, but in 1952--his election as governor had been kind of a fluke, although he worked very hard at it. It was an accident really. He was not expected to win.

So the divided campaign with the national committee here and his campaign headquarters out there--well, he didn't have many people who
were behind that fence who knew anything about politics. And they didn't know how to handle Allan, and Allan went up with kind of a chip on his shoulder anyhow. But I've always thought that with a little more diplomacy, it's possible that Shivers--I don't think he would have supported Stevenson, but he probably wouldn't have supported Eisenhower. He might have just kept quiet.

B: Did Rayburn try to make a person-to-person appeal to Shivers to either stay in the Democratic Party or at least stay quiet?

H: No, no. I don't think so, because the thing was too far gone by the time Rayburn got into it. It was all over as far as the Shivers part was concerned. You see, the Shivers convention had endorsed Eisenhower and the Shivers committee endorsed Eisenhower. When we started our campaign down there, they wouldn't even give us a mimeographed list of the county chairmen. If we wanted to know who the Democratic county chairmen were in the county, we'd have to phone the newspaper or somebody in that county and say, "Who's your county chairman?" That's how much bitterness there was. By the time Rayburn got there--which was late, I don't know, it was up in September as I recall--it was too late for that sort of thing.

B: Did Mr. Johnson play any part in the campaign in Texas that year?

H: Yes, my recollection is he introduced him in Fort Worth; I heard him introduce him in Dallas. I don't remember whether he rode on the train that Stevenson took from Dallas to Uvalde to see old man Garner and then came back to San Antonio. It seems to me that Johnson may not have been at either San Antonio or Houston, but that you'd have to
check. I don't remember. I was at San Antonio. He didn't introduce him in San Antonio is my recollection, but he did introduce him at the Fair Grounds in Dallas, and I think he introduced him in Fort Worth.

B: That campaign in Texas was an uphill battle all the way.

H: It was a hopeless battle. It was a hopeless battle. The people wanted Eisenhower to start with, they wanted a change, and then the tidelands thing gave a lot of people an inflammatory excuse. It could never have been won.

B: And as you say, the lack of organization. The Shivers people taking over the machine.

H: We didn't have any money until about the last two weeks of October when the Gallup Poll showed Stevenson moving up, then the money came floating in too late to do anything with it, and we ended up with a surplus. We had money we couldn't spend.

B: Was that people hedging their bets at the last minute?

H: Yes. And about fifteen hundred dollars worth of checks were stopped after Stevenson lost. But the money came in, as it frequently does, when a man--you know, people hedging. Some of it was people putting up additional money, [people] that were already for Stevenson. But most of it, I think, was a little insurance money. But it was too late to do anything with it. If we'd had a million dollars, we couldn't have carried Texas that year and I think we all knew it.

B: In the four years after that, between 1952 and 1956, the Democratic organization in Texas didn't improve any.
We started building. We had to start from scratch, because the state committee had endorsed Eisenhower. Shivers was still very strong, and so we concentrated on two things: local organization and fund raising. Texas had a quota of seventy thousand dollars for the national committee and we met that quota in 1953 and we met that quota in 1954. Since the machinery was all in the hands of the Eisenhowercrats, Shivercrats, we set up an ad hoc committee called the Democratic Advisory Committee, patterned after the state committee. The national committee, Steve Mitchell, ignored the state committee, and Wright Morrow, who was then national committeeman and had supported Eisenhower, worked with the Democratic Advisory Committee. And we raised that money, most of it by having dinners for ten dollars, five dollars a ticket. And we brought in a great number of new people who had never been in politics before, but you had to go into the community and just start from scratch. That didn't help Stevenson in 1956. The chief beneficiary of that effort at that time was Ralph Yarborough, because many of those people then moved into the Yarborough—I guess all of them moved.

I was going to say, because in those years what you had at least beginning was what later became the extreme liberal faction becoming active.

We started in 1953 and 1954, you see, to work out a peace, a modus vivendi, between the loyal moderate Democrats and the liberal Democrats, to get them to live together. There were a lot of people who were not for organized labor, we'll say, who still were loyal
brass collar Democrats. And so in this Democratic Advisory Council, in the selections for this council and so forth, what we tried to do was to rebuild a coalition that would have 51 per cent of the votes. It's very difficult. Always when you're defeated, everybody is blaming everybody else. And then there was the illusion that a lot of people had that you could build a coalition of the Negro, the Latin American, the labor man, the loyal Democrats, and the liberal intellectuals, and you'd have 51 per cent. Well, of course, it was an illusion; it is an illusion, and yet people fight for their illusions. The two achievements were that we raise this money, which the national committee needed very desperately, and we did bring a lot of new people into the picture who later on became very useful to Ralph Yarborough.

B: Were Mr. Rayburn and Mr. Johnson active in this, too?

H: Of course Rayburn was. Rayburn was in the middle of everything, every tiny little move was coordinated with Rayburn. Johnson had no part in it that I can recall. He wanted as little to do with it as possible. He had his own problems; he was coming up for re-election in 1954, you see, and he was worrying about that. He just tended to his own knitting.

B: Was the idea that he could only hurt himself by getting involved in the thing?

H: Well, of course, it was obvious to him that this was still a minority in the state. He couldn't rely on this group and if he had a strong opponent be re-elected. And he'd had the scare of his life, of
course, in 1948. And he had supported Stevenson. He was criticized by a number of the liberals as not doing enough for Stevenson in Texas. He made speeches for him all over the country. They said, well, he should have done it in Texas. Perhaps it was his own political fortune that had a part in it, but maybe it was his judgment that Texas was lost and he might carry Wyoming or Montana or some other place, you know. But he'd had the fright of his life and he hadn't had a test since then. And the state was definitely pro-Eisenhower, and the state was more conservative than ever. So he had a very legitimate worry, I think, about 1954 if he had a major opponent.

B: Did that create any resentment among the loyal Democrats in Texas that he was staying out of it?

H: Oh, among a lot of liberals, yes. They'd never gotten along with him; they'd gone with him, say, against Coke Stevenson because Coke was less palatable. But, you know, it's just like the Goldwater people on one side or the liberals on the other--they want you to be simon-pure and belong to them and them alone, you know.

B: I was going to say, some of the extreme liberals in Texas like Mrs. Randolph appear to have intensely disliked Johnson for personal and philosophical reasons.

H: Well, I've always thought that the Frankie Randolph thing, while she never would have trusted Johnson because of ideology and so forth, her real deep bitterness, I suspect, came out of that convention in 1954.

B: 1956.

H: When, 1956?
B: With the national committeewoman?

H: Yes, where she was national committeewoman, but her delegation from Houston had not been seated and they were challenging it before the credentials committee and she stayed with them. Then she felt that although she was national committeewoman, they wouldn't admit her to the convention. There again, I suspect it was a bunch of hot-headed people on both sides that created a needless situation. She never was a Johnson Holy Roller; it wasn't in the cards for her to be. But I suspect that she would not have been so bitter, but, like so many women in politics, she was a great organizer, and so many women in politics are great pros for eight and a half innings and then the last half of the ninth inning, they turn into an emotional female. And that's what Frankie did. She took it not as a political blow, but as an insult to her as a lady. And Johnson is hot-headed, you know, and impetuous, too, and I suspect, as Texas tempers get at all conventions, this was something that cooler heads might have avoided to where they could at least stay in the same party, but they didn't.

B: As it turned out, of course, Johnson had practically no trouble at all in 1954.

H: I don't even remember who ran against him.

B: Dudley Dougherty in the primary, which apparently was sort of a whim.

H: Oh, yes, well, somebody made some money out of Dudley, and Dudley had no more chance than. . . . But he had the money to indulge himself if he wanted to do it, you know. Yes, I don't remember.
Of course, the worry was that Shivers might run, you see. And Shivers, if he didn't beat Johnson, he would come very, very close to it, and he might very well have beaten Johnson. But I always believed that Shivers never did want to be in this thing. He had a free ride for the Senate in 1952 and turned it down, so I don't think Shivers—he doesn't want to be one of a hundred people; he wants to be kind of the walk or nothing. But obviously Johnson couldn't be sure of that. And Shivers probably would have been unbeatable. Johnson might not have been able to beat him in 1954. I don't know how it would have turned out. It would have been a very mean, hard campaign.

B: And Eisenhower was still very popular.

H: Eisenhower was still very popular and Shivers was still very popular. Shivers had not lost any popularity at that stage of the game, obviously. He was re-elected governor. And so I think Johnson had quite a legitimate worry about Shivers running against him, or if Shivers backed a candidate running against him.

B: Next comes along the 1956 state convention and national nominating convention. Was there a time there in 1956 where it looked like Shivers might set himself up again as a loyal Democrat and take the lead of the state group, the state delegation to the national convention?

H: Well, of course, he wanted to control the delegation, obviously. He did everything he could to get control of the delegation. But as a loyal Democrat, that's something else again. No, I don't think Shivers would ever have supported Stevenson. I don't think there was
any thought of supporting Stevenson. And it was quite likely that he certainly wouldn't support Kefauver. No, Shivers, by that time, had crossed the Rubicon and if he had taken his delegation to the convention, it would have been in the role of spoiler. He wouldn't have been there to promote the chances of the Democrats in November.

B: The delegation that went from Texas was a loyalist delegation with Lyndon Johnson as a favorite son candidate.

H: Yes. Mr. Rayburn, I have always believed, shoved Johnson into the water and they had that knockdown-dragout fight with Shivers over the control of the May convention and selection of the delegation. Johnson said at one stage there, one speech, that "I either had to fight or run," and he chose to fight. And, as you know, they had this terrible statewide battle and they defeated Shivers by a pretty good margin. Rayburn thought up this idea of Johnson to have both roles, as chairman of the delegation and as favorite son. He knew that our Stevenson crowd couldn't win the battle, but you put with that Johnson's other friends and you might win, which is what happened. But they had this terrible fight with Shivers right down to the wire, and it took everything everybody had to win it. Shivers was formidable.

B: Was there any indication there at that 1956 national convention that maybe either Mr. Rayburn on behalf of Mr. Johnson or Mr. Johnson himself had any ambitions to be more than just a favorite son candidate?

H: Oh, Johnson definitely wanted the nomination. Absolutely.
B: For the presidency.

H: For the presidency, yes. I don't know the exact point at which Johnson decided to become a serious candidate. I had the feeling then that this decision was probably made on Sunday when Harry Truman arrived in town and came out for Averell Harriman as his candidate to head off Stevenson, and that Johnson may have decided then that this is going to be a wide-open free-for-all. And "If it's going to be a wide-open thing, I'd have as good a chance as anybody, so let's get busy." So they worked all night, I'm told—I was still on the Stevenson staff—raising money to finance a drive and the printers worked all night and printed these tags "Love that Lyndon." And he made a serious effort. Well, the Truman thing didn't amount to anything. Stevenson had it blocked up.

B: I was going to say, did the Truman announcement scare the Stevenson camp badly?

H: Oh, yes, sure. It would scare anybody, because you just don't know what effect it will have. But the lines held.

B: I was going to say, you already had a good many votes going up to that stage.

H: Had a lot of votes, but it's always a question, you know, will they stay with you? Will they stay with you past the first ballot? Roosevelt had a lot of votes, too, but yet it came within a few minutes of getting away from him. That's the terror of these conventions, that your delegation will leave you without any notice. Sure, it scared the Stevenson people, it didn't panic them, but they worked
very hard to be sure they had the things nailed down, which they did have.

B: Anyone from the Johnson camp come to see you personally to suggest that if Johnson was an active candidate, that's where you ought to be?

H: No. Mr. Rayburn's suite and Adlai Stevenson's suite were on the same floor of the Conrad Hilton Hotel. I know I went in and got Stevenson and took him to the Rayburn suite for them to have a talk. And I saw Lyndon Johnson a number of times there and we'd be standing around talking. He knew, of course, that I was working. I was a paid employee of Stevenson and had been for nearly a year. I would feel a little embarrassed at times, you know--be standing in a circle there and everybody would have on a "Love that Lyndon" tag except myself, but he never showed any feeling. I'm sure he didn't like it; he always wanted all the votes like every politician does, but he never said anything. He never said, "Why in the hell aren't you for me?" He knew that long before he ever got into it at all, I had already become a part of the Stevenson staff.

B: Arthur Krock's memoirs that have been published just recently say that after Stevenson was nominated, you and John Connally were emissaries from Rayburn to Stevenson to suggest Lyndon Johnson as vice president. Is that correct?

H: I never heard that. I haven't read the Krock memoirs, I read the Saturday Evening Post abridgement, but I have not read the book. No.

B: Was there any thought--

H: No.
B: --from the Stevenson camp of Johnson as vice president?
H: I don't think so. I never heard it if there was. Let's see, he had--
B: Kefauver was running hard for it, and so was Kennedy.
H: And Albert Gore and Frank Clements and God knows who else! I think it was that--I never heard that before.
B: I'm pretty sure that's reasonably [accurate]. That's not an exact quote, but it's the burden of the essays.
H: I think Arthur Krock is mixed up on that. We had a meeting in Hale Boggs' office in, I don't know, 1962, 1963--Arthur Krock and Tommy Corcoran and Ed Foley and Hale Boggs and myself, I guess. John Holton, Mr. Rayburn's administrative assistant, was invited, but he had to be out of town, in which we talked about this. Hale told Arthur Krock at the time something that I never heard before or since. That Rayburn indicated to him that he ought to go to see Stevenson and feel Stevenson out about Rayburn being on the ticket. I don't want to cross Hale up, but there are always a lot of things in politics you don't know even if you're in the same room, but that just doesn't add up to me. I think he misunderstood what Rayburn was trying to tell him. So he said he went to see Stevenson, and Stevenson said, "Well, there's nobody I have more warmth for or admiration for than Sam Rayburn, but we've got this age problem now. One of our assets against Eisenhower is the fact that he has had a heart attack and he's an old man; and here's Rayburn up here in his middle seventies. They turned [Alben] Barkley down four years previously because he was too old. It just won't do."
B: Would Mr. Rayburn have even considered the possibility?

H: Well, Hale thought he was telling him to go see Stevenson and see if Stevenson would "take me on the ticket." But it didn't ring true to me. I think he misunderstood what Rayburn was trying to tell him, I think he misread the signals. Because I had talked to Rayburn before I went to work for Stevenson. I said, "Now, Mike Monroney and a number of them are talking about pushing you as a favorite son. While I'm very strong for Stevenson, if you're going to be a favorite son, I don't want this to get in this crossfire. I'm going to support you naturally." Mr. Rayburn said, "No, indeed! I'm going to shut Mike and the boys up. I appreciate what they're doing, but it's completely unrealistic. I've had a medical exam, and the doctor tells me my heart's good to ninety-five or a hundred, and I told him I'd take a hundred. I feel in wonderful shape and all, but, my God, over half of the people in the United States, half the voters in the United States, are under forty years of age. And they think anybody forty-five is an old man. I'll be seventy-four years old, and it just doesn't make any sense at all. No, Stevenson ought to be the nominee. He's the best we've got, and he ought to be nominee and you go to work for him."

Now, of course, politicians change their minds, you know. He might have decided. . . . But I just don't think Rayburn would have traded the speakership for the vice presidency at any time in his career.

B: Could Rayburn have been hinting at the possibility of Johnson on the ticket?
H: Well, I don't know. Yes, I think he would have liked to have seen
Johnson on the ticket. Sure. He was trying to promote Lyndon Johnson
every way that he could and it certainly would add strength to the
ticket in Texas. Whether Johnson wanted it, who knows? He insisted
he didn't want the nomination in 1960, but he finally ran very hard
for it. Then, of course, there was no chance of his taking the vice
presidency, but he took the vice presidency. So you know what a man
says and what secretly he feels are often two different things.

B: Of course, that 1956 convention ended up with Stevenson, rather than
choosing, designating a vice presidential nominee, throwing it open
on the convention floor, with the subsequent Kefauver-Kennedy--

H: That's right. John Sharon sold him on that idea.

B: I was going to ask you how that idea came about. It sounds a little
quixotic.

H: I have always understood that John Sharon, who was a young lawyer and
a very fine man, later Clark Clifford's law partner, was the one who
had the idea and sold Stevenson on it. It was the sort of thing that
Stevenson might very well be attracted to; it saved him from choosing.
He sort of needed Kefauver and yet Kennedy had nominated him. Kennedy
had a lot of loyal followers. And if there was any Johnson problem,
it got him off the Johnson problem, you know. And it was something
new in politics. Rayburn, I know--I was told, I was not at the
meeting at the Stockyards Inn where they had this fight just before
Stevenson made this announcement. But as we were walking over--I was
outside the building--here were all the dignitaries going to the
stage. Hy Raskin, who was deputy chairman of the national committee, had been up to the meeting and he said to me, "My God, is the old man mad?" He denounced this idea as a bunch of the biggest dam-foolery he'd ever heard in his life. Stevenson was adamant about it, and he finally grabbed Stevenson by the arm and said, "All right, Adlai, if that's what you want, let's go on and get it over with. I'll take you over."

B: The "old man" in that is in reference to Rayburn?

H: Rayburn, yes. And Johnson told Kennedy when Kennedy talked to him about the vice presidency, "One thing--whoever you want, you be prepared to fight for him and put it through. Don't do what Adlai did to you and to Estes, and let you all inflict a bunch of needless scars on each other. You mustn't do that!" So I assumed from that--now, whether Johnson was in this meeting at the Stockyards Inn, I don't know. I don't know who was in it. But I never heard any challenge to the assertion that John Sharon was the one who sold this to Stevenson.

B: Did Rayburn have any choice between Kefauver and Kennedy, or did he just not like the idea of opening up a floor fight?

H: Well, it would have been opposition to having another blood bath inside the convention, of having a blood bath inside the convention. At that time, he was still unhappy with Kefauver for the way Kefauver had promoted himself in 1952 at the expense of the Democratic Party. But on the other hand, he had no admiration for Jack Kennedy. He liked Kennedy, but Kennedy made no impression in the House of Representatives and didn't matter too much. You know, he was
attractive, all this and that and the other. But I don't know. I
don't know who Rayburn would have been for. I doubt that he had a
choice. You know, he had a great quality that he didn't make deci-
sions that didn't have to be made. You say, well, he's stalling.
Well, he wasn't stalling. That was something he had to decide. That
saved him a lot of wear and tear, deciding things that never come to
pass. And I doubt that he had a candidate.

B: I've heard it said that neither Kefauver nor Kennedy at that time
was particularly popular among the professional politicians.

H: No, no, they were not. Kefauver, because many of the pros felt that
Kefauver had dirt-daubed the Democratic Party and had beaten a number
of Democrats with his crime investigation to glorify himself; that he
was a selfish politician, putting himself above the party's welfare.
They hadn't gotten over that in spite of the fact they all recognized
that Estes Kefauver was a man of tremendous ability and tremendous
courage. Kennedy, on the other hand, had just gotten through with his
actions up in Massachusetts in helping to defeat the Democratic gover-
nor, Foster Furculo, to take care of Jack Kennedy.

And that night after Kefauver was nominated, I was with Steve
Mitchell and his wife and son Tony. We walked off the convention
floor. Just as we were going through the door to the outside, here
came Jack Kennedy. I guess that's the first time I ever met Jack
Kennedy. Steve introduced us and he said, "Quite a day today," or
"That was a close one today," or something, you know. Said, "Jack, do
you want some good fatherly advice?" And he said, "I sure do!" He
said, "Then, suppose you go back to Massachusetts and try to elect some Democrats there besides yourself." Kennedy said, "That's darn good advice!" It wasn't a very politick thing for Steve to say to a future president, but he did say it.

And that was fresh in the minds of many. Kennedy would have been nominated, in my opinion, had he not knifed Furculo in Massachusetts. But if he'd do it to Furculo in his own state, he'd do it to somebody else--that's the way a lot of the pros felt. And I think there was just enough in that very close situation to make the difference. Now, there are all sorts of things about Rayburn wouldn't recognize this one, Rayburn wouldn't recognize that one, but I don't think there was any conspiracy.

B: I was going to ask about that. It has been said that Rayburn slammed a pretty fast gavel there to--

H: Oh, you can always interpret. Maybe he did. Rayburn, even in 1960, felt very strongly that a Catholic could not be elected. He had campaigned very hard for Al Smith in 1928. And as he often said, "When people don't want to be reasoned with, you can't reason with them." And this was the issue. This religious issue in 1928 was one that you couldn't reason with people on. I think he felt that the Catholic issue was still strong enough even in 1960, you were probably going to be defeated if you nominated a Catholic. Now, whether he felt that in 1965, I don't know.

He recognized Governor Raymond Gary of Oklahoma at a critical moment there, but Raymond Gary was a good friend of his. Mr. Rayburn
was known as the eighth congressman from Oklahoma; he worked on Oklahoma problems a great deal; he knew all the Oklahoma politicians. It may not even have been that. He may just--you know you've got a sea of screaming people out here and one, for a reason that you don't know, catches your eye and you recognize him. And Gary then switched the votes, his votes, to Kefauver as I recall. But I've read various accounts about John McCormack was on the floor signalling Rayburn, "Don't recognize him, but recognize him." I said to Tom Hennings of Missouri--I happened to wander over to the Missouri delegation while all this madness was going on, and Tom Hennings, who was a friend of mine, was up on a chair screaming at his delegation, saying, "We can't go for him. We'll lose the whole state." He said, "Jack has voted against every farm bill since he has been in the Senate. We'll lose everything in Missouri if we back Jack."

B: You mean Jack Kennedy?

H: Yes. So there was as usual a jillion different angles, depending on the state you were from, the district you were from, and how it would affect you in your own district. And this Furculo thing. On the one hand, Kefauver and his operations in 1962, and his challenge to Truman, you know. It was truly a wide-open convention, there's no question about that.

B: Incidentally, I think we perhaps ought to make this clear now--Mr. Rayburn's views on the possibility of a Catholic being elected. They represent, I assume, political judgment rather than his own religious prejudice.
H: As far as I could ever detect, he had absolutely no anti-Catholic prejudice at all. He had been an admirer of Al Smith's, campaigned very hard for Al Smith. It was simply a matter of political reality, I think. He just thought that was too big a hurdle to jump. If he ever had any trace of religious intolerance, I could never find it.

B: What part did he play in the subsequent campaign?

H: I was an advance man for Stevenson. I set up the meetings in Miami, in San Diego, Detroit, I guess that was all.

B: [Did] Mr. Rayburn and Mr. Johnson play an unusual part in the campaign?

H: No, they were not at any one of the three. I think they both—Rayburn made a lot of trips, and I think Johnson did, too. That's a matter of record. I was not in any position to watch and see what they were doing, because I wasn't seeing any Texas papers or anything like that.

B: You didn't do any advance work in Texas in that campaign?

H: As a rule, you don't send a man into his own state. Because whoever you send has a lot of scars, and he has partialities between politicians in his home state. If he doesn't have political experience, you don't want him. But if he does have political experience, he has already formed attachments and alliances that will show up in the advance work that he does. Now, there was one exception to that, but it was a very marginal thing. In 1960 I had a major part in setting up the rendezvous of Johnson and Kennedy in El Paso. But El Paso's hardly Texas. I had never worked in El Paso; I didn't know the politicians—I knew a couple of them; I'd never been in any kind of a
battle in El Paso. Actually what we were working on, what I went out to work on, was Arizona and New Mexico, and the El Paso thing was a very marginal thing. So that was a little exception to the rule, but they would never have sent me to Austin, I wouldn't have gone to Austin. I would have said, "No, it doesn't make sense to send me to San Antonio or to send me to Houston—I'll have no part of it."

B: You mentioned a while back that by this time Stevenson was a better politician.

H: He learned very rapidly. And Bill Blair learned very rapidly. There's a story that we might insert here because I think it illustrates what we're talking about—the people around Stevenson. Steve Mitchell got a call—he was the national chairman here in Washington, he had been hand-picked by Stevenson—and he said he got a call from Bill Fulbright. And he said, "Steve, on my way to Springfield I want to come by Washington and have you fill me in as much as you can on what my duties are going to be." He said, "What's that?" "Well," he said, "I got a call from Springfield telling me to come immediately, that I was going to travel on the plane with Adlai. But they were a little hazy about exactly what I'm going to be doing and what's expected of me, and I'd like to come by and have a good talk with you." He said, "All right, come on by and I'll see what I can find out about it. I've never heard of it."

So he phoned Springfield; I don't know who he talked to. And they said, "Yes, that's right. When we got to making out the roster of the people to travel with the candidates, we had the labor liaison
man all selected, and had the farm liaison selected, and the NAACP liaison man, and the veterans liaison man, and so forth. Suddenly, looking at our chart, we realized that we didn't have anybody as liaison for the practical politicians, so we asked Bill Fulbright to come up. That was rather typical of the 1952 campaign, all well-meaning people but Stevenson's judgment was better than that. But he was hemmed in to a very large extent by these people who just moved in, as they do, as everybody tries to do in campaigns. You try to throw up a fence to keep all the people with views other than yours away from the candidate, you see.

B: And by 1956, that grew. Although so far as I know, most of them were still with Stevenson, but by that time the professional pols--

H: Well, Stevenson in 1952 decided on Steve Mitchell. Steve Mitchell had no political experience; he had been one of the three men that more or less drafted Stevenson into public life and had raised money, worked very hard to get him elected governor, but he had not come up through the ranks of politics. So Stevenson said, "Steve Mitchell will be national chairman," which was a shock to all the pros; they never heard of Mitchell. And he said, "Wilson Wyatt will be my campaign manager." Wyatt had been a very good local official, a very able, a fine man, but again a man not of great savvy on political tactics and strategy I think at that time. He [Mitchell] liked Wyatt, always liked Wyatt. Stevenson said, "Now, I'm going to have my headquarters in Springfield because I've got to go on being governor, but the national committee operation will be in Washington." So Steve said to
him, maybe with Wilson Wyatt there, "Now, Adlai, how is this going to work between Wilson and myself?" Stevenson said, "Oh, you're just going to work together, you know." [Mitchell] said, "I know, but who is to be responsible for what, and who is to be responsible for something else? How's it to work?" "Oh," he said, "you know, we just run the campaign." Very airily. Well, Springfield never knew what Washington was doing and Washington never knew what Springfield was doing.

So, it was Stevenson's own speeches, of course, those marvelous speeches were the redeeming feature of the campaign. But the party was all to pieces anyhow and Truman was in very low esteem at the time. Somebody on Stevenson's staff either signed his name, or he signed it without realizing what he was doing--the Republicans had been yelling about the mess in Washington--and then Stevenson signed a letter out in Oregon, which was made public, in which he referred to the mess in Washington, which of course just infuriated the Truman people. There was bad blood already. But it was an amateurish campaign.

By 1956 techniques were much better, except you had a tired man who was desperately hoping to be elected. In 1952 I've always felt that he didn't think until October that he had any chance to be elected; he did not want to be nominated; he was genuinely drafted. And I've always thought he said to himself, "Well, I'm going to run this campaign on a high level, and we can't win, but we can make a fine record." And then the last part of the campaign, the Gallup Poll
picked up, I think he got buck fever maybe for a few days. But in 1956 he desperately wanted the nomination and he desperately wanted to be elected. And he tried. He lost some of this glamour that he had had as being the man above the race that was so appealing in 1952. But technically the campaign, from a strictly political point of view, although it didn't get as many votes. . . . He had Jim Finnegan running the campaign and Jim Finnegan was the best man on the city campaigning in the country; he was a real pro. And he had a lot of other good people. He had learned; Bill Blair had learned, and he had a more professional group around him. But he didn't do as well.

B: Does that mean that the professional group had managed pretty well to isolate the Schlesingers, Galbraiths--?

H: No, but Stevenson had learned by that time how to keep all sorts of people on tap but not on top, to use an old Rayburn expression. He had learned how to make use of the talents of a Walter Reuther without Reuther dominating him, or the use of an Arthur Schlesinger without Schlesinger dominating him. And he was much more at home with the professional politicians. He had gotten to be very good at meeting with professional politicians by that time. He had learned to talk their language and for them to be at ease with him, you know. He had four years of tireless speechmaking and campaigning over this country. He learned very quickly; he was a brilliant man, and he learned very quickly, and so did Bill Blair. Bill Blair was good in 1956. In 1952 he was just a young, innocent, rich boy, very excited about this boss that he adored, but he really just didn't know anything. He'd never
been in a campaign before. I don't think he'd been in Stevenson's governor's campaign. Maybe he had, but he certainly didn't have any major role in it.

B: Did Mr. Rayburn ever play any kind of elder statesman advisory role in the campaigns, just chatting with the candidate, like with Stevenson in 1956?

H: Oh, sure. Before the campaign, people, of course, were always coming to see him, phoning long distance, you know, and sometimes something would come up and he might phone them and volunteer his advice. Oh, yes, because I think most of the pros had a very high regard for not only his judgment but his candor. And he was not a competitor of anybody's and he put party first, he wanted the party to win, so, yes, I would say he was constantly being--

B: Would his advice be general, or did he have a detailed political knowledge of the separate state situations?

H: He knew the states very well. When I got ready to go to Florida to try to--they sent me down to Florida in late October in 1955 to survey the situation. And at that time, I think I'm right, they were not sure that they would go into any primaries. Then they decided that they would go into only about five about the time I went to Florida. Mr. Rayburn said to me, "When you get to Florida"--I didn't know anything about Florida, I knew three or four people there--"the first man you look up is Congressman Bob Sykes down there." Well, I did exactly that. The result was that Bob Sykes became our campaign manager and without Bob Sykes, Kefauver would have beaten Stevenson in
Florida. He barely won it anyhow by about, I think, twelve or thirteen thousand votes. And that whole margin came out of Syke's congressional district. "Daddy Bob," as they called him. "Daddy Bob" was the right man to tie to, not some character in Miami, but Sykes was the solidest man in the delegation. Rayburn knew that, and his advice--of course, I followed it. So I got down there, and I found out that in my judgment Stevenson had to go into the Florida campaign because the law at that time was that a slate of delegates is pledged to a certain candidate to be put on the ticket, and that was it. So I decided that if Stevenson did not pick out his own slate and run it, that the Kefauver people would put the slate pledged to Stevenson which would be a dummy slate. And Kefauver then would knock this dummy slate down and say, "We beat Stevenson in Florida."

So I went back in Chicago and I had a big meeting one night. And I outlined this--that I thought there was no choice but to go into Florida. They didn't want to because they were short of money and this was going to be very expensive and it was a state that Stevenson didn't really fit into. But they agreed that he had to go. It was miserable, but I think he had to do it. I think Kefauver would have put up a dummy slate and would have defeated him in a fake contest. The people didn't want Kefauver and they didn't want Stevenson; they wanted Dick Russell and he wasn't running. It was a miserable campaign from every point of view.

But Rayburn was like that on almost every state. He knew the politicians; he knew who was reliable, whose judgment was good. He
wouldn't interfere in every state, of course. But they'd ask his advice about people and he'd give them a very frank opinion about "this fellow here talks big, but he can't deliver; this fellow over here doesn't say anything, but he knows how to get the job done." And he not only knew the states, but he knew most of the congressional districts. He knew more about them than many people holding the job. Because he had watched them for fifty years. This was his business, and he was good at his business. So he would know what a man from a certain district could vote for and what he couldn't vote for. He might not vote that way, but Rayburn would know that a man could vote against Taft-Hartley and survive in District X, or he'd know that he could not vote against Taft-Hartley and survive in District X, or he'd know that he could not vote for lower tariffs in District X. And he knew about a great number of districts in this country. He knew not only the incumbent, but he knew everybody that had preceded the incumbent congressman for the previous forty-five years.

B: After the 1956 election, you moved on to Rayburn's staff then. How did that come about?

H: Well, I took off a year. I got to Washington in June of 1956, thinking I was on my way to New York to look for a job. I knew I didn't want to go back to Texas. I had always wanted to live in New York. So I stopped off here actually just to spend a day or so. George Ball, who was a former partner of Stevenson's, had been in Florida working on the campaign and we got to be great friends. So George said, "Why don't you try to get to Washington in time for the
California primary? We'll listen to the California returns together."
So I timed it to get in to Washington the afternoon of the California primary. I went out to his house and we sat up all night drinking his whiskey and using his telephone credit card calling California. We were listening to Stevenson's great victory out there.

So, of course, I went to see the Rayburn people. Hale Boggs had been the southern manager for Stevenson. When I went to work for Stevenson, I didn't know Boggs and before this was consummated, he told me to fly over to New Orleans so he could meet me and size me up. So I flew over there and we hit it off fine. He's the one who sent me to Florida immediately. And so, of course, I wanted to see Boggs and meet the Boggs staff. I knew some of them, and I didn't know the Rayburn staff. I wanted to get acquainted with them.

I was working on an article on Shivers for Harper's and it had been dragging along for months. And I thought, "Well, this is a pleasant place. I'll just settle down here and finish this article here, the revision of this article." Then I got an idea to write an article on Rayburn for Harper's, and Jack Fisher said, "No, we've had too many Texas articles. Why don't you write a short biography of him?" Henry Allen Moe up at Guggenheim Foundation had been after me to get a biography of Rayburn written. Why don't you take a little more time out?" Well, that intrigued me. So I asked Rayburn if he'd cooperate and he said yes, he would. So, when I wasn't out campaigning I got a study room over at the Library of Congress--I spent a year over there researching on the Rayburn thing.
Then I ran out of money and I was broke in the middle of 1957. Well, they set up a committee here to investigate the regulatory commissions. That had been a field in law school and I'd had Emmette Redford as a professor, and then in law school, this administrative law was the thing I seemed to do best at, more sensitive, and so I applied for a job on the staff. And John Holton said, "You'd better tell the Speaker; he doesn't like to be surprised." And I said, "Oh, I don't want him getting into it. I want to do this on my own." And he said, "No, you'd better tell him. You don't have to get him into it, but you'd better not let him be surprised." So I went in and told Mr. Rayburn, and he said, "That's fine. I want you to have one of those top jobs over there. By God, you're a lawyer and you're a newspaperman and so forth, and I want you on that staff." Well, he couldn't swing it. He didn't have enough influence to swing it. So there was a great fight. They brought Dr. Schwartz [?] down from NYU or CCNY, and it turned into a God-awful mess before everybody got through with it.

But he called me in one day and he said, "Why don't you come to work for me?" I'd never dreamed of working for Rayburn, never had any desire to work for him. He said, "I need another man on my staff. Why don't you come to work for me?" And I said, "Well, I don't know, Mr. Speaker. I haven't even thought about that." What was worrying me was whether working for Rayburn would ruin my judgment on working on the biography. So I talked to several of his friends and mutual friends of mine about it, and they uniformly said, "My God, two
reasons. In the first place, this old man needs help. He needs everybody that he can to pitch in and help him. You'll always be proud that you helped, for this is one of the great Americans. You'll always be proud that you had some part in the last years of his life. In the second place, by working for him, whatever you may lose in impartiality, you will more than make up by being with him all the time and really getting to know the man. You ought to take the job."

So in about ten days I went back and told him okay. And I've never had any regrets. He didn't know what he wanted me to do and I didn't know what was expected of me, and it took about two years before I finally was able to figure out where I could best fit into the operation.

B: I was going to ask you what niche you eventually found. I realize a staff like that isn't specialized, but did you--?

H: People would say, "Now, what does she do?" Said, "She works for me." "Well, what does he do?" "He works for me." "What do they do? Exactly what do they do?" He looked surprised and said, "Well, they do whatever had to be done!" John Holton said, "What title do you want on the payroll? The Speaker doesn't have any titles. You've got to put something on the payroll!" And I said, "I don't know." So we figured out a title of Research Assistant, which I guess was as good as any. And so I really didn't know what to do, but gradually--and he didn't know either. Lyndon Johnson told me--I asked him Rayburn's weaknesses, and he said, "Well, one of them is he doesn't know how to
use a staff. He runs everything out of his back-ass pocket," which was very true.

So finally--like all good politicians, he was ravenous for information--I learned that I could be useful to him in sort of being additional eyes and ears and getting to him maybe a little thing out of the New Leader over here or the Wall Street Journal over here or something somebody had told me, gathering news for him about the world in which he lived, the political world in which he lived. And so then I started clipping things for him. And I'd either lay them on his desk or I'd go in and summarize them for him. I did a lot of speech writing eventually, got to where I did all the speech writing for him.

Then he started using me on other things. When the Griffin-Landrum labor bill came up, of course, he didn't know the ins and outs of labor legislation and certainly I didn't. He appointed me to work with the Kennedy people, the Jack Kennedy people; there was Archie Cox from Harvard Law School, Ralph Dungan who was later in the White House and ambassador to Chile--those were the two principal ones--and Ted Sorensen once in a while, to work with them and become thoroughly familiar with the movement on the Griffin-Landrum bill so that I could answer the best I could any questions that he had. Because he had to make a lot of decisions about the strategy on the bill. So I did. I worked on that with him.

He'd have me sit in on conferences from time to time with different people as, I don't know, protection, I guess, or maybe he wanted to talk about it later--I don't know about that. And he'd take me
with him sometimes on his speaking trips or conventions. It was just like he said: you do whatever has to be done. And it was frequently not the same today as it had been last week or yesterday.

He didn't worry about protocol. Nobody in the office had any authority to give anybody else in the office an order. That includes secretaries. Everybody worked together. And I never worked in an organization that was as happy and as smooth in my life, because everybody just did whatever had to be done. There was no rank; there was no status. He might ask one person to do this today and tomorrow he'd ask somebody completely different to do the same thing, you know.

B: You mentioned in passing one intriguing thing. There was a time when you asked Lyndon Johnson for an assessment of Sam Rayburn's strengths and weaknesses.

H: Yes. I asked him what his shortcomings were?

B: Did he mention any others besides the one about the use of the staff?

H: Well, that was one. The other was that Rayburn's weakness was that he did not go out and anticipate future trouble. He handled a situation when it became troublesome. But he did not go out and anticipate something six months from now that might be a crisis. I think that's a very fair judgment of Rayburn. I think Rayburn's defense of it would have been that "you spend all your time trying to anticipate; 90 per cent of what you are worrying about is not going to come to pass. The main thing is to be able to handle the situation when it arises."

Well, this is the difference in temperament between people. Other people spent all their time worrying about Nigeria fifteen years from
now; Rayburn didn't live like that. He worried about [things when they happened]. Johnson told me one time he was down at the Board of Education having a drink with him, and he said, "Mr. Speaker, we've really got our tail in a crack now. That monkey's right on your back! It's right on your back, Mr. Speaker!" And Rayburn tinkled the ice in the glass and said, "Yup, that's right. Know what I'm going to do? First thing in the morning, I'm going to reach up and get that monkey and put him down!" And [LBJ] said he did.

Rayburn's idea about government, one of his ideas about government was that when things are moving all right, leave them alone, don't always be tinkering with an automobile that's running right. He liked Calvin Coolidge. He thought Calvin Coolidge was a pretty good president because things ran without much crisis atmosphere while Coolidge was president. He wouldn't have phrased it this way, but he himself was a social engineer, he was a legislative engineer. When you started having a knock in a part of the motor, he'd try to get the knock out of the motor; but he wanted as little controversy as possible. If you had to have it, then you had to have it. But you didn't go looking for it. And a lot of politicians create about half of their own worry, their own problems. They stir up trouble; they send out a questionnaire to all their constituents. "What do you think about this, that and the other?" It comes back and you have to make a decision. "Well, 40 per cent, Rayburn said, you're going to have at the minimum. Ignore the judgment of 40 per cent of the people that have answered, and they're going to be mad at you. You ask them what
to do, and then you didn't do it. Hell, I'd rather argue with them after I vote than before and after," he said. But many politicians don't do that, you know. They stir up mail. They try to get a lot of mail coming in. Rayburn, the less mail he got, the happier he was. If he didn't get any mail, that meant everybody was pretty content. But this was just part of his method of operating. He certainly knew that Johnson was quite a different operator.

B: I was just going to ask the reverse of my previous question. What would Sam Rayburn's estimate of Lyndon Johnson in those days have been?

H: Well, I think he thought he was probably one of the greatest legislative and political geniuses he'd ever known. And, particularly, Rayburn thought that the basis of success in life was not brilliance, but it was hard work. Certainly on that score Johnson was one of the hardest workers of anybody he'd ever seen in Washington, day and night. He was smart, he was a fine strategist normally, and he worked like the devil. He liked him, he admired him. He recognized him early for what he was—a man of enormous talent.

B: Did Rayburn see any weaknesses in Johnson?

H: Oh, he'd get irritated and I think the chief thing that he was probably critical about was Johnson's attitude toward the press, Johnson's extreme ultra-sensitivity to any criticism. And Rayburn just didn't—Johnson would read something that had ninety-nine nice things to say about him and one uncomplimentary thing and he'd just hit the ceiling about the one uncomplimentary thing. I read Rayburn
an article once out of the Progressive magazine, just raking the House leadership over the coals as being old and tired and ossified. I thought he ought to know it, know what was being said, and I read him this article. Ended up, he said, "That's a pretty good article; it's a little more favorable than unfavorable." He'd play for 51 per cent any day, but Lyndon Johnson wanted to have everything perfect, you know. But this was the difference of the temperament of the man. He'd say, "Those newspaper boys, they admire Lyndon Johnson; they want to help him, but he always goes in with his guard up against them."

B: Did Rayburn ever try to help Johnson with the press; that is, talk to reporters about "Don't worry when he gets mad at you" and so on?

H: Oh, I'm sure he did. I don't recall any specific instances. He wouldn't look up somebody; it wasn't his job. If somebody said something to him critical of Johnson, why, he'd undoubtedly try to straighten them out and say, "Now, what you don't see is this, that and the other." In the first place, he didn't go up in the press gallery. But he didn't go around trying to put out fires for Lyndon Johnson. As he used to say, "All these people are grown people. I believe in helping everybody, but I don't believe in coddling anybody. They're mature, grown people when they get here, and it's got to be their primary responsibilities as to how they get along." That would apply to Johnson; that would apply to his nephew; that would apply to his staff and everybody else. He wasn't always trying to pull the fat out of the fire for somebody else except that he wouldn't let anybody say something about anybody--Johnson or anybody else--that he thought
was untrue. He'd say, "You don't know what you're talking about," or "What you don't know is such-and-such."

That was one thing about him--if he was for a person it didn't make any difference. Justice [William] Douglas told me that when Tommy Corcoran left the White House, left the government, and started making money, Roosevelt got very furious with him, and so all the New Dealers started picking on Tommy. They'd all been running around kissing his foot for years before that when he was in power, but it became the vogue at all the cocktail parties here to run Tommy Corcoran down. Justice Douglas said he saw it time after time. Everybody in the place would be running Tommy Corcoran down. Mr. Rayburn would say, "Now, wait just a minute." And he said, "You know, people--the King says so and so, we'll mouth what the King says." He [Douglas] said, "That added more to my admiration of Rayburn than any other single thing, the fact that Tommy was out of favor and Rayburn stood up for him in the face of hostile crowds every time it came up."

B: That brings up an almost idle question. Did Rayburn make the social circuit much?

H: In his latter years, yes, after his eyes got so bad. He didn't particularly like it; he preferred to go out as little as possible. There are a lot of things you have to go to, especially the speaker. Every organization in your district has a national banquet here and you've got to go eat the damned sorry food and listen to the tiresome speeches. So you've got enough that's obligatory. So then there were a few people that he really enjoyed going to their homes, but he much
preferred to go home and listen to the radio or watch television or read. He loved to read. But later on, by the time I came to work for him, he was an old man by that time and he was going out more. There were more demands and he was lonesome. Fred Vinson, the chief justice, had been perhaps his closest friend. While Fred Vinson was alive, they tell me he'd go by two or three afternoons a week and have a drink and maybe stay for supper and spend an evening talking with Fred Vinson. Well, Vinson died, so that was a change. And so he went out more and more. Then in 1959 he lost the sight of one eye, and his other eye got so bad that he couldn't read and it was hard for him to watch television. So instead of sitting at home in the darkness, he got to where he'd go out nearly every night, but he liked to go home early. He just didn't care for the social circuit per se.

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview I
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interviews of D. B. Hardeman

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Maury Maverick, Jr., of San Antonio, Texas, Executor of the Estate of D. B. Hardeman, do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of personal interviews conducted on February 26, March 12 and April 22, 1969 at Washington, D.C., and on January 19, 1977 in San Antonio, Texas, and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

(2) The tape recordings shall be available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) Until May 15, 1998, the D. B. Hardeman Estate retains all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter, the copyright in both the transcripts and tape recordings shall pass to the United States Government. Until May 15, 1998, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts and tape recordings without express consent in each case.

(4) Copies of the transcripts and tape recordings may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcripts and tape recordings may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Donor Maury Maverick, Jr. as Executor only
Date May 11, 1988

Don W. Wilson
Archivist of the United States
Date May 26, 1988
INTERVIEW II

DATE: March 12, 1969

INTERVIEWEE: D. B. HARDEMAN

INTERVIEWER: T. H. Baker

PLACE: Mr. Hardeman's residence, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 1

B: Last time we were talking about Mr. Rayburn in Congress. During those years there, after you got with Mr. Rayburn from the late fifties on, did you see much of the relationship between Rayburn and Johnson?

H: Yes. Of course, I saw only a small part of it. Johnson would come over quite frequently to Rayburn's office. Rayburn would only very rarely go over to Johnson's office because Johnson didn't like to go over on the Senate side of the Capitol, furthermore the difference in ages and the father-son relationship. Johnson felt at home on the House side; he'd been a House member for many years, so it was more natural I think for him to come over to see Rayburn.

Rayburn had two suites of offices. He had what is known as the Speaker's rooms right off the House floor where a speaker normally sees most of his visitors. And then he has a suite of offices back in the center of the Capitol which we call the Speaker's office. Usually when Johnson came over during working hours, he would come over to the Speaker's office. Rayburn would come back to that office from the Speaker's rooms, oh, anywhere from three-thirty in the afternoon to see the mail that had come in that day. That back office, as we called it, or the Speaker's office, handled his congressional work
primarily. Johnson would drop by there and naturally go right in to see the Speaker and usually they would be there by themselves.

Johnson and Rayburn also talked over the telephone quite a bit, many times I thought on procedural matters, keeping each other abreast of some little development in their respective branches of the Congress. Then Johnson was a frequent visitor to the Board of Education at five-thirty or six o'clock in the afternoon.

B: Were there many other senators who came to the Board of Education?

H: Not many senators, my impression, because the Board of Education—I never did know whether I was supposed to go down every night or only on specific invitation, and I don't think anybody else was quite sure either. Rayburn left it vague. Tiger Teague told me once, "I've been baffled because every now and then he'll stop me and say, 'Why don't you come down and have a drink this afternoon?' and I try to always go if I can, but I don't know whether that meant I'm welcome every night." I felt the same way about it, so I made a rule of not going down unless he said so. I went down very little in 1957, 1958, more in 1959 and 1960 and 1961 quite a lot. I didn't want to go every night; I didn't want to be tied up till seven-thirty or eight every night. I was tired and I wanted to get home, so I wasn't too anxious to have an invitation to come every night. My impression was that Johnson was not there every night either, but many times he would drop by there and have his driver pick him up on the House side. He'd drop in at least to compare notes for thirty minutes or so.
So, the senators you asked about--Stuart Symington would come over from time to time, he and Mr. Rayburn were very close. I never saw him there, but I was under the impression that once in a while Mike Monroney would come. I thought Mike Monroney was probably the closest man in the Senate to Mr. Rayburn after Lyndon Johnson. I'm trying to think of other senators that were there. I would say not too many senators came over. From time to time Johnson might pick up somebody on the way and bring them over, say, "Come on. Let's go over and have a drink with the Speaker."

But the House and Senate were two separate worlds, and that's why it was so useful, I think, that Johnson and Rayburn had this working relationship. There probably was closer coordination between the House and the Senate in those years than there ever has been before or since.

B: That relationship is often called a father-son relationship. Is that precisely it? That implies that the son, Mr. Johnson, is deferring to the father, Mr. Rayburn.

H: Oh, well, proud, intelligent men, strong-minded men, while they always listen to other strong-minded men, that doesn't mean they defer to them.

B: That's what I was wondering if--

H: It depended on what it was.

B: If Mr. Rayburn and Mr. Johnson ever got into really knock-down drag-out arguments about policy or procedures or--
H: Oh, they differed, of course. They differed in their judgment of men. But they, I think, were more deferential to each other. Mr. Rayburn said to me one time, "I think I know exactly what is my business and exactly what is not my business." I've heard Lyndon Johnson ask him two or three times about something in the Senate, "What do you think I ought to do?" And Mr. Rayburn would say, "I don't know anything about that place over there; I'm not going to tell you what to do, because I don't know anything about that place."

On the other hand, something that had to do with the House, Johnson was quite likely to take Rayburn's judgment on it, not without challenge. If Johnson knew something that Rayburn didn't know, he'd say, "Well, Mr. Speaker, you just haven't talked to him," or "This man's changed on you," or something like that. But he had such respect for Rayburn's judgment as to what the House would do and would not do that he understood, too, that was Rayburn's business and not Johnson's business. And on the other hand, Rayburn understood that the Senate was Rayburn's business and not Johnson's business.

B: Did Johnson really understand the House? I've heard it said--

H: Oh, I think so, yes. He was in the Senate for twelve years, and he was in the House from 1937 to 1948, eleven years as a member and then he had all those years of service as a staff man. I think many times staff people, if they're the stripe of Johnson and move around a lot and listen and learn, may know more about the operation of the House overall than most congressmen ever learn because they tend to work on their districts and their committee, where an energetic staff man like
Johnson would know, as a staff man, a great deal about the operation of the whole House. I think his judgment in the House was good, but of course there were many, many new members coming in all the time in a body as large as the House that Johnson could have only the most casual acquaintance with if he knew them at all. But he had a lot of loyal friends from all over the country in the House all during those years. He worked at it. But it's next to impossible for a person to know four hundred and thirty-five members, especially if you're spending nearly all your time at the other end of the Capitol. But, as far as the techniques of the House are concerned, I think Johnson's very good. He proved that as president. He knew how to pull the levers in the House very, very well, I think. But, again, Johnson was normally smart enough not to substitute his judgement for the judgment of John McCormack or Sam Rayburn who were right on top of the situation.

B: Do you recall any specific legislative fights in those days to illustrate how Rayburn and Johnson worked together? I know that's a tall order. Skip it if it's too vague.

H: Well, I wish I knew the details of how they worked together on the first Civil Rights Bill in 1957. I don't know it, because I didn't go to work for Rayburn until July of 1957, and for some months after that, I knew very little about what he was doing on things of that nature. I am under the impression that Johnson was the one who decided that the time had come in the nation's life when there had to be a civil rights bill and that he, over a period of time, convinced
Rayburn of this fact. Rayburn did not want to agitate the issue, and he did not believe that you could find a legislative solution to it—that only time and prudence would work out a betterment of the situation. But this again I can't document.

But my impression is that there had been an unspoken agreement among the two parties, the leaders of the two parties, ever since Reconstruction days to let sleeping dogs lie. And some of the men, I know, feel that the man who broke the truce was Robert Brownell as attorney general. So when the Republicans started to make a political issue out of it, then that meant that both parties had to begin to take an interest in it. The results, of course, first was the Civil Rights Bill of 1957 and then the Civil Rights Bill of 1960. This I can't document, but this is what I think is the basic background of this.

Then I know that they—this again was before my time—had to work very closely on such things as the Tidelands Bill and the Natural Gas Bill, the Kerr Natural Gas Bill, the Harris Natural Gas Bill, although it would not be a matter of Johnson trying to line up votes for those bills in the House or Rayburn trying to line up Senate votes, but they would keep each other informed as to the outlook and the amendments that might be necessary to accept and so forth and so on. And on the second bill, on the Harris Natural Gas Bill, why, of course, an ad hoc lobbying organization was set up and John Connally was the head of that organization. Well, Rayburn had an extravagant, very high opinion of John Connally. He said he thought he had more natural ability
than any man of his age that he'd ever known. And they worked
together very easily, very closely; but probably more stormily, with
Johnson. Nevertheless he had the most complete entree at both ends of
the Capitol to those two men.

B: How close were those two to the Texas big money, the oil and gas
people--Rayburn and Johnson?

H: Oh, that's hard to say. Rayburn had some very close personal friends
among the so-called independents--Jim Abercrombie in Houston was very
close to him; J. R. Parten was a lifelong devoted friend, just
couldn't have a closer friend that J. R. Parten. Of course he knew
Sid Richardson and Clint Murchison. I never felt that there was any
warmth there; I had a feeling that Rayburn really didn't have great
admiration for Clint Murchison and that Richardson's super ego was an
obstacle in their relationship. He told me that Richardson said to
him one time, "I'm going to be remembered a hell of a lot longer than
you are, Sam, because I'm going to leave all my money to build boys
towns and things like that." And this irked Rayburn; he didn't
believe it. And he didn't think Richardson should be saying it any-
how. Rayburn's attitude--I can't speak about Johnson's attitude--I
suspect it paralleled Rayburn's. Rayburn felt that the many people in
the oil industry were greedy sons-of-bitches, and he used to say, and
he was thinking about the oil people I think among many others, that,
"I think I know a lot about human nature, but there's one thing I
never ceased to be surprised at--that the people who will gripe the
worstest and we help the mostest and made the richest hate us the
worst." The arrogance—he had a great dislike for arrogance. He liked pride, but he despised arrogance. And the arrogance of the big-spending oil man was personally offensive to him.

On the other hand, his feeling about such things as the natural gas bill and oil depletion and so forth were that there were certain national needs that had to be supported regardless of what you thought about the individuals that would profit from them. And also that there were certain things that were right and wrong, particularly on oil depletion. You could abolish oil depletion and the majors would get along all right, but since the independents, as he reasoned it, did most of the exploration, if they did not have the source of capital that came from oil depletion allowances and tangible drilling costs and so forth, before long they would be short of capital and they would be swallowed up by the majors and pretty soon you would have in effect a tightly held cartel controlling vital oil and gas resources in this country.

Furthermore you had in Texas hundreds of thousands of landowners who had a direct stake in the oil business through their leases, through some production. And then you had many people in Texas, workers all the way from roughnecks to the people in oil well supply houses, people in banks, so forth, who were dependent on the oil industry for a livelihood. And then the parochial interest that every member of Congress has that if an industry is important to your community, they have a right to expect you to present their point of view in the great debate in Congress. All of these things. But I
know that he felt that there were many actors in the oil and gas industry who were real sharks, rapacious, ungrateful sharks.

Harry Sinclair, Sinclair Petroleum Company, told me he put up a good part of the money in 1944 to try to beat him, and that he was having lunch out in California one time, 1948 I suppose it was, with Ed Pauley. He always liked Ed Pauley or defended Pauley at the time when Pauley was an anathema to many people. [He said] that Harry Sinclair came over to his table and said something to him about "Oh, I'm sorry that you had an opponent in 1944." G. C. Morris came very close to beating Mr. Rayburn. Mr. Rayburn said something to the effect, "You needn't be telling me that, when you put up most of the money against me." Sinclair said, "Oh, no, there's no truth in that. That's not true." And Rayburn said something about, "Well, it's hard for me to believe that you didn't know it, but if you don't know it, you check with your man in Texas and find out how much of your money he did spend in my district trying to beat me."

So this was an ambivalent attitude. The closeness was restricted to some individuals; as I say, Jim Abercrombie was one of them that he was very, very fond of and J. R. Parten certainly he was very fond of. At one time the Eisenhower Administration was toying with the idea of the Treasury revoking the tax exemption of the funds for the Republic, and Rayburn told Bob Anderson, the secretary of the treasury, with whom he was very, very close, "Now, Bob, you'd better think long and hard before you do that because you start this kind of business, there's going to be all sorts of organizations all the way across the
spectrum with just as good a case of cutting off their tax exemptions, and some mighty fine people like J. R. Parten [are] connected with the fund for the Republic." He said, "Now, my advice for you is to look this one over very, very carefully." And they didn't revoke the--

B: I was going to say, that kind of advice from Mr. Sam might have carried a lot of weight.

H: Well, of course, if you can do it, you can do the same thing to the John Birch Society. And Bob was a wise enough man to understand this was a real Pandora's box. He persuaded me that he felt that the national security alone justified the oil depletion allowance, but that he was just sorry that some of the major beneficiaries of the oil depletion allowance were people that he didn't have a very high regard for and were certainly not grateful politically or personally.

Now, on the natural gas bill, that was a different thing. I thought Rayburn sincerely believed that Congress did not intend at the time of the passage of the Natural Gas Act to give the Federal Power Commission the right to control the price at the wellhead. The Supreme Court said the language of the bill gave that power to the Federal Power Commission. But Rayburn persuaded me that whatever was wise or unwise, the Congress never intended that power to be in the hands of the Federal Power Commission. And that's what these natural gas bills were all about, was trying to reaffirm the congressional intent in the way that Congress intended it. I don't know when that act passed, 1935, 1938, back in the New Deal days. And Rayburn, of course, his committee had jurisdiction over interstate movements of
oil and gas. So I can only say that if he believed that was not the intent of Congress, I would have to bow to that because he appointed the subcommittee that investigated the interstate movements of oil and gas, the famous Cole Subcommittee and so forth. He certainly knew what he intended at the time, because he had an almost perfect memory, an almost total recall type of memory. But his closeness to the oil and gas industry, his personal closeness in my opinion, was restricted to specific individuals that he would have been close to had they been in the shoe business.

B: I believe you said last time you got closely involved in the Landrum-Griffin Labor Reform Bill.

H: Yes, that's right. This bill quickly became very controversial. The excesses of labor and the racketeering in labor, primarily stemming from the Teamsters Union but not restricted to the Teamsters including, I think, some of the bakery officials who were indicted and convicted and the president of Carpenters Union was convicted. They were playing fast and loose with union funds, and some of the unions were doing all sorts of things. And the McClellan Committee had been investigating. Then of course Dave Beck was president of the Teamsters Union, and he went to jail; and then the Hoffa incidents. The nation just turned very much against labor unions, which had been out of bounds with a lot of their practices. So this became quite a burning issue. They had first the Kennedy-Ives Bill; Jack Kennedy and Irving Ives of New York had this bill which was a rather moderate effort to correct some of the abuses in labor.
At that time, the House Committee on Education and Labor had a chairman, Graham Barden of North Carolina, who was very anti-labor and a very temperamental man, difficult to work with. Most people found him very difficult to work with. So this bill in 1958 did not pass. But my recollection is Rayburn held it on his desk without referring it to Education and Labor Committee because he felt that the committee would turn it into a strong anti-labor bill. So he held it on his desk without referring it. I heard one man say, "I know how long Noah was in the Ark; he was in the Ark forty days and forty nights, because Sam Rayburn held that bill on his desk for forty-one days." And this was an exercise of the power of the Speaker which was quite unusual. But it's the power—as I interpret the rules, there's no way to make a Speaker refer a bill except by the vote of the House, and the House wasn't about to vote and tell you, "Speaker, you've got to go ahead and refer that bill."

So then he called this up for a vote in order to make a record for the 1958 election. Then after the 1958 election the House leadership was able to put a lot of people who were moderate or friendly to labor on the Education and Labor Committees and take control of it away from Barden, and it was a much more moderate committee from the point of view of the unions. But the tempo of anti-union activity had increased so much over the country that this became the issue of 1959 and resulted in a furor in a campaign which, in my opinion, was the second most ferocious lobbying campaign in the history of the Congress, exceeded only by the public utility holding company fight in
1935. Old-timers told me at the time that the pressures exerted and cruel heat turned on by both sides in the Griffin-Landrum fight was much in excess of that generated over Taft-Hartley.

B: I guess I didn't realize that. That kind of pressure tried to be applied to Mr. Rayburn, too?

H: Well, yes, surely, from his district. Because he had some very strongly anti-union manufacturers in his district. I don't think they were able to have much influence on him because by and large those were the people that had never been noted for loyalty to him or the Democratic Party either. So many of them were the wrong people who have any--he had to respect them as any man has to respect even his political enemies, but they were not people for whose opinions he had such a high regard anyhow. But he always on labor matters as on many other matters had two hats to wear. He had the pressures from his district and the political problem in his district, but then he always had to remember that he was one of the major factors in the national Democratic Party. But over and above that on labor relations, I think he understood the excesses of labor very well in a general way. Nevertheless in this eternal struggle between labor and management, what he was trying to find always was a fair middle-of-the-road plan with which both of them could live. He didn't believe the government should throw all of its weight on the side of either labor or management, but it ought to try to curb the abuses and excesses of both management and labor and this is what he tried to do.
B: The bill, as it finally ended up, did contain some things that labor liked. I think generally labor, at least publicly, disapproved of the bill, but there were features in it that labor itself wanted. Was that the kind of compromise that Rayburn would work out?

H: Well, of course, when you get in one of these fights, both sides get frozen into ridiculous positions. In order to appease their members, they in public can't take a reasonable position or accept a reasonable compromise. Just as labor talked about the Taft-Hartley Act as the slave labor act; well, of course, it wasn't. The proof of it is that we've had it on the books now for twenty-two years and there's never been a major amendment of the act. It's worked, not perfectly, but it hasn't ruined labor and it hasn't freed management from the bothers of the union movement.

But the Griffin-Landrum Bill, the real fight, the two major fights there--one was the fight on the bill in the House originally; Rayburn and his forces working for a less severe bill were able to get what was known as a committee version--a committee bill, the Elliott Bill--out of the Education and Labor Committee to the House floor. Then Landrum and Griffin had their bill to offer as a substitute. And the heat generated was so intense that on the House floor this substitute, this anti-labor bill which its opponents charged was drafted by the NAM and so forth and so on, was adopted on the House floor. Then the Senate passed, or maybe it had already passed, a much less restricted bill. It went to conference committee and the conference was on the verge of of breaking up, day after day and week after week,
and did stay together long enough to bring in a bill that was, I thought, in the end a pretty fair bill with respect to both management and labor. The main thing labor did not get in this was when they called the situs picketing provision, that involves the construction unions. And they didn't get that, they haven't gotten it yet. It's a complicated thing, but this was something that apparently both the contractors and the construction unions, craft unions, were agreed on, yet they've never been able to get it on the books. And it has been ten years since Griffin-Landrum. Griffin-Landrum didn't pass, but the conference committee compromise on the Griffin-Landrum versus the more moderate bills did pass.

B: Did you see anything of Mr. Johnson's involvement in all of that?

H: No, I didn't. There was gossip around the House that Johnson had complicated the factor by telling friends like Frank Ikard and Homer Thornberry that they would probably be defeated if they voted against the Griffin-Landrum Bill. Johnson was not for the Griffin-Landrum Bill, I was convinced, but whether he ever said anything like that to them I have no way of knowing. But there were whispers around there that maybe he added to their decision to vote for the Griffin-Landrum Bill and against Rayburn's position, but I never did see it.

B: About the same time, too, was this business of the Democratic Advisory Council that the national party tried to put into effect. Did you see Rayburn's and Mr. Johnson's reaction to it?

H: Yes, their reactions were not secret at all, very public. When your candidate for the presidency has lost, from the beginning of our
political parties there has always been the question of who speaks for the party outside the White House. And the situation has never been resolved satisfactorily. I saw Hubert Humphrey on television the other day, and he said that, "I suppose there is no such thing as a titular head of a party when it has lost the presidential election."

And yet the people who are the warmest in support of the defeated presidential candidate traditionally think that he should be the spokesman of the party. Those who are still in office or those who are in the highest elected office that their party holds in the Congress will never buy that. For example, Barry Goldwater had no voice as a titular head of his party after he was defeated. The Stevenson people felt that Stevenson—and a group of people, close friends of his, felt much as he did—should be the voice of the party, they should enunciate party policy. Well, Rayburn as speaker and Johnson as majority leader took the position that "we are the highest public officials that our party now has in office, and while we are not going to try to be the voice of the party, we are not going to let somebody else arrogate unto themselves the right to set the policies of the party. What policies are going to be written for the party are going to be written in the record that the party makes in the Congress when you're out of power. And so Paul Butler came forward at the urging of many of these people with the Democratic Advisory Council.

B: Was it his idea?

H: I have no idea. I imagine it was something that came out of many conversations over a drink and, "What do we do to pick up the pieces
now? We've suffered a major defeat. How do we keep policies in front of the people that eventually they will buy? How do we gain the White House in 1956? 1960?"

B: It also involved the kind of policies that those people behind the Advisory Council who were on the liberal wing--

H: Well, primarily in the Stevenson wing of the party, not exclusively. I don't remember the details of the original proposal, but it included a number of members of Congress, including both Rayburn and Johnson, I believe initially, and then some people of various shades of opinion in the Congress. But it was the liberal wing of the party, there's no question about it. But many of those people were people who had not held political office, who had never held a political office, and in the opinion of old pros like Rayburn and Johnson, it was nonsense! These people could make all the speeches they wanted to and have all the meetings they wanted to, but to try to draw around themselves the cloak of spokesmen simply wouldn't be tolerated. So again I don't know about this from personal experience, but I assumed and everybody says that Rayburn and Johnson contacted the members of Congress who had been invited to serve and persuaded all of them not to serve. Well, that, of course, shot the idea down for all practical effects. They had meetings and they had a small staff, a small paid staff. Charlie Tyroler was executive secretary and so forth and so on, but it never did in my opinion amount to anything. Rayburn and Johnson always--I'll speak about Rayburn, I don't know about Johnson, but my impression is he felt the same way which was that the record we take
to the people for the next election is the record that the Democrats
write in Congress. That's what we're going to have to run on. It's
not on what somebody said in a speech, some ex-officeholder or some
person who never held office. That's not what we're going to be
offering the American people. We're going to be offering the American
people. We're going to be offering the American people the record
written in votes in Congress.

So this was just an honest difference of opinion between people
all of whom wanted the success of the Democratic Party as to the
wisest way to proceed. Both Rayburn and Johnson, I assume, of course
were prejudiced in favor of officeholders. They felt there was a
great difference between what a person can say, what a person will say
as a private citizen, and what he will say and what he will do if he
had the responsibility of having to get elected to office.

B: When in this time did you first hear anybody start talking about
Lyndon Johnson for president?

H: Well, I think that everybody that ever knew Johnson felt that cer-
tainly his ambition or his dream was that some day he'd be president
of the United States, but the odds were very much against him as they
had been against Rayburn, for all the reasons that you know--location,
votes, and so forth. I did not see any evidence of a serious Johnson
effort after he made his effort in 1956 until, I'm not sure, I suppose
1959. Johnson had become a really truly national figure by that time
from his operation in the Senate. An enormous amount of very favor-
able publicity and exposure, accomplishment. So it was quite natural
with all the people speculating privately and in columns and "Meet the Press" and so forth that Johnson would be certainly a man that the party would look at. I couldn't pinpoint the date without going back and checking it. I'd say early 1959.

B: Did you ever hear Rayburn comment specifically on the possibility of Johnson getting the nomination?

H: Yes. Again, I can't give you specific dates. He thought Johnson was by far the ablest man we had. And I remember arguing with him once; I argued that Johnson could not be nominated for president and that if nominated, he couldn't be elected. This was along in 1959, I guess, early 1960, and Rayburn said, "Well, you just don't know what you're talking about! There are just millions of Republicans that don't want to vote for Richard Nixon, but they're not going to vote for Jack Kennedy; they're not going to vote for Hubert Humphrey; they're not going to vote for Adlai Stevenson. They're going to vote for Nixon in preference to these other fellows. But they will cross over and they'll vote for Lyndon Johnson, and if we had sense enough to nominate him, why, he would beat Nixon, in my honest political judgment. He'd defeat Nixon. But the problem is the nomination."

He also said at that time--this is off the subject--that if the Republicans had sense enough, which he didn't think they had, to nominate Bob Anderson for president, he'd beat any Democrat.

B: I remember the talk at the time--"Anderson for President."

H: He loved Bob Anderson, not only for his ability and his brilliance, but his very high character. Bob Anderson, when he decided to leave
the Democratic Party and support Eisenhower in 1952, he made a special trip to Bonham to tell Mr. Rayburn what he had decided and why he had decided it. He came out of rock-ribbed Democratic family, his father was a brass collar Democrat. Even after Bob left the party he was very critical of his son becoming a Republican, but Bob said that he felt the country needed a change. Now, this is of course all third-hand, but he believed Eisenhower was a unifying force and he believed the fiscal policies of the country would be better served by a Republican in the White House and that reluctantly but firmly he had come to the opinion that he had in all good conscientiousness to support Eisenhower. Mr. Rayburn thought that was the manly way to handle it instead of having been a Democrat all these years that Shivers had and then suddenly turn up in the Republican camp. He didn't appreciate that. But he thought Bob handled it in a very manly, honorable way. And he said he told him, "Well, of course this disturbs me greatly, but I know it's an honest decision on your part and I think you for your frankness in discussing it with me and giving me your reasons. A man has to follow his own conscience."

B: Did Mr. Rayburn distrust or dislike or fear Nixon?

H: Well, of course, his antipathy to Nixon came from Nixon's service in the House. Rayburn was very unhappy with and felt very deeply about the charges made by the Republicans and some Democrats that Truman was soft on communism. He believed that was a complete lie, was a political lie, and the Un-American Activities Committee had been a thorn in his side for years. And Rayburn put a lot of stock in his own
capacity to judge men just by looking at them and talking to them. At one time somebody said to him--he said something about a man's face, he didn't trust that man because of his face--"Well, a man's not responsible for how he looks, Mr. Speaker." And he shot back and said, "Every man is responsible for his face after he's forty years of age." He thought he could read a man's character very well by watching him, looking at him. He said many times that Nixon had the cruelest face he'd ever looked into. And when he left the House, he said to people, "Well, good riddance! I hope he never darkens the door of the House again!" He thought he would go over to the Senate and be forgotten; he ended up as candidate for president. He felt that Nixon was very reckless and unscrupulous in some of his campaign speeches, as other Republicans like Sherman Adams were in charging by innuendo, not in so many words, the Democrats with twenty years of treason. This was the unforgivable in politics. Fight a man as hard as you want to, but you don't question his loyalty to his country. And Rayburn met this issue head-on the second and last time he talked to the National Press Club. This is a matter of record; the transcript is available on his appearance over at the National Press Club.

It went something like this: after the formal presentation of the speaker, then the reporters write out anonymous questions and send them up to the president of the Press Club and he selects the ones that he wants and asks the speaker to answer them. Somebody had said, "What can you tell us about your personal relations with Richard Nixon?" A rather mildly worded question along that line. And he
said, "Well, there has been a lot of talk, irresponsible talk, going around all over this town about how I hate Richard Nixon. Now, I don't hate anybody! I don't have time enough in life to love all the people that I ought to love, much less be spending time hating people, so I don't hate anybody. But there a few that I loathe!" And so he said, "Mr. Nixon said what I consider to be some very harsh and unfair things about the party of treason and so forth in political campaigns, but I think we took him to the woodshed in 1954 and gave him a pretty good treatment; I don't think he'll be saying those things anymore." Now, this is all a matter of transcript available on all this. So he met this issue head-on.

Then I was told by a man that allegedly Nixon had told this to, on the other side of the coin Rayburn and Nixon sat by each other for about four hours as they counted the electoral votes in 1961. And then it was Nixon's constitutional duty to announce the results of the election. So he and Rayburn sat up there during that very boring procedure all afternoon, chatting with each other. I never did ask Rayburn about this, I don't guess I knew about it before he died, but somebody told me that Nixon said as he got up to leave, he had adjourned the session, he almost fainted. Rayburn reached over and patted him on the shoulder and said, "Dick, we're going to miss you around here." Now, I don't know whether that's true or not. That's a story. But he felt that these charges of a whole party being treasonable or soft on the security of this country were beyond the pale of legitimate political tactics.
B: Back in 1960 there, a lot of people have said that the campaign to get the nomination for Lyndon Johnson, if indeed that's what it was, was just not a very good one, that Mr. Johnson or somebody just didn't understand the nature of convention politics, relied too heavily on congressional support, and just got beat way before the convention started by the Kennedy group.

H: Well, a losing ball team always looks bad. A winning ball team buries its mistakes. I think that's true. I never did believe there was a chance for Johnson to be the presidential nominee in 1960; I didn't think that was in the cards. Second, Kennedy's strategy was set very early and, in retrospect, very wisely. Ted Sorensen told me in 1958, I think, that their strategy was simply the Roosevelt strategy of 1932 and that was to start so fast and go so hard that they would be way out in front at an early date. And I said, "Well, there's always the danger of a front-runner being shot at by everybody." He said, "Yes, there is. And our strategy is to be so far in advance that although they're shooting at us, they can't hit us." That's exactly what happened. He had an exceptionally able team; they had unlimited resources which they were willing to spend; they had a very attractive and able candidate.

And Johnson was in a box. He was the majority leader of the Senate, and there were about a half dozen senators who wanted to be nominated. They were naturally jealous. They were not about to promote Johnson's candidacy in any way. So Johnson, if he aroused the jealousy of these competitors for the nomination too greatly, they
might ruin his leadership in the Senate and make him fall on his face as majority leader, which would eliminate him from the race. Furthermore, the party would not have the record that he thought they ought to have made in Congress in order to run a winning campaign in 1960. He was in a terrible bind. Now, my own opinion is that it was not in the cards in 1960 for him to be nominated. If he had been free like Jack Kennedy to forget the Senate and just campaign--I don't think the time was right, I don't think a Texan could have been nominated, I don't think Lyndon Johnson could have been nominated if these other things hadn't been present. I do think that, quite understandably, Johnson relied, as any politician must rely, on the people that he knows, and those were the senators and congressmen. I think also that being new to national politics, convention politics, that he did perhaps overestimate in one state and another the power of ex-senators or present senators to deliver. It's sort of a myth, I've always thought, that members of Congress have very much influence normally in a state in the selection of convention delegates. They have the prestige and they have the office, but when it comes to selecting delegates, your local politicians and your state officials many times take the position that, "Well, now, that senator and that congressman, they got theirs. Now let them stay out of this. This is ours!" But even with that, he could not, in my judgment, have overtaken Kennedy.

B: Curious that Mr. Rayburn and Mr. Johnson did not realize the difference between congressional politics and convention politics.
H: Well, no, I don't think so. They were skilled in one and they were amateurs in the other. Rayburn understood handling a convention after it met, but Rayburn had never been out in a nationwide campaign rounding up delegates for anybody.

B: How active was Mr. Rayburn in the pre-convention strategy for Johnson?

H: I thought only to the extent when people would come in from out in one of the states and all, he would put in a plug for Johnson to try to help him and so forth. But he did make some trips. He went to Detroit and it seems to me to a midwest meeting. He went to Albuquerque I think to a New Mexico state meeting. He did some traveling for Johnson in key spots to try to assist Johnson, but again he was not able to take off too much time either. I think he did everything that was asked of him along that line, but Rayburn had never managed a campaign in his life, including his own. You have a different cast of characters at a convention. There are many men at conventions, in those days certainly, that maybe had never been to one of these hundred dollar dinners, or maybe they had met Rayburn or Johnson when he spoke out at Laramie, Wyoming or something, but it would have been a casual relationship.

Then one of the things in the West and other places besides the West, Pennsylvania for example, I think everybody underestimated the power of Catholics in party machinery in different states. But there were many Catholics who had gone West who, as their forebears had found, politics was a way to climb rapidly. And the Democratic Party in place after place, the local leaders or the state leaders were
Catholics who very much felt the desire to break the myth about a Catholic being president of the United States, which was of great assistance to Kennedy. But never underestimate the attractiveness of Jack Kennedy as a candidate. He was a most attractive, decent, able man. If his name had been Jones and he'd had no money and he had been a Seventh Day Adventist, he still would have been a formidable contender, in my opinion. He was a very attractive man.

B: You went to the convention in Los Angeles in 1960. Can you trace the story of what you saw and did there?

H: Oh, that's such a minor little facet. There are five hundred and fifty-five official versions already, and none of them saw more than one little facet of the operation.

B: We're kind of hoping that some day someone would put all these like this one here together and get a version out of it.

H: Well, there will probably eventually emerge a semi-official version, just as there's a semi-official version of the smoke-filled room in the Blackstone Hotel that selected Warren G. Harding. But there are lots of loose ends there, if you go back and look at it. I don't think you'll ever have it all together.

Well, of course, Rayburn nominated Johnson. He was out there and he was meeting with people. A constant stream of people coming to his suite, or he was phoning people and doing everything that he could do to try to win over delegates for Lyndon Johnson. Once Lyndon Johnson had made his decision to enter, Rayburn of course approved of it and
did everything that was humanly possible on it. And he convinced me that he really felt that Johnson was the strongest candidate that the Democrats had because of the fact that he felt that there were millions of Republicans who didn't want Richard Nixon, but wouldn't vote for any other potential Democratic nominee. But he nominated Lyndon Johnson. He told me to prepare the elements of the nominating speech, which I did, and which he went over. And he told me what main points he wanted in it. I tried to put those in language and went back to him time after time and he would revise and insert something else and so forth and so on. Then he had me take the speech to Senator Johnson and go over it with him and Johnson approved it, I believe, without change of a word. So then this was mimeographed and distributed to the press. Then, of course, Rayburn couldn't read a speech by that time. One eye was out and the other eye he couldn't read with, so he gave what was a much better speech, a complete ad-libbed speech at the convention. But we released the formal speech. So there are two nominating speeches: one that the press carried initially and the other one that was actually delivered. Then he was on the floor of the convention all the time, you know, seeing people, advising, and conferring with people during that period.

Then Kennedy was nominated and that night we went back to the Rayburn suite and he did something I saw him do only two or three times—that is, to take a drink after dinner. He never wanted to have a drink after supper except on the rarest occasions. I don't remember who was in the suite that night. I think that J. T. Rutherford, the
congressman from the El Paso district; probably Frank Ikard and Homer Thornberry; John Holton was there, I think—I'm sure he was there; Nick Kotz of the *Des Moines Register Tribune* was there; probably others—I just paid no attention to it.

But I have no recollection at that meeting which was just to have a nightcap. I know I went to bed that night absolutely convinced that the nominee for vice president was going to Stuart Symington. In my mind there wasn't any question about it from the conversations that had taken place. I do not recall any mention by anybody at that post-morten that night of the possibility of Johnson being the nominee.

B: Before you go any further, had Mr. Rayburn ever said anything about who might be the vice presidential candidate if Johnson had gotten the presidential nomination?

H: I don't recall if he did. I just don't recall the subject ever coming up. Oh, I'm sure he had speculated with a lot of people from time to time, but the nominee is entitled to his own choice. And I don't recall it ever coming up.

B: Anyway, you went to bed that night certain it was not going to be Johnson, probable that it would be Symington.

H: That's right. Then one of Mr. Symington's campaign leaders from his district came into the one where Nick Kotz and myself were staying. He's now the correspondent for the *Des Moines Register* here. At that time he was covering either the county courthouse or the statehouse in Des Moines for the *Register*. He's a very close friend of mine, so I invited him to go out with me with the understanding that he was there
as my friend and not as a reporter and would not write anything about the convention. So he had complete access to wander in and out just for the experience of watching a convention.

So this fellow came in and we couldn't get him into a taxi until about six o'clock in the morning. So we went to bed, thoroughly exhausted. About twelve-thirty there was a banging on the door and it was Hale Boggs and with him was Ed Foley, who was the under secretary of the treasury in the Truman Administration. Hale said, "Where's the Old Man? Where's the Old Man?" I said, "I don't know where he is; I haven't seen him today." He said, "I've got to see him right now." I was irritated, I said, "What's eating you?" And he said, "Well, Jack has offered Lyndon the vice presidential nomination and the Speaker has got to see to it that he takes it." I said, "Oh, you don't know what you're talking about! Stuart Symington has been chosen," or something. He said, "Oh, that was last night. Jack has made the offer, and I've got to see the Speaker and make sure that he--we've got to get Lyndon on the ticket to win." And I said, "Oh, I know where he is. Every convention the delegates from the congressional district have a breakfast; he's over at the Fourth District breakfast." Hale said, "The hell he is! He's not at any breakfast. Do you know what time it is?" I said, "No." He said, "It's twelve-thirty." This was twelve-thirty noon. And I said, "Well, I don't know. Go down to his suite and see if he's in there."

So, meantime, a couple of friends of mine from U.S. News banged on the door, and they of course got the story. So they came in and we
were still in our shorts, just lounging around on the bed. They stayed, it seems to me, like an hour, just speculating and talking. And I still didn't know anything about it, you see.

So we got dressed and were starving to death, so we didn't even go to the Rayburn suite; we went downstairs and had some scrambled eggs or something. Came back up to the suite and I suppose it was 2:30 by that time. And of course there was great confusion at this stage of the game, milling around, and nobody knew what was going on. The phone rang and my recollection is that I answered the phone, and he said, "This is Dave Lawrence. Is Sam there?" I said, "Oh, yes, Governor, he's right here." So I called the Speaker over, and the Speaker talked to him. Lawrence said to him, "You going to be there a little bit?" You see, the convention was meeting because of the time difference—I think five-thirty in the afternoon and this was, my recollection is, about a quarter to four. And said, "I want to come up there and get you to help me on some facts and things for my speech." The Speaker said, "Has that got to do with Lyndon?" And he said, "Yes, they told me to get a speech ready to nominate him, and a lot of facts I don't have. I need to come up and talk to you." Mr. Rayburn said, "Well, is that thing all set?" And Lawrence said, "I don't know. They just told me to get a speech ready."

So at a quarter to four, or some time thereabout, apparently Rayburn did not know whether the situation had jelled and that Johnson would be the Kennedy choice. And then whatever the record shows, I
think it was about four o'clock, Kennedy came on television and told the world that Johnson was his choice.

So Lawrence arrived with his executive secretary to write the speech. And so two researchers, William C. Gibbens, who is now head of the Political Science Department at Texas A&M and was working on the Democratic Policy Committee under Johnson, and Dan McCrary, who was then a Congressional Fellow in Johnson's office who now works for Business Week here in town, they were the research fellows and they had the Johnson-cyclopedia, which was a loose-leaf notebook I'm told of everything Johnson had ever said and the facts and figures and all. So I went and tried to find them. And I found Dan McCrary, brought him back. And Dan McCrary and this executive assistant of Governor Lawrence found a typewriter and they used the room Nick Kotz and myself had and worked on a speech for Lawrence. Then they told me later they rushed around and located Lawrence and read it to him and he approved it, but Lawrence had bad eyesight, so then they had to find an oversized typewriter and retype it so he could see to read it.

By this time the clock was running and it was time for the convention. In the meantime Price Daniel said to me--his suite was adjoining Mr. Rayburn's and I had known Price for many years--Price said to me out in the hall, "You know, we've got to get some seconding speeches lined up, and I'll bet nobody's tending to that. Go down there and see Lyndon and ask him who he wants for seconding speeches. I think I ought to make one; I think Governor [James] Almond of Virginia ought to make one, and Bill Dawson ought to make one from
Chicago, and I don't know--Governor [John] Hickey of Wyoming ought to make one. Go down and get his suggestions."

So I went down and the Johnson suite was in complete uproar, but he was sitting in a chair. He was obviously tired. And I knelt down beside the chair and told him what Price Daniel had said. So he said, "That's right. You ought to have this one and you ought to have that one," and he said, "Whoever Price thinks we ought to have. I've got to go to convention; I won't know what's going on until they get up to speak. I won't know who's going to speak. Tell Price to go on and handle this and get it lined up." So I went back and reported that to Price Daniel. That's about what I personally saw.

B: Did you ever hear any talk afterward around this question of was Johnson at first reluctant to take it, or was Rayburn reluctant to have him take the offer, and if his mind needed changing, how it came about?

H: Oh, yes, I've heard different participants. This is all third-hand as far as I'm concerned. President Johnson said that the first person to mention to him the possibility of the vice presidency was Price Daniel. He said to him after the Kennedy nomination, "If that boy's half as smart as I think he is, he's going to offer you the vice presidential nomination and you've got to take it." Johnson said he told Price, "That's ridiculous; we've had too many harsh words out here and too much feeling; he'll never do that." Price said, "Well, if he's as smart as I think he is, he's going to do it." Then he mentioned it to Will Wilson, who had been our attorney general, and
Will said, "I hadn't thought of it, but it makes perfect political sense." So then he said he called Rayburn, apparently that night, at what time I don't know.

B: This is Daniel?

H: No, no. Johnson called Rayburn and told him what Daniel and Wilson had said. And Rayburn flared up and said, "Now, don't you do any damned fool thing. Don't you even think about anything until we talk it over," or--I don't know the exact words, but something to that effect.

So then according to Johnson's story, after Kennedy came to see him and made the offer which Johnson left open-ended, he said, "One thing you're going to have to do it persuade Sam Rayburn. He's definitely opposed to anything like this." He called Rayburn and told him that he thought he'd be hearing from Kennedy pretty soon. Well, Rayburn had gone to this--but I'm getting ahead of the story. Rayburn got up the next morning and went to this breakfast. John Holden went with him. They got back from the breakfast, John told me that he was not sure when, he thought some time maybe a little bit before noon. And when they got to the Rayburn suite. Rayburn looked down the hall and saw all these journalists down at Johnson's suite and he said, "What's going on down there? Oh, I bet I know what this is!" So apparently right after he got back to the suite, he got this call from Johnson.

Well, in the meantime, Hale Boggs and Tommy Corcoran were apparently about the first ones there to see Rayburn. Tommy Corcoran
had been walking the halls all that week and God knows how many weeks before—I don't know—pushing the idea of a Kennedy-Johnson or Johnson-Kennedy ticket. And he had many arguments for it either way. So he was talking to Rayburn. Then Hale Boggs went from our room down there; he and Ed Foley went down there. Hale said that they finally eased Tommy out of the room, and he and Foley got to talking to Mr. Rayburn, telling him, "Lyndon has got to accept this. It's the only way we can keep Nixon from being elected. Lyndon has got to take it!" and so forth. Then Ed Foley left the room and Hale kept on arguing with Mr. Rayburn. And Mr. Rayburn in the meantime had gotten a call from Kennedy, saying, "I want to come to see you." Mr. Rayburn said, "No, I'll come see you." Said, "No, I'm just above you. I'll be down there in a few minutes. I want to talk to you." And Kennedy didn't show up. So Mr. Rayburn said to Hale, "Go up there and see if that boy's coming down here."

So Hale went upstairs and here were the people raising hell about the offer to Johnson; Soapy [Mennen] Williams and Joe Rauh and Walter Reuther and I don't know who all was up there. They were raising hell with—arguing with Kennedy. So Hale said he said to him, "He's down there waiting; you can't keep him waiting. Now let's go down there." So they went out a back door and went down the fire stairs to the Rayburn suite. Kenny O'Donnell and Jack Kennedy and Hale Boggs. They got there and Kennedy said, "Shall we all talk?" And Hale said, "No, why don't you let Kenny and myself get better acquainted and the two of you talk?"
So he went in and talked to Mr. Rayburn alone. And Mr. Rayburn's version of the conversation was that he said to Kennedy, "Now, Jack, in the first place I want to say to you that Lyndon and myself don't want anything; we're not running for anything; we're not looking for anything." Meanwhile, while he was waiting for Hale to report on Kennedy, he said to John Holton, "John, I want to get off by myself and think a little bit." There wasn't any place to put him but in John's room which was down beyond ours. We couldn't get interlocking rooms. So John left him in his bedroom and said he didn't know how long he stayed there, maybe twenty minutes, and then came back to his suite.

Kennedy was talking to him and [Rayburn] said, "Now, Jack, as I think you know, I've been dead set opposed to this whole idea since I heard of it, but I've done some hard thinking about it and if you tell me... In the first place," he said, "whoever you select, you be prepared to see to it that that convention nominates him and doesn't cut him up in the process." And he said, "Furthermore, Lyndon is a very active man and he likes to be doing things and the vice presidency is a terrible place for a man to be who's active and energetic. I don't think he ought to take it if he's just going to sit there as vice president. I've been opposed to this, but I want you to understand that we're not looking for anything and not wanting anything. But if you tell me that you're willing to tell the world he's your choice and you're willing to do whatever is necessary to get him nominated by that convention and if you tell me that you'll use him
every place that you can, on the National Security Council or any other thing that you can give him to do, and if you tell me that you don't think you can win this election without him on the ticket, then I'll withdraw whatever objections I've had to his taking it." And Kennedy said, "I tell you all those things." And Fred said that was it.

So then what went on that afternoon, I've told you what little I know about it, but at some place, which I now think was when Rayburn and Holton went down to Johnson's suite, Rayburn said to Mary Margaret Wiley something about, "Whose bedroom is this?" And she said, "This is mine." He said, "We want to use it." So they went in there.

Bobby Kennedy had arrived, so they went in apparently there and the two of them talked. Mr. Rayburn's version of it was that Bobby Kennedy said to him, "Things are just coming all to pieces up there. These people are upstairs there with Jack and they're raising hell about Lyndon being on the ticket, and they're saying that they won't contribute to the campaign and that they'll sit on their hands and they won't work if he's on the ticket. It's just awful. I don't know what's going to happen." Mr. Rayburn said Bobby's hair was hanging down in his face. He said, "Well, now, listen, Bobby, I want to say this to you. Lyndon and myself are not talking to but one man, and that's your brother." He said, "I'll tell you what I told your brother," and he repeated his conversation with Jack Kennedy. And he said Bobby Kennedy sort of straightened up and slapped his leg and said, "Well, that's it. I'm going back and tell Jack it has got to be
Lyndon." Now, that's Rayburn's version of the Kennedy conversation. And as near as I've been able to pinpoint it, it took place down in the Johnson suite. But this is all third-hand.

B: That visit from Robert Kennedy is apparently the source of the allegation or the rumor that the Kennedy camp was trying to back-pedal or some of the Kennedy people weren't--

H: I've always felt Bobby was trying to back-pedal, that Bobby didn't want him on the ticket, which lends credence to the theory that Jack Kennedy had decided on Johnson and hadn't even told Bobby about it. Maybe he'd made up his mind sometime before the convention that he had to have Johnson, but probably knowing how Bobby felt about Johnson--Bobby did not have the urbaneness that Jack Kennedy had about personal attacks and so forth, Bobby was younger, Bobby just did not have the urbanity of his brother, so he undoubtedly deeply resented the attacks that had been made during the campaign. Jack Kennedy could overlook them. Jack Kennedy was the candidate, Jack Kennedy was a broader-gauged man, and so perhaps he knew how deeply Bobby felt and rather than argue with Bobby, he wouldn't even tell his brother, his closest friend, what he decided. And Bobby probably genuinely was fearful of labor and the liberals boycotting the campaign, you know, it was quite a legitimate fear. So whether Jack Kennedy sent Bobby down there or whether he even knew that Bobby was there, I doubt. I'll never know, but I rather doubt that Bobby was there in behalf of anybody but himself. You get in a fast-moving situation like that, there's not time to know what the other fellow's doing even if he is your brother
and your campaign manager. It was everybody for himself in a fast-moving situation like that.

B: At any rate the ticket ended up Kennedy-Johnson.

H: It ended up Kennedy-Johnson.

B: And you did some advance work in the campaign.

H: Primarily for Johnson. There was only one meeting involved with Kennedy.

B: Tell a story you told me the last time about the El Paso trip, Kennedy in his hotel room.

H: Well, they were to rendezvous there. Kennedy had been out in the Northwest and California and he was flying in from California to meet Johnson in El Paso. Johnson was coming in from the Ranch; they were to meet on Sunday night. And they were to have a rally with local leaders, a breakfast with local leaders, the next morning. Then they would step right out of the hotel onto a platform where there's a big public square and address the crowd there. Then they would get on the plane and start a circular trip of Texas. At the end of that trip, this was to include the famous, now famous, Kennedy confrontation with the Protestant ministers in Houston. And at the end of the trip Johnson was to spin off and go to New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and I don't know where from there. Kennedy was going on to St. Louis and back East.

The Kennedy advance man got out there, Tom Whalen got out there, and I went out to Arizona and New Mexico. John Holton was in charge of the Albuquerque stop for Johnson, and Max Edwards, who was an
assistant secretary of the interior most of these last eight years, was in charge of three little towns in eastern New Mexico. I took Phoenix and Tucson and got another assistant to work on Tucson. Then I flew back to El Paso to try to help on the arrangements there. Tom Whalen and myself worked on that trip.

Well, they had a terrible feud going on in El Paso between Woodrow Bean, the county judge, and the Mayor, who later was ambassador to Costa Rica under Kennedy. They wouldn't even use the same restroom and it was a terrible feud. Each faction would try to grab the advance men, you know, and kidnap them. But, anyhow, there was nothing scheduled for Sunday night and we decided we did not want an airport crowd because six or twelve policemen were all that we could get for the airport. So we didn't want a crowd out there to meet them because we couldn't control it, being Sunday night.

Well, Johnson was an hour or so late getting in. And then Kennedy was an hour and a half or so later getting in. The radio and TV were carrying the news about this and I think everybody in El Paso was listening to the news and they said, "Well, let's get our shoes on and get the kids in the car and go to the airport." So we ended up with a crowd of about ten or twelve thousand people. All we had up was a rope to keep people back. Well, the Johnson plane got in and to kill time and try to hold the crowd, which by that time, you know, here it is! They got a flatbed truck, and everybody on the Johnson plane, I think congressmen and so forth, got up and made a speech to the crowd to kill time, including Johnson and Lady Bird and so forth.
So Kennedy finally arrived. I was with Kennedy and I said, "Senator, your convertible is over here," and there were police officials there and all. And so he said, "All right." We started over toward it and here was this crowd. So Kennedy decided to go over there to greet his well-wishers. They were screaming and cheering. The Latin Americans liked Kennedy very much. He sort of broke and walked away from us before we knew what was happening, walked toward the crowd and the crowd surged and broke the rope. We were terrified because a child can get trampled to death in a situation like that very easily. We were afraid some people would be killed. So the people sort of moved in and sort of held the crowd back and got Kennedy over to his car and went on into town. I was told later that the Chief of Police really bawled Kennedy out and said, "You came close to getting people killed out there tonight, and from here on I hope you do what people tell you to do. Don't ever do anything like this again." And Kennedy said, "Well, I just made a mistake. I'll know better next time."

We got to the hotel and there was an enormous crowd there. We heard on the police radio going in that there was a big crowd out in the square and that the hotel lobby was full. So we rolled up there and they got out of the convertible and the police and several of us threw out hands around them, a cordon around them, and surged through the crowd right in through the door. The elevator was being held for them, and we just go them onto that elevator in a hurry and got them up to their suite. They were on the same floor. Mr. Rayburn was down
on the floor below. The lobby was full of screaming, shouting people. So they said, "What's the next thing?" or something, I don't remember clearly, but I said, "Well, I think you ought to go down to the mezzanine and say a few words to the crowd in the lobby." "How do we get down there?"

Well, the elevators were jammed and then I realized I had goofed. I had never envisioned this possibility, so I had not reconnoitered the fire stairs. It was the only way to possibly get down. They were on the seventh floor or something. So we ducked down the fire stairs, not knowing whether some of these doors would be locked or not, and we walked all the way down those fire stairs and suddenly came out on the mezzanine. And they leaned over the balcony of the mezzanine and said a few words to the crowd.

So then we got on back upstairs. Kennedy went to his suite, and I went to the Johnson suite and the Senator said, "Go down there and tell Jack to come down here. The Speaker's on the way up here and we're going to talk to him about what to say about the depletion allowance tomorrow."

I went down to the Kennedy suite, and there was a guard on the door, but nobody in the suite with him. I heard Kenny O'Donnell had cut loose and gone over to Juarez. Senator Kennedy was sitting in the middle of the living room and his suitcase was just lying open on the bed in the bedroom. He was sitting there reading some long clipping. They had put a basket of fruit in his room and he had a bunch of white grapes on his lap. He was sitting in this chair kind of pulled out in
the middle of the living room, reading this clipping, and plucking a grape and eating it along the way. I told him, "Senator, I'm so-and-so, and Senator Johnson would like for you to come down right away to his suite; the Speaker's on the way up to talk about the depletion allowance."

He very coolly said, "All right," and went back to reading and plucking a grape. He kept on doing that and I was standing on one foot and then another. And in just a minute here came Senator Johnson, just walking seven league boots down the hall. Came in and said, "Come on, Jack, come on, Jack! The Speaker's on the way up. Don't keep him waiting. Can't keep him waiting. Come on, Jack!" He looked up at the Senator very coolly and said, "All right, in a minute," something like that, and went on back to reading his clipping. So Senator Johnson—of course they were all tired—was walking back and forth in the living room and throwing his shoulders back. "I've got some kind of a crick in my back." Kennedy looked up very coolly and said, "I believe you're cracking up. If you do, where do you want me to send it?" And so Kennedy put the clipping in his pocket and they disappeared and went on down the hall.

B: Did you forego the rest of the Texas trip with them?
H: No, I went on to Phoenix.

B: Anything else stand out in your mind about the campaign?
H: When we first went out as advance men on that first trip, I felt that Bobby and the national committee were going to give as little money as possible to the Johnson advance men. I wasn't sure that was the case,
but I kind of raised my eyebrows about it, because they did not give us an air travel card or a telephone--well, I take it back. I was given a telephone credit card, but no airplane travel card. We were going to have to pay for the airplane travel and then they gave us expense money. Then any excess expenses we had to submit a voucher or memorandum to the national committee. I thought this was a very strange proceeding although I had heard that they were in bad financial shape. While air travel cards are abused in campaigns, it's the really sensible way to expedite travel, rather than wait to pick up the ticket, and so forth. So I wondered whether they were just short of money or whether maybe they were not going to be as liberal with the Johnson advance men as they were with other--I didn't know. Well, I think maybe it was just newness on their part because when I got to El Paso, the Kennedy advance man had been sent out and they hadn't even given him a telephone credit card. So he used mine, and they hadn't given the other advance men telephone credit cards, and so they all took my number down and God knows how much was charged to that one number. So looking back on it now, I don't believe there was an intentional discrimination, but I did wonder about it at the time. I don't think there was. Later on, as they got into the campaign, why, they loosened up like previous campaigns.

D: Did you have any unusual trouble in coordinating the two candidates' activities?

H: No, because as far as--I worked in that trip out in the Southwest and John Holton and myself went out to Chicago and advanced the appearance
of Senator Johnson in Chicago the last week of the campaign. I think it was on a Friday, pretty sure it was Friday before the Tuesday election. John and myself went out sometime in advance, not knowing how efficient the [Richard] Daley machine was. We were staying down at the Morrison because the Johnson luncheon Mayor Daley gave and had all the ward leaders in to hear Senator Johnson was to be at the Morrison. We stayed at the Morrison first and it was such a wretched hotel that we moved to the Sherman. Picked up the paper one day and Kennedy was working the suburbs of Chicago. He stayed out of downtown Chicago, but he was making shopping centers and all that on the west side. It said that the Kennedy party was staying at the O'Hare Inn at O'Hare Airport. Well, Senator Johnson was to land at the military section of O'Hare Airport, coming in from Missouri and places down South. So we said, "Well, you know he's going to be here--get in at midnight and then he'll be taking off the middle of the afternoon. Might be sensible to stay out there and not bring that whole entourage into town, checking them in and checking them out. Let's go out and see what it's like."

So John and myself went out there and we got there just as the Kennedy party was coming out of the O'Hare Inn and loading up in their car to take off. They had checked out of the hotel. So we went in and we liked the set-up, so we just moved in right after them. But we had nothing to do with the Kennedy people, there wasn't any avoidance, but we just had no business with them. And they loaded up and we saw some of the reporters and other people and said hello to them. The
situation was very friendly. There was no sign whatsoever of friction; I don't think there was any friction at that stage of the game. Each one was covering different cities and so forth.

B: How efficient was the Daley machine?

H: I think John and myself went out about ten days ahead of time--

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview II
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interviews of D. B. Hardeman

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Maury Maverick, Jr., of San Antonio, Texas, Executor of the Estate of D. B. Hardeman, do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of personal interviews conducted on February 26, March 12 and April 22, 1969 at Washington, D.C., and on January 19, 1977 in San Antonio, Texas, and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

(2) The tape recordings shall be available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) Until May 15, 1998, the D. B. Hardeman Estate retains all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter, the copyright in both the transcripts and tape recordings shall pass to the United States Government. Until May 15, 1998, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts and tape recordings without express consent in each case.

(4) Copies of the transcripts and tape recordings may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcripts and tape recordings may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Donor Maury Maverick, Jr. as Executor only
Date May 11, 1988

Don W. Wilson
Archivist of the United States
Date May 26, 1988
INTERVIEW III

DATE: April 22, 1969

INTERVIEWEE: D. B. HARDEMAN

INTERVIEWER: T. H. Baker

PLACE: Mr. Hardeman's residence, Washington, D.C.

Tape 1 of 1

B: Sir, last we time had gone to the 1960 election, which brings us to John Kennedy's years as president. One of the questions that comes up is how active then-Vice President Johnson was in Congress. You were still with Mr. Rayburn and after his death in 1961, with Mr. Boggs during these years. Could you tell whether or not Lyndon Johnson was still using any of his expertise in Congress for the administration's programs?

H: Well, in the first place, I saw much less of Lyndon Johnson. He continued to come to the Board of Education, Mr. Rayburn's Board of Education, from time to time. In the early months in 1961, he seemed to be quite a changed man. In the years as majority leader, he would come to the Board of Education and be full of discussion about what had happened in the Senate or what was happening politically. He would many times dominate the conversation, but in those very early months he sometimes would come over to the Board of Education and mix himself a drink and sit over in the southwest corner of that room and hardly say a word. After a while he would get up and leave.

Once I heard Mr. Rayburn tell those in the Board of Education that he said to President Kennedy, "Lyndon seems so morose and subdued these
days; he doesn't have anything to say; he's quite changed. He seems very subdued." And Mr. Rayburn said that President Kennedy said, "Why, of course he is. He doesn't have enough to keep him busy. He's a man who likes to have a lot of things to do all the time. I spend a good part of my time trying to think of things that I can turn over to him to keep him as busy as I can, but you know, Mr. Speaker, under our form of government there is practically nothing that a president can turn over to someone else. The final decision has to be that of the president," or "it can be that of the president." And he said, "I'm doing the best I can to give him as much responsibility as is constitutionally possible."

As to his role in the Rules Committee fight, the fight to enlarge the House Rules Committee in January of 1961, my feeling was that he was working either personally or through Walter Jenkins in trying to get as many of the Texas delegation members to go along with Mr. Rayburn as possible. If he ever tried to influence anyone outside of Texas, I never heard of it.

B: Incidentally, how did they get Mr. Rayburn to agree to that?
H: To agree to what?
B: To the enlarging of the Rules Committee. Was he reluctant to--?
H: Well, he realized that something had to be done. He had been convinced by the deadlock between 1959 and 1961 that Howard Smith would, in order to get his way, block legislation even of a Democratic president. And he was very much afraid that unless there was something done to break this hold of the Rules Committee, that the Rules Committee would block
most of President Kennedy's proposed major legislation. And President Kennedy then would go back to the country in 1962 with a record of no accomplishment or little accomplishment, and we probably would lose control of the House and at the end of four years, Kennedy might be labeled a "do-nothing" president and might be defeated for re-election. So it was imperative that [there be] some change. He had been thinking about this undoubtedly for many months. He discussed the problem with Congressman Carl Elliott of Alabama in the fall of 1960, and there were two major possibilities. One was to increase the size of the committee, which was finally done, and the other was to purge Congressman [William] Colmer of Mississippi, who was bolting the ticket. You never know a man's motives, but I think that probably this was a tactical maneuver that he first proposed to purge Congressman Colmer and take him off the Rules Committee, and that of course is a very unpalatable thing for members to have to vote on. They don't like to vote to purge. And so some of his best supporters, particularly in the South, said, "Oh, no. If you will drop the idea of purging, we can get you more votes to enlarge the committee." And I suspect that this is exactly what he planned all along, because he said to Carl Elliott that, "No, the way to do it is add to the committee. You give the Republicans another member and you give the Democrats two more members."

But he knew that something had to be done and he had gotten by through makeshift methods for twenty years, but from 1959 to 1961 he was dealing with a Rules Committee where makeshift methods no longer worked.
So he realized that he had to take the risk of splitting the Democrats in the House, and he had to move and make some changes.

B: I guess mostly he was dealing with Judge Smith.

H: He was dealing with Judge Smith and Colmer and he had no influence with either one of them. Judge Smith would sometimes agree to things and that was fine, but on the very thing that you needed the most, the Judge might decide not to agree and if that was his decision, there was nothing you could do about it.

B: In general, is it really possible, Constitution aside, for a vice president to exert any influence over the Senate or the House, even a Lyndon Johnson in the vice presidency?

H: I think the capacity of a vice president to be influential even in the Senate is very limited. He's an outsider there even though he has been one of the great all-time senators. When he becomes vice president he's no longer part of the legislative branch, in spite of presiding over the Senate. He has no right to speak on the floor; he is looked upon as an outsider really by the members of the legislative branch. He's working for a new employer now which is the president. Of course, a man's friendships continue; a man's discussions in the cloakroom or over a drink can be influential. Vice President Hubert Humphrey played, I think, a useful role, but it's a limited role in the House of Representatives. The same thing applies except that his influence is still more limited because members of the Senate by and large are not very influential in the House, and I think it's true, vice versa, that House members are not influential in the Senate. They try to run their own shows and that's a full-time job.
B: Was there ever any hint in those years that some members of the Kennedy staff would not particularly like to see Lyndon Johnson have too much power?

H: I don't recall that at the time. I just felt, as an observer of politics, that there were people in the Kennedy entourage who really would never forgive him for his race against Jack Kennedy for the nomination and particularly for his attacks on Kennedy in seeking to get the nomination. I never felt that President Kennedy had that lingering unhappiness, but I felt that the people of the disposition of Bobby Kennedy probably had it. I never had the feeling that Larry O'Brien had anything but the highest respect and regard for Lyndon Johnson. And a man like Ted Sorensen, very intense man, intensely loyal, a man without too much humor--I don't know what his feeling was toward Johnson at that period, but he's the type of personality that might have also still been resentful of Johnson. Then there are the other people who had a candidate for that second place on the ticket who were still disappointed that Johnson was selected and that their favorite, whether it was Symington or whoever, didn't get it.

B: Was there ever any serious talk of dumping Johnson in 1964?

H: Oh, I saw just a little hint here and there in newspaper columns, but my own feeling was that it was completely unrealistic. Later on, I came to believe--and this was after the assassination--without any personal knowledge whatsoever on my part, that Bobby Kennedy probably was trying to set up a situation where he could have more influence in trying to
persuade Jack Kennedy to drop Johnson, but I never did believe that Jack Kennedy would do it.

B: One would think that whatever political motives that made Johnson a candidate in 1960 would still apply in 1964.

H: Well, Kennedy had not swept the country into his own fold; he had had a breathtakingly close race in 1960. He had reached a high peak of popularity after his handling of the Cuban missile crisis, but then in 1963 it seemed to me that his fortunes were ending because of the stalling of much of his legislative program. So that perhaps his race in 1964 might be as close as the one in 1960 and that he would need Johnson for the same reason that he needed him in 1960. Furthermore, there was not a logical alternative to Johnson that I could see. I don't know the name of an individual who would have been more useful to the Kennedy operation as a vice presidential candidate. I never did see speculation about someone that would be better politically or even better personally for Kennedy.

B: Anything particularly associated with the selection of John McCormack as speaker after Mr. Rayburn's death?

H: No, I don't think so.

B: Cut and dried seniority?

H: I think Johnson could have had no influence there had he tried to exercise influence. That is strictly a family operation. No advice is wanted from the Senate; no advice is wanted from the White House. And interference in the selection of the speaker in modern times, I think,
would have hurt more than it would have helped. And I think Johnson was fully aware of that. Furthermore McCormack was never in danger.

B: He practically inherited the position.

H: He inherited the position, and the only possibility was whether Dick Bolling might run against him and when Dick decided not to, why then McCormack was home free. But I don't think anybody believed after Rayburn's death that McCormack would not be elected.

B: Just to keep the record straight, that's when you moved from the Speaker's staff over to the Whip's staff, Hale Boggs' staff.

H: That's right. I moved in the latter part of January, 1962 over to the Whip's office.

B: Another event of those years: were you in a position to see anything of Bobby Baker and his troubles?

H: Not after 1961. I think perhaps the last time I saw Bobby Baker was during the campaign in 1960. I rode out to the arena in Charlotte, North Carolina--on the train out to the arena with him. And I may have seen him just in passing a time or two after that, but I have no recollection of it. Certainly, as far as I can recall, I had no conversation with him after that.

B: Was it general knowledge or suspicion around Congress before the scandal broke that Bobby Baker was perhaps verging on the unethical if not the illegal?

H: No, not as far as I ever knew. I was caught completely by surprise. The only time I ever raised my eyebrows in all those years was on this ride out in the car. We passed a corner there in Charlotte and he just
said to me in an offhand way, "I'm getting ready to build a nice motel over there on that piece of land." And I didn't say anything, but I just asked myself the question, "Well, how in the world does a person on the staff salary build a motel?" But I never heard any accusations about Bobby's interference with legislation. Around Capitol Hill you hear all sorts of gossip at all times about members and about staff members, their love life, this, that and the other. But if there was any whispering about Bobby Baker, I never heard it.

B: It's curious. Based on what was later revealed, you wonder how it can go along without knowledge around about it.

H: Well, I have a theory. I know very few of the facts in the Bobby Baker case, but my own feeling is that you look back at the actual charges made against Baker and they were charges involving his activity after the 1960 election. The one exception would be this motel and the Carousel Motel--I don't remember when that opened--the one over at Ocean City. But I think the other charges, my impression without being an expert on this at all was that these other activities that he has been criticized for date after the 1960 election. And there is one body of thought that up until that time, LBJ had kept him so busy that he didn't have time for extracurricular activities, and after LBJ left, there was a different tempo and a different mood in the Senate and he had time to engage in other activities.

And then another major factor was when LBJ left, the strong man in the Senate was Bob Kerr. Now, I heard a lot of innuendo about Bob Kerr's activities in business for several years--uranium deals, deals in
connection with the Arkansas River, acquisition of land, various other things. That's why I say these rumors get out about people a lot of times when they're not true, but I never heard any rumors about Bobby Baker. But then Bobby's closeness with Kerr—I don't know when it began, probably had been going on for years and I didn't know about it, but certainly his closer operation with Kerr seemed to come after LBJ departed from the Senate majority leadership.

B: I've got a purely speculative question that you may freely ignore if you'd like. But you were in the Whip's office. Would you care to hazard a guess as to whether or not the John Kennedy legislative program would have passed in 1964 had there not been an assassination? Would things like the tax bill, Civil Rights Act, have gotten through that session?

H: I've always thought that a major part of the Kennedy program would have passed had he lived; that at the time he was assassinated and the newspaper people for a lack of any hard news were writing what we referred to as thumb-sucking pieces. They sit around in the corner and suck their thumbs trying to think up something to write about. [I think] that they forgot that there's a cycle in Congress, certainly in modern times, a burst of no activity in the first year of Congress until after Easter, then the easier legislation is put through one house or the other in the summer of that first year, then the tougher pieces of legislation have longer hearings and more involved operations so they seem to be held up. And then in the fall of the first year you go into sort of an inactive slump, and then along in the spring of the second
year of a Congress, you come to grips with these hard issues and you get them out of the way one way or the other in an election year. And I think that was what would have happened in the case of the Kennedy program had he lived.

I think the tax bill undoubtedly would have passed, perhaps not in the same form that it did pass in. I think civil rights legislation probably would have passed in some form or other, probably not as sweeping. There might not have been an FEPC provision in that bill. There are some things that I do not think Kennedy would have passed that summer that Johnson was able to get passed. One of the measures that I think Kennedy had no possibility of passing and that Johnson—I don't think he expected to be able to pass it either, John McCormack really is the man that I think deserves most of the credit for it, although LBJ certainly helped, and that was the Mass Transit Act. I do not think Kennedy had any chance to even get that voted on and Kennedy's programs, which did not pass in 1964--maybe they did, I don't remember. What became the poverty program, was that passed in 1964?

B: 1964.

H: Well, I don't think the poverty program would have passed. Kennedy had two bills: one was the Youth Opportunity Bill and the other was another phase of the poverty program, Community Action Bill I think they called it. And those to me were dead as a doornail and with good reason, I think, because the Kennedy Administration, the sponsors of the bills, really hadn't thought them through. I sat in an all-day meeting of a citizens committee trying to push the Youth Opportunity Bill, headed by
Malcolm Forbes of Forbes Magazine, including Bill Anderson, now a congressman from Tennessee, and Mrs. Arthur Goldberg and others. And we met all day long and I was invited to sit in. And the thing that struck me when I came out of the meeting was that these people really don't know--they haven't thought through the hard questions behind the bill. They don't know exactly--they're avoiding the gut issues here; they're trying to get the bill and then solve the problems after they get the bill. And I didn't think it would work, and I don't think it would have worked.

LBJ took advantage of the Kennedy assassination and the emotion aroused by it; he got a very catchy phrase, "the poverty program," he put the two together with modification and put them through. I do not think Kennedy would have got either one of those. But as I mentioned before, I think much of his legislation would have passed had he lived. I think the newspaper assessment and the historical assessment that he had run out of steam in Congress is not correct.

B: When you were in Mr. Boggs' office, did you stay close enough to Texas politics to understand what was going on in Texas in 1963? The Connally versus Yarborough--

H: No. No. The longer you stay away from the state, the less you know about it. A new generation of political figures comes along. I just knew what I had known for a long time. John Connally and Ralph Yarborough had very little use for each other.

B: Now, the question of course [is] where was Lyndon Johnson in that arrangement? He had been very close to Mr. Connally, of course.
H: Well, yes. Of course, all of his emotional instincts and his ties of friendship were much stronger on the Connally side. He and Yarborough had not been happy with each other for a long time. Why, what started it, I have never been able to satisfy myself that I knew what started it. I don't know what started it. I imagine it is a chemical antipathy between the two men. On the other hand, Johnson had a major stake in seeing that Texas did not split into two camps and wreck the chances of the Democrats to carry the state in 1964. And furthermore, it seems to me that he had a very personal stake. If Texas were hopelessly divided in 1964, then those who wanted to dump him from the ticket would have some pretty good arguments to do so. Here's a man who can't even keep his own state in line.

B: Apparently Mr. Johnson as vice president and Senator Yarborough had some quarrels over patronage in Texas. Did not Mr. Johnson try to have at least a veto over patronage appointments in the state?

H: I never did know about the patronage. I heard that, yes. I heard that Yarborough felt that since he was the senior Democratic senator, the only Democratic senator, that he should inherit the patronage. Johnson didn't see it that way. He felt that he was vice president and he was the highest elected Democratic official from the state of Texas and that he was entitled to some of the patronage and was going to insist on it. But the ins and outs of it I never did know; I never did really want to know.

B: As you say, unless you live with that kind of situation from day to day, it is almost impossible to understand it.
H: Well, you get into all sorts of petty personality quibbles over this candidate and that candidate and the other candidate. These things usually are settled by them working out a *modus vivendi* between themselves, and I didn't care about the play-by-play reports. Now they did agree on things like the very strong push that the Vice President and Senator Yarborough gave to people like Judge Sarah Hughes to get her appointed federal district judge. They were as strongly united on that appointment, for example, as they could possibly be. There was no argument—I think I'm right on this—there was absolutely no argument, for example, over the appointment of a man like Barefoot Sanders to a federal district attorney job in Dallas. There were many places where they did not quarrel. But Johnson did insist, and I always heard that he had made this point to Kennedy, that if he became vice president on the ticket, that he was to continue to have a strong say in major patronage appointments. I am under the impression that, for example, on the appointment of the assistant postmaster general in charge of operations, Mr. McMillan was appointed; that Yarborough, Rayburn, and Johnson were all strong for that appointment. So the quarreling was over certain offices, but not all offices.

B: Where were you at the time of the assassination?

H: I was sitting in the Whip's office with a friend when one of our staff came running in and said he had just heard over the radio that the President had been shot.

B: Was it you who notified Mr. Boggs? I understand he was not in the office, I believe, at the time.
H: No, I did not notify him. I'm not sure how he heard it, perhaps on the car radio.

B: Did any special kind of activity on your part that hectic weekend and in the weeks after--

H: Well, yes, that was a very wild and exhausting weekend, of course. In connection with Hale Boggs, I think the first time I saw him after the news broke was that he sent for me and he was in the little Ways and Means Committee room up on the second floor or the main floor of the Capitol. He had written out in longhand a statement for the press. And he sent for me to ask me what I thought of it. He was very, of course, shocked because he was close to Jack Kennedy, he had been for many years, and it was an emotional attachment to Kennedy as well as a political attachment to Kennedy. He had just returned from some speeches down in Louisiana in which he hit out very hard at the right-wing extremists. He threw down the gauntlet to them in Louisiana. So he had written out this statement--he was convinced that he had been assassinated by the right-wingers. I'm not sure at that moment whether we knew whether he was dead or not. I think we probably did. But he'd talked in this statement about the "drums of hate beating louder and louder and now they have done it." He didn't say right-wingers, but you couldn't read the statement and get any other conclusion. And I remember arguing with him very vociferously to wait, "Let's wait. We don't know who did it. We may know in thirty minutes; we may know in an hour. Let's wait! I think like you do, I think this is probably a right-wing movement that has done this, but we don't know, and thirty minutes is
not going to make any difference on your statement. Please don't."

Well, we couldn't agree on that.

And so, of course, the whole afternoon was wild. I was in and out of the Speaker's office and hundreds of newspaper people and politicians and so forth. And I spent just by accident quite a time that afternoon with Congressman Don Brotzman of Colorado. And he was telling me about some of the assassination problems that he had had when he was--I believe federal district attorney in Denver, or in Colorado. And we kept watching the ticker tape. We were watching it, I think, when we got the word that they had arrested Oswald. And so it was so chaotic there for several hours. Then, of course, there was all the arrangements that had to be made during the next forty-eight hours in connection with the funeral. Much of that work fell on our office.

B: Excuse me, the Congressman's assassination problems while he was a judge, you meant threats of assassination against himself?

H: I'm not sure it was assassination. He had tried the case of the kidnapping and murder of one of the heirs to the Coors beer industry, and we were talking about problems of proof and identification and whether there was a conspiracy and how many people were in on it. I had not known Brotzman before. He's a Republican congressman, he was a first-termer then. We just happened to bump into each other out in the Speaker's lobby watching the ticker tape and we got to talking and each one of us wanted somebody to talk to, and it was off the beat. So I was away from Hale Boggs for a part of that time.
B: During that weekend or in the next week, did anybody sit down and speculate on what kind of president Lyndon Johnson might make, or do you in that kind of circumstance?

H: Oh, I don't think anybody had time or had enough emotion left. Trying to remember back then is very tricky business. I had always felt that if Lyndon Johnson could ever get to the presidency that he would make a great president. I had great skepticism as to whether he could ever be elected president; I just thought the odds were against him. But I said many times to people that, "If he ever gets there, he has all the qualities to make a great president," and I think he made a great president. But at that moment, we were living from moment to moment. You had the cathedral service and the clamor of people to be invited to that; you had the arrangements for the rotunda; you had telegrams to members; the busing arrangements. Everybody was completely drained of emotion and drained of energy. We were just ready to drop physically. I remember thinking that he handled it very well when he stepped off the plane and made that very short statement to the nation. I thought he handled that in a very nice and very dignified fashion. And I thought he conducted himself through the ceremonies with the heads of state all with great dignity. I had no inkling then of the unhappy plane ride; I had no inkling that there was a scuffle about how they were to take the coffin off. That all came much later.

B: Did Mr. Boggs' assignment to the Warren Commission mean any extra work for you?

H: No, I was not involved at all in the Warren Commission. The Warren Commission came about, according to what Hale told many of us, [because] a
number of subcommittees and committees of the Congress decided to investigate the assassination. It looked like it was going to be a field day with the number of investigations—subpoenaing the same witnesses and each one trying to prove something different, and there would be utter chaos. So Hale said that he said to the President, "The only way to head this off is for you to name a blue ribbon commission that will make all these others keep hands off it. There is no alternative to it." So the President called him at home and told him that he had decided to name this blue ribbon commission and that "That means that you have to serve on it."

And then I remember a little incident—one of the individuals in the House was trying to, I don't know, he was making a speech for a resolution to appoint a special committee or something involving the committee, and Hale, on the spur of the moment, got up and, trying to head this off, said, "I can say on the highest authority that a blue-ribbon commission will be named and therefore we should cease our discussion of this right now," which did head off whoever was trying to do this. I know he said later on that the next time he saw him, the President said to him, "You know when you say 'on the highest authority,' do you know you're talking about me?" And Hale laughed and said, "Well, I had to say something right then and there or we'd have been in trouble."

B: How close were Mr. Boggs and Mr. Johnson? Had they been close before?
H: Oh yes, all through the years. I don't know, I suppose Hale first met—I don't know when he first met Lyndon Johnson. Hale and Lindy Boggs, as far as I know, have always been very, very close to the President and
Lady Bird on a personal basis, a social basis. It extended to the children; Lindy was very close to both of the Johnson daughters, had a major role in their weddings. In turn, the President attended the weddings of both of the Boggs' daughters out at the Boggs' home. And they were back and forth on a personal basis over a long period of years. It was a family relationship in my judgment.

B: Just for the record, is Lindy L-I-N-D-Y?

H: Her name is Corinne, but everybody calls her Lindy, L-I-N-D-Y Boggs. I don't suppose there was any woman closer to the President and Lady Bird through all the years than Lindy--and Hale. But President Johnson and Hale Boggs, they're both strong-minded men and they're both men who have a temper, temperament, and the President sometimes would give Hale the silent treatment as he would give everybody else. But I know Hale had a great respect for the President and a great liking for him. They are very candid in their assessment of people, and they knew each other's limitations--each other's strong points and each other's weak points.

B: What was it like from the vantage point of the Whip's office, that session of Congress in the spring of 1964?

H: Feverish activity, because the tempo was so fast. The first time I saw the President after the assassination was about the tenth of December. It was the night of the Jewish holiday of Hanukkah--I believe it's Hanukkah around there. Anyhow, that was the night that Hale Boggs was supposed to interview the congressional fellows of the American Political Science Association who wanted to work in his office that coming spring. And he had agreed to meet with them late in the afternoon.
Well, it was a wild day and Hale would come down and before he could start meeting with them, the Speaker would send for him and he'd have to go back upstairs. This happened three or four times, so Hale said to me—we haven't covered this, have we?

B: No.

H: Hale said to me, "Take them in your office, or keep them in your office and give them a drink and I'll try to be back down in about fifteen minutes." So we were all in there having a drink, this was about seven o'clock, and I remember that it was this Jewish holiday because one of the boys was Jewish and he was supposed, under the Jewish faith, to be at home with his little boys at six o'clock. He wasn't going to make it and he was very worried about it. And we happened to be standing up for some reason, and one of the candidates was the assistant to the majority whip in the Pakistan General Assembly, a man named Shan Suddin Ahmed [?]. And for some reason we were all standing up with our drinks in our hands when I heard Hale's voice call out: "Silence, everyone, the President of the United States!" And in came Hale Boggs and the President of the United States! He shook hands, and I was so flabbergasted that I couldn't think of the names of a lot of these fellows in the room. There were about eight of them, I think, in the room. And I fell down on the names.

So the President went around the room and each one introduced himself, and when he got to Ahmed, he stopped and told Ahmed how much he'd enjoyed his trip to Pakistan and how much he liked the country and how much he liked the people and so forth. He stayed just a few minutes, but well, there with Ahmed, and when he swept out of the room as he does, why,
Ahmed was completely dazed. He said, "I've been in this country ten days and the President has already been to see me!" There was a great chain set in motion. The press got this and Newsweek picked it up, and Ahmed was invited by the Pakistani Ambassador to come have lunch with him. And the Ambassador said, "Why haven't you been to see me before?" And Ahmed said, "I've been over here about three times and all I got from your people was the brush-off." And so then the White House called him, and the President had received a letter from some man who had served with somebody named Ahmed in India during World War II and he wanted to know if it was the same Ahmed. So the White House was calling him, and Ahmed was quite the center of attraction for a while.

Lyndon Johnson had come up that night unannounced to the John McCormack Board of Education to bring the Speaker a picture. The President had come up to Speaker McCormack's Board of Education and Hale said to him, "I have a bunch of congressional fellows around in my office. Would you come around and say hello to them?" Well, the President was very familiar with the congressional fellowship program because he had had congressional fellows in his office and on his staff, and he had, I think, a very high regard for the program. So he said, "Sure." So that was the reason that he came around that particular night.

The first business contact that I had with the President was quite accidental. The President was trying to get authority to sell wheat to Russia. This was the week before Christmas in 1963. And it was a very volatile issue. And the House met all night long. And the Republican ban on selling wheat to Russia prevailed by, it seems to me, like five votes--
very close margin. We were in the middle of a terrible snowstorm and the House had been meeting from noon until five-thirty on Saturday morning, and we were all absolutely dead. But many of the members had already started home or had gone home for Christmas. And so at six-thirty in the morning, Hale came down to the office—we went down to the office—and Hale said, "I'm going to try to get home. Will you get on the phone and phone everybody that didn't answer the roll call and run them down wherever they are, and tell them to come back to Washington immediately?"

So we had gotten the last roll call, or some of the last roll calls, and we were compiling a list of the absentees and started phoning some of the absentees at six-thirty in the morning. And the phone rang. In the meantime, I was by myself for a little while and I looked up and John Monahan, the assistant to Speaker McCormack, was walking in and he was as tired as everybody else. He took off his coat and he said, "I'm here to help you." I was very grateful for it. And the phone rang, said, "This is the White House. Jack Valenti wants to talk to Congressman Boggs."

And I said, "I don't know where he is. I think he's somewhere between here and his home. Is there anything that I can help with? This is D. B. Hardeman," and they said, "Just a moment." This voice came on the line and I recognized it immediately. This was about, I guess, six-thirty or six-forty in the morning. He said, "D. B., what happened up there?" And I said, "Well, Mr. President, we got our tail whipped."
"What was the vote?" And I told him the vote. "Who did we lose?" And I said, "Well, I didn't check the roll call carefully. I don't have the last roll call, but we lost a lot here and a lot there." "What did we
lose in Alabama, say?" And I said, "Well, I heard so-and-so answer 'no,' and so-and-so, but I don't know who else we lost." And he said, "What about Texas? What about so-and-so in Texas? What about so-and-so in Texas?"

And I told him the ones that I had heard answer the roll call one way or the other, but there were many that I just didn't know about. So he interrogated me about many different members, and my information was perhaps not very helpful, but he stayed on the phone about twenty minutes. Apparently he had just waked up and Jack Valenti had given him the news that he had tasted his first defeat as president on the floor of the House.

So then we worked all during that weekend, and there was a wild day on Saturday. And they finally decided to have another vote on it on Tuesday, I believe, or the day before Christmas--Christmas Eve. I'd had very little to eat that day, and I was completely exhausted. I hadn't been to bed for about forty-eight hours or something like that, and I walked in the apartment and the phone was ringing. And it said, "This is Larry O'Brien's office. They want you at the White House at ten o'clock tomorrow for a meeting in Larry O'Brien's office." That was Sunday at ten o'clock.

So I went down and at that meeting with a number of people there, of Congress and others, they decided to charter a plane out on the West Coast to fly across the southern part of the United States picking up missing members and bringing them back in. I left that meeting and went up to the Hill upon the instruction of that meeting, and we sent out telegrams to
all members. We sent, as I recall, telegrams to their homes in their districts, to their offices in the districts, to their offices here, and to the homes here where we had home addresses. You never have all the home addresses of congressmen either in their districts or here, because they won't give them to you. But we did the best we could, trying to get people back in here. They decided to send a plane down—[Congressman] Dick Bolling was down in the Virgin Islands, the French Virgin islands, and he was on the Rules Committee and they needed him to make a quorum on the Rules Committee to report out a special rule to authorize the new vote. So I was told at this meeting that they had told the Governor of the Virgin Islands to send a small plane to this remote island and pick up Dick and bring him back. Dick wouldn't come back, so they sent the plane back the second time. And this was typical. So then Speaker McCormack had to get Congressman Colmer to leave his sick wife in Biloxi, Mississippi, and catch that plane and fly back up here to report out a vote on the wheat bill. It was a week of feverish activity.

Then, Jake Pickle had just been elected to Congress, and he flew all night long to get in here. The House met at seven o'clock on Christmas Eve morning to have the decisive vote on the wheat sale to Russia. And so Jake and Warren Woodward, who had been one of LBJ's assistants, and their wives came into our office and wanted to know what to do to get Jake sworn in so that his vote would count on the wheat sale to Russia.

John Connally had certified him—as governor—that he had been elected at one minute after midnight, and had wired the Speaker and had
wired the clerk of the House. The wire had not arrived at the Speaker's office and the clerk of the House didn't bother to come in that day, and so we had no proof of the certification. So we had to rush around, various people had to rush around, and McCormack had to get Halleck to agree not to challenge him because he lacked the certificate of election, and Halleck agreed. And then Wright Patman as the senior Democrat from Texas was supposed to walk down the aisle with Jake to swear him in, and the Speaker was frantic to get him sworn in because the vote was coming up immediately and we couldn't find Mr. Patman. So I asked George Mahon if he would walk down since he was number two in seniority, and Mahon said yes, he would, but where was Wright? So he walked down with Pickle while he was sworn in and Mr. Patman then appeared and felt that his prerogatives had been raped. So it was wild and woolly.

But then in the middle of all this snowstorm, the Monday night during all this confusion, if I am correct, or maybe Tuesday night--the record will show this--the President about three-thirty in the afternoon sent word up that he was giving a reception that afternoon at the White House about seven o'clock, I think, for the members of Congress and some of the staff members. So we went up to the White House and he climbed up on a chair--I remember thinking he ought not to be up on that nice chair, but he climbed up on this chair with his shoes in the dining room and made a little speech about how the Congress had responded and wishing them a merry Christmas. It was the most beautiful occasion I've ever seen at the White House because all the Christmas lights were on; the Christmas decorations were up, and he mixed and mingled and so did
Lady Bird with all the members and it was a goodwill gesture that was very, very useful.

B: And probably needed. Wasn't there a certain amount of resentment in the Congress at being pushed that hard?

H: No, I don't think so. He was still on his honeymoon then. His first major test was over the agriculture bill.

B: Before you get into that, one question that occurs. Who pays for chartering a plane like that?

H: That question was raised at the time, and I was told that the Democratic National Committee paid for it.

B: Some of the planes that were sent out for members of Congress on that occasion were military planes, weren't they?

H: This was very interesting. Gerald Ford, who is usually a cautious man, in the middle of this angry afternoon--it was one of the angriest afternoons I ever saw on the House floor that Saturday afternoon after this all-night session--everybody's nerves were frazzled--Jerry Ford got up and made the charge that the Democratic administration was using military aircraft to bring their people back and that he had phoned McNamara's office and demanded the facts on it immediately. Well, this brought an angry roar and I think Carl Albert went to the phone and was assured that that had not happened for any Democrats and so forth and so on. And this was before the plane was arranged for; that was arranged I think the next day, maybe my sequence is wrong, but I think that's correct. So there was real anger between Democratic and Republican leadership over this charge. And it developed that planes had not been used
to bring Democrats back, but William McCullough of Ohio, the ranking Republican on the Judiciary Committee, got up and very sheepishly said—this must have been on Monday or Tuesday after this plane had been arranged to bring the members back—that he wanted to state to the House that he couldn't get back any way because the airlines, so many of them, were grounded and that he went to the air base close to his home in Ohio and got them to fly him in a military plane. So it developed that the only member that was brought back by military aircraft was a Republican who himself requested it, and Gerald Ford had popped off and made himself look very foolish—the only time I ever saw him look foolish on the floor of the House.

B: The Democratic flights then were the charter—

H: The Democratic flights were the charter flights. I remember some of the Democrats from the Detroit area three times tried to get back to Washington and every time they got as far as Pittsburgh and either had to land in Pittsburgh or turn around and go back to Detroit. The weather was terrible. So the House adjourned then about eleven o'clock and people made a mad scramble on Christmas Eve to get out of town.

B: Before I interrupted you, you were getting ready to say something about the agriculture bill.

H: Well, the agriculture bill had already been scheduled for House action before the Kennedy assassination, and it was a patchwork bill; it was a bundle of compromises that nobody was happy with. Everybody that was supporting it was doing so with grave reservations and reluctance. But it had been scheduled before the Kennedy assassination. So then President
Johnson found this out and the House leadership found itself in the very unpleasant predicament of the first major test of the President was on a bill which could fall apart at any moment, a bill which really nobody wanted to vote, nobody was enthusiastic about the bill, and yet here was a new president in great jeopardy that on his first test with the Congress he would meet a stinging defeat. And this might be the end of the honeymoon. The first defeat always makes the second one easier and the third one still easier. So there had to be frantic efforts on the part of the House leadership and the President to swing enough people into line to pass that bill. John McCormack, that was one of his finest hours. He understood the argument that he had to use, and he used it with all the force at his command which is a lot of force—that "I don't care what you think about the bill, you cannot allow this new Democratic president to be defeated on his first major test. You've got to waive your objections and you've got to support this bill. We cannot allow our new president to be defeated on this issue."

My estimate was that he changed sixty-five votes on the bill. A study by a political scientist named Randall Ripley, now at Ohio State, being I think overly conservative, I think he estimates McCormack alone changed about forty-five votes. And of course the President and the President's people were working as hard as they could and the bill was saved. But he was in danger of being defeated on the first test. It was not a bill that was his bill; it was not a bill that he scheduled; it was a bill that had been scheduled before the assassination and he was simply the inheritor of a bad situation.
B: The honeymoon lasted pretty much through that session so far as it appeared from the newspapers.

H: Well, I think the honeymoon lasted through the end of 1965 and might have gone on indefinitely had not the Vietnam War intervened. It wouldn't have gone on indefinitely, of course, it never does, but I think it would have lasted longer if our escalation of Vietnam had not come about.

B: You campaigned for Mr. Johnson in 1964, didn't you?

H: No, I didn't campaign for him. I was asked to go out again as an advance man, and I felt that I was too old and too tired for that. I had done it in 1956 for Stevenson and I had done it in 1960 for the ticket, and I thought that was enough. I was very tired; at the end of 1964 I was sick and tired both. I didn't know I was sick, but I was tired, and so I just told them I could not go out on the road.

So then I got a call, I'm not sure who the call was from, I think perhaps Mike Feldman who had been Kennedy's counsel and retained by Johnson as counsel, and told that the President wanted a group of people to meet down at the White House and talk about tactics, and to meet in his office every afternoon at five o'clock. So I of course accepted that invitation; Congress was still in session of course, and so I attended a number of those meetings which later became known as the "Five O'Clock Club."

B: That's what I had reference to. Who then was involved in that besides yourself?

H: Well, Evans and Novak have a list, as I recall, that's pretty foolproof. I haven't read it in several years. It was a floating group.
One person would be there maybe two days a week, or one day a week, or
three days a week, or maybe not at all that particular week; then next
week they would be there every day. I don't think I ever made a list of
them; I remember some of the offhand. Leonard Marks, who was later head
of U.S. Information Agency, was there—I would say was, I don't know
whether he was formally titled as chairman, but he certainly was one of
the most active members. Tyler Abell was there; Ernest Cuneo, head of
Newspaper Editorial Association, was frequently there; Abe Chayez who
had been counsel in the Defense Department, I believe now teaches up at
Harvard Law School was there. He was an old Truman hand. John Sharon,
who was later Clark Clifford's—or maybe at that time was Clark Clif-
ford's law partner. Tom Phinney, Mike Monroney's staff. Pat Moynihan
was there from time to time. Bob Wallace of the Treasury Department.
Milt Semer, who was general counsel of I think Housing and Home Finance
or maybe of Housing and Urban Development itself—I don't remember, but
he was an old hand around Washington. Mike Feldman, of course. I never
did make a list. My recollection is that Evans and Novak had what
seemed to me to be a pretty complete list, but they were there as I was.
Maybe I'd be there three days a week or maybe five days a week or maybe
none in a particular week.

B: The Evans and Novak account indicates that that group was kind of a
"department of dirty tricks." Is that substantially correct?

H: Well, I never did think the group was accomplishing very much. I was in
a minority on that, I think. The purpose of the group was, as I
understood it—and it was like everything in politics, it was never
spelled out too clearly—was to try to make quick responses to small tactical situations. Goldwater would say something and we would want to get somebody on the House or the Senate floor to answer him and maybe prepare a speech for him and get the newspaper publicity arranged for it or get somebody on one of the quiz programs. Or certain signs had appeared at a rally and we were supposed to have in a hurry, have some signs made for Goldwater's next appearance that night or the next day. I didn't think of it in terms of a "department of dirty tricks." I don't remember any dirty tricks that were ever thought up, but there wasn't any moral reluctance. I just don't remember any ever being thought up.

I know they wanted one thing that I demurred on, and they got it done anyhow. They wanted to have a member of the House attack Bill Miller, the congressman who was running for vice president, on his connection with a company in Lockport, New York. He had drawn some fees from them and they wanted to make it into a conflict of interest situation. And I argued against it in the meeting because I said that whoever made the speech would be out of order under the House rules; he would be attacking a fellow member which was not in order and is not kosher; that I thought it was a flimsy charge that would backfire. So I just sort of eased—they wanted me to do this, and I just sort of just didn't get around to it. Later they got a member from California to make such an attack, and it seemed to me that he got a pretty good kickback on it. It seems to me, but I'm not sure, but it seems to me a point of order
was raised and the Speaker had to call him down. It was an abortive effort, whatever it was.

But oh, such things as trying to get an editorial in a certain publication or in a certain newspaper or an editorial on the air or various things of that nature.

B: Your reference to quiz programs, does that mean the Sunday morning TV programs?

H: That sort of thing. I don't remember any specifically in connection with this, but the sort of thing that, say, "Well, so-and-so is going to be on--Bill Miller's going to be on "Face the Nation." Let's try to get somebody to ask him about the Lockport Steel case. Who can do that, or who can try to do that?" You see, that sort of thing.

B: Did Walter Jenkins' troubles take you by surprise in that campaign?

H: Yes, completely, absolutely shocked. I was driving home from work, and I heard just a sort of a snatch of a radio broadcast and I wasn't sure what I had heard. And I got up to the apartment and turned the radio on and heard--this was, oh, six o'clock in the afternoon, something like that--that the charge had been made on a Los Angeles radio station, I believe, or something. Then, of course, the story unfolded that night.

B: I've heard some people suggest that there may be an element of frame-up involved in that.

H: Of course, I don't know the facts at all. Yes, I heard that charge made many times during the weeks following that. And I heard people say third and fourth-hand that the President had said to them that it was a deliberate political frame-up. It had this element in it that seemed
very curious to me, that the head of the Morals Squad and his assistant just happened to be upstairs on the first floor of the YMCA at the time this took place. That to me was one thing that was never, never explained. And I of course never saw any of the reports or anything else. But I heard the charge made many times that this was a part of the Goldwater campaign and that they had other things of this type planned if they got away with this one.

B: Were there rumors of additional kinds--

H: I just heard the rumors. It's an old technique that was used in Europe to document your enemies. Senator Tom Hennings told me that Senator Joe McCarthy, when he first started getting Texas oil money, the first thing he did was to try to build up a personal dossier on everybody in Washington that could stand in his way. And he was ready to blackmail them or anything else. Now, I don't know. Hennings told me that personally. But this is an old game that has been played by fascists and communists both, and people went around saying this sort of thing. But I have no way of knowing whether it's true or not. I do know that one of the newspapermen told me about being approached by--you know, it's always "them," trying to plant with them, with this press association, a very scurrilous story on Hubert Humphrey, and they threw him out of the office. But he said this fellow had been all over town trying to plant the story and nobody would buy it. So there would have seemed to have been smoke about this being part of the pattern.

B: I've also heard it said that on past the election of Mr. Johnson's
H: Well, of course, I wouldn't know because I was not in the White House then or later. Certainly the degree of trust that he had in Walter and Walter's great ability undoubtedly was greatly missed. Furthermore, no public official can come through this without being shaken up, not only about this situation, but also a worry that "maybe there are some other things going on that I don't know about." There's an old saying in politics that the perfect politician is the one with no known living relatives; and so very often politicians are crippled by some financial misdeed or something of somebody that's close to them and they had no reason to be suspicious of. This is the nightmare of politics.

B: I know you're acquainted with Bill Moyers. Did you see anything of the relationship between him and the President?

H: Not during the White House years. I had known Bill, known him well, from the time that he first came up here. And I worked very closely with him during the campaign; I always thought of him as a close personal friend. He's one of the people that gave me that picture up there. For example, we walked together behind the Johnson car in the parade in Chicago. We walked the whole route together and so forth. But after he went into the White House--

B: When was that, sir?

H: This was the weekend before the election in November of 1960. But I saw Bill a time or two when he came up with the President, when the President delivered speeches to Congress. But I was never in the White House, I
think I'm right, except for that--well, I was there on that "Five O'Clock Club," and then that Christmas reception. And then in February of 1965, the President had a meeting one night of the Democratic leadership, of the Whip and Assistant Whips and a couple of staff people, and I was down there for that session. But I was never in the President's office itself while LBJ was president that I can recall. And I was never in Bill Moyers' office. I would see him once in a while, but always just on a casual--I guess I talked to him on the phone a few times.

B: I was asking because apparently Mr. Moyers and President Johnson parted with some bitterness that both of them still find it difficult to talk about.

H: Well, I never did know. I have not seen Bill since he left; I've never had a chance to talk to him about it. Of course, I've never had a chance to talk to the President about it. I wouldn't talk to the President about it.

I was sorry that Bill left because I thought the President needed him very badly, but I was sympathetic with him leaving from Bill's own point of view. Bill had served him long and faithfully; Bill is a very independent man. He's a man who is entitled to make his own career. I heard that the President was unhappy when Bill decided to leave him and go to the Peace Corps. But men in public life, most of them you know, can't understand why any staffer would want to do anything except to serve them. And the officeholder himself has a motivation and has a potential reward that the staff man doesn't have. And Bill Moyers and Horace Busby and others came to the President's aid when he became
president under tragic circumstances and stayed on and on and on, and I would strongly defend Bill Moyers' right to do exactly what he did. And if he had ever talked to me about it at the time, I would have advised him to do what he did. No man is indispensable or should be indispensable to an officeholder. And whether there was bitterness or not, I don't know. But Bill Moyers served him exceptionally well, it seems to me, and if there was a bitterness there, until I knew more of the facts, I'd be on Moyers' side.

B: Back to politics again. Is it true that the Democratic National Committee in 1964 and 1968 had fallen on hard times?

H: I've never known them when they weren't having hard times.

B: Well, more so than usual.

H: I can't imagine them being short of money in 1964.

B: Well, not only money, but in organization.

H: Well, of course, I worked for the Democratic National Committee part time for two years. And I suppose they're a necessary evil, but I just don't have a very high opinion of the role of national committees in either party in the middle of the twentieth century. It seems to me that when they're out of power, they spend all their time raising enough money to pay the salaries of the help and pay the rent. When they're in power, they don't have say about it--the say is all down at the White House. That applies to the Republican National Committee as well as the Democratic National Committee. They do some housekeeping chores, but it seems to me that the main existence of both national committees revolves around raising money. Any major decision, when your party is in the
White House, all major decisions are made by the president. And I don't blame the presidents--I'd make them too. When you're out of power, the national committee is, oh, I suppose it's some sort of a link or an information center of sorts, but the national committee chairman doesn't speak for the party. He has no authority to speak for the party when it's out of power. That was the quarrel between Paul Butler and Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn, and I think they were absolutely right in that. Frankly, I just never have seen too much major good that was done by either national committee in my time, except fund-raising, and they pay their way on that.

B: I'm down to the real general questions now, and I'm almost done, you'll be happy to know. You mentioned earlier that you had known Mrs. Johnson for a long time. Would you count her as a major influence on her husband's career?

H: Well, of course, I can't answer that, not knowing the personal relationship. Certainly, with everybody that I've ever known that I've ever heard express an opinion, she has been a great, great asset to him in the opinion of everybody I've ever heard talk about it.

B: She's a pretty good politician herself, too, isn't she?

H: Well, I've often thought that if he had listened to her judgment more often on things, he might have avoided some of the headaches he had. I've always thought her judgment about life, not just politics--she has what Sam Rayburn loved so much. She had common sense, and he said, "When you've got common sense, that's all the sense there is." And she has it. She has demonstrated, as first lady, what people who had known
her before had always know about her. Her judgment just seems to be first-rate on everything she undertakes, socially, politically, personally. I have heard more people talk about the way she responded to the Walter Jenkins crisis. She went immediately to that family which had been part of her family, and she put out the most beautiful statement, the most understanding statement. And I think that everybody that I heard mention it spoke of her with appreciation and awe. When many a politician's wife would have waited to see which way the wind was going to blow, she didn't. She did the human and the wise thing. That's just a sample of her reaction under stress. I just never have heard anybody criticize Lady Bird.

B: I have now run out of questions. Is there anything you think ought to be covered that we haven't, anything else you'd like to say on this kind of record?

H: In my opinion, he used the telephone more than any president in our history to try to persuade members of Congress to vote for things that he wanted passed or that he wanted killed. He was not afraid on legislative matters to commit the full personal prestige of the presidency on individual members. I'm not sure how this worked. Larry O'Brien could tell you exactly, but it's my impression that in the House, for example, we would decide after these numerous conferences in the Speaker's office that there were perhaps thirty people that would be highly useful and maybe determinative if the President would call them personally. And that list would be made up by the Larry O'Brien staff and given to the President in order of importance, and that he would go as far down that
list and make as many calls as his time would permit. I don't recall ever knowing of that being done in the Kennedy Administration. President Kennedy used the phone a great deal, but it was usually for a specific thing. I don't recall hearing of President Kennedy using such a list and making five, ten, fifteen, twenty-five calls on a piece of legislation.

B: Was there ever any danger that that kind of clout would be diluted by being used too much? Did you try to reserve that kind of thing for an absolute necessity?

H: Well, I don't think anybody in the United States if the president is trying to get them to do something they don't want to do--there's not anybody that doesn't puff up a little when the president of the United States calls.

B: No matter how many times he does it?

H: No matter how many times, no matter whether you turn him down or not, no matter whether he puts the blowtorch to you or not. There's something self-expanding about the ego when you get a call from the White House; it doesn't have to be the president. There's an almost mystical awe about the White House, something akin to the Royal Palace. The only man I ever heard of turning down a call from the president was [Congressman] Clarence Cannon, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, refused to talk to Kennedy, but there are not many Clarence Cannons, and he wouldn't do that--I've never heard of him doing it but once. No, it's very difficult to say no to a president of the United States. The fact
that Johnson would do this was just a measure of the extra hours and the extra energy that he put into the office, it seems to me.

B: What about the weaknesses? You've praised the President highly. Does he have weaknesses?

H: Oh, of course he has weaknesses. He's a man on a gigantic scale, intellectually, physically, emotionally. I think people do not see some aspects of him. One is that this man is a deeply emotional and a sentimental man—a very deeply sentimental man. He's a man to whom tears are not foreign. He's a man of so many moods, a kaleidoscopic man. One of his weaknesses always, I think, was in his lack of understanding of how to work with the press. It always seemed to me that he never had a sure sense of press relations; that he either courted them too strongly or he gave them too much of the cold shoulder; that he confided in some of them too much, or that he was too inaccessible. He never had, it seemed to me, a sure sense of press relations. Now, I don't expect any president over a long period of time to have good press relations; I don't think it's possible if a president is doing anything, because the president and the press had two different jobs to do that are—there's a built-in conflict there.

But I think that some of the things that he did in connection with press relations—I felt, for example, that he overexposed himself on TV, radio, and the press. Mr. Rayburn said one time, "A politician has got to have publicity; it's his life blood, but he can damn well get too much of it, because the people are smart as hell and they know good and well that a man can't be doing something important every day in the
year." And I felt that the President was--it's like an appearance of the king; he certainly should appear, but his appearances should all be highlighted. And I felt that there were too many bill signings, too many--going to Harry Truman on Medicare and going to Ellis Island on immigration were great, but there were many of those that I thought could have been dispensed with to his own advantage. I thought the walks around the White House lawn with people trailing him madly were just not helpful.

Maybe he tried to do too much--I don't think so. I think a president in the modern time has to be very much of an activist, but the more times you go to bat, the more times you're going to strike out. That's the penalty you pay for being an activist. A story said the other day that thus far Richard Nixon had scored two bunts and no hits. Well, he has got a pretty good batting average, but he hasn't scored yet. Johnson scored many times, but there were also some--relatively few, but there were some strikeouts.

I thought many times that he was probably unduly sensitive. All public officials have a large ego; you can't stay in public life and survive in public life without believing very, very strongly in yourself and your own fate. But I felt that he was more thin-skinned than he should have been. And a lot of times when people say things you don't appreciate, you just brush them aside and don't let them worry you. I think the President--that's not anything you can impute fault to him for, that was just the nature he was born with. But I think that was one of his weaknesses as a president.
People have said on the Vietnam War that he was too stubborn. Well, I don't buy that at all. I think he did what any self-respecting president of the United States would have done under the circumstances. The fact that in hindsight we see that he got bad advice or bad information from some people—I don't know who; I would say perhaps the military—they told him they could do things that they were not able to do. I do remember that meeting at the White House with the whips. I don't know whether we've covered that or not.

B: Not the subject matter.

H: Well, the President wanted a meeting—this was early in 1965, I would think the latter part of February; the White House Calendar will reflect it. And he invited down the Speaker, the Majority Leader, the Whip, Deputy Whip, Assistant Whips, and a couple of staff people. It was a fascinating evening for me. We were to meet in the Red Room. It was all set up in the Red Room. Well, the President came in late and he looked around and he said, "This setup is no good. This is a mess." And it was a mess, crowded and just inappropriate. So he made them change it all around, and we met in the State Dining Room. And he and all the members who could crowd around sat at this great enormous table, and a few of us sat in chairs over on the sides. And the President started off by apologizing for being late. And he said, "I was in approving the bombing targets for tomorrow in Vietnam." And he started saying, "There is never any let up in the office." And hanging on the west wall of the State Dining Room was this big portrait of Abraham Lincoln, and the President waved toward it and said, "He walks these
halls every night. His ghost walks these halls every night. You have these problems with you twenty-four hours a day. There's never any escape from them."

And then he started in a monologue of what he apparently had told the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And he said, "Now, don't you be talking to me about fighting eight hundred million of them," referring, I suppose, to Communist China, "when you haven't proved to me by a damn sight that you know how to lick fourteen million of them. So don't you be talking to me about any eight hundred million of them. I don't know how to fight a war, I wasn't trained for that, but you were, and if you don't know how to fight and win a war, then we've wasted a hell of a lot of money on your educations. But don't you be talking to me about fighting any eight hundred million." And he went on on this monologue.

Then he started talking to the people assembled about the importance of winning and winning on Capitol Hill. Medicare was in a critical state then in the committee, and the committee had adopted a couple of amendments that he didn't like. He was saying, "We've got to undo this." They were trivial amendments about the inclusion of fees or something. And I remember him slapping his hands together--he said, "You've got to Johnny-at-the-rat-hole. You've got to be Johnny-at-the-rat-hole all the time," and everybody laughed, you know. And so then he singled out a member from Alabama, who had just put through a bill with great skill--Bob Jones. And Jones had gotten this bill through in a brilliant handling of legislation. And he said, "I don't know how you did it. Brilliant! Masterful! I've never seen anything greater since
I've been in Washington! I want to congratulate you. It's just marvelous! It's just great!"

And then he turned to somebody else and he'd chide them and say, "I'm going to pick on you now. I'm going to pick on you. Why didn't you do this? Why didn't you do that?" And so forth and so on. And then I remember he bore down on something and Dan Rostenkowski, the congressman from Chicago, who was a big hefty fellow who is now chairman of the Democratic caucus in the House, and I was sitting next to Danny. Here Danny came out of the Daley machine and so forth, but the President made one of these points. And Danny leaned over to me and said, "God, he's tough!"

But there was this great range of emotions displayed, from near anger to ribald humor, to history--appeals to history; it was a very fascinating intellectual and dramatic display. It was a performance that--I don't like to call it a performance, but it was an evening that held you on the edge of your seat. This man had such a knowledge of all these little developments of issues and such a knowledge of the problems involved and these changing moods, the lights and shadows were constantly changing, you know. It had to be seen to be believed, but this was the man showing all these phases of his personality.

So the meeting finally broke up. It was a long meeting and the President said, "Well, I apologize. I'm going to have to leave now. I've kept Senator Dirksen waiting for about forty minutes," or twenty minutes or whatever it was. And so as the meeting broke up, Senator Dirksen wandered in. And he was down there to talk about civil rights.
The President had won him over to support, or was going to eventually win him over to support cloture.

Well, the President the night before had delivered a speech in Congress. And it was a very--I think that was the "We Shall Overcome" speech, if I'm not mistaken, and it was a terrific speech. So the members were crowding around him, and I happened to be standing right close to the President. Dirksen had wandered right up to him. Members were saying, "That was a great speech last night, Mr. President. That was a great speech!" And Dirksen cut in and said, "Too damned long!" And the President wheeled on him, irritated obviously, and he said, "Well, when you get interrupted forty-one times by applause, of course it's going to be long." And Dirksen stood his ground and said, "Huh! Still too damned long!" But the obvious relationship between the two men was very easy and very close.

But it made an indelible impression on me. He was talking that night about the whites of the world were outnumbered by the people of other colors and how we couldn't just be an island with all the good things of life when the rest of the world didn't have them, that we had to realize this, that we were very much the minority in the world and we'd better understand this. He was talking in global philosophical terms as well as minute terms about a specific amendment on a specific bill. I don't think anybody could have seen him in that without recognizing that this is an absolutely unbelievable human being, aside from his presidency or decisions. He undoubtedly has one of the--

End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview III
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interviews of D. B. Hardeman

In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Maury Maverick, Jr., of San Antonio, Texas, Executor of the Estate of D. B. Hardeman, do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of personal interviews conducted on February 26, March 12 and April 22, 1969 at Washington, D.C., and on January 19, 1977 in San Antonio, Texas, and prepared for deposit in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions:

(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

(2) The tape recordings shall be available to those researchers who have access to the transcript.

(3) Until May 15, 1998, the D. B. Hardeman Estate retains all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter, the copyright in both the transcripts and tape recordings shall pass to the United States Government. Until May 15, 1998, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts and tape recordings without express consent in each case.

(4) Copies of the transcripts and tape recordings may be provided by the Library to researchers upon request.

(5) Copies of the transcripts and tape recordings may be deposited in or loaned to institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library.

Donor Maury Maverick, Jr. as Executor only
Date May 11, 1988

Don W. Wilson
Archivist of the United States
Date May 26, 1988
Okay, let me mention this now because I may never think about it again. A person that might have a little note on Johnson that you haven't got now is a former Princeton professor named John J. Corson, C-O-R-S-O-N. I think he lives in Alexandria, Virginia now or Arlington or northern Virginia, and I think he's a consultant now. But he's had a distinguished teaching career. He's an expert on bureaucracy and upper managerial bureaucracy, written some books on it. I think Brookings published one of them. But anyhow, Jack Corson was the deputy to Aubrey Williams. He told me this story which I didn't write down because it really didn't pertain particularly to me. But I don't know whether you have [this story] in your files, and I don't know the story. But I was looking for a job in 1937. When did LBJ become head of the NYA, 1937?

G: No, that was in 1935.

H: 1935. So it was announced, as I recall, on Friday that the National Youth Administration in Texas would be headed by a state legislator, or former state legislator maybe, named DeWitt Kinard, K-I-N-A-R-D, of Port Arthur, who was a good friend of mine. So I jumped for joy because I thought
DeWitt would give me a job. It's very distinct and clear in my mind. Well, nothing was ever heard of DeWitt Kinard again, and early the next week Lyndon Johnson was named head of the NYA. So something happened over the weekend and I don't know what it was. But Jack Corson told me this story. I knew him when he was at Princeton.

He said, "Aubrey Williams was out of town and a situation came up involving the Texas NYA. We were in a jam. Aubrey came back into town and came by the office briefly. I told him that we had a mess in Texas. I didn't know what to do about it. Aubrey said, 'I'm busy. I'm leaving town. I've got to catch that train. You go to Sam Rayburn and see what his advice is.' I went to see Mr. Rayburn, and Mr. Rayburn said, 'Yes, I know what you ought to do. Dick Kleberg has or has had a young boy, young fellow, working for him and he'd be just the right man for you. His name is Lyndon Johnson. Check him out.'"

I'd like for you to talk to Corson because he would remember the details. It wasn't important for my project so I didn't explore it any further.

G: Perhaps it was Corson rather than Williams who ended up appointing Lyndon Johnson.

H: He worked it out apparently, yes. But it's just something that might be worth your checking out. Corson I believe is a management consultant, living in northern Virginia. John J. Corson.

G: Sure.

Let's start at the end and get the story on the last time LBJ saw Sam Rayburn alive.
Okay. In the last weeks of his life, Mr. Rayburn would come and go from what I would call it a coma. He'd be very lucid; he'd be very talkative perhaps, and then he would slip away and he would be totally incommunicative. He would be like he was in a coma. You never knew. One morning the nurse and myself were with him. Three of us: H.G. Dulaney, John Holton, and myself, took turns about staying up all night at the hospital. One of us was there every night. This particular night I was on, and he usually would wake very early in the morning. So we were there.

He said belligerently, "Give me a cigarette." So I lighted a cigarette for him. Before I got it lit he had drifted off, so I went ahead and smoked the cigarette. In just a few minutes he opened his eyes and said, "You never did give me that damn cigarette." But that's the way it was. He'd drift in and out. He might be out for a couple of hours or a couple of minutes. There was no way of predicting it.

John Connally came up. Rayburn was supposed to make a speech out at the Veteran's Hospital on November 11, and of course couldn't make it. So John Connally took his place and came by to see him. He said to John, "John, I'm mighty sick, or "I'm a mighty sick man." John said, "Yes, I know you are, Mr. Speaker. But we're doing everything we can to make you well again." So he was very lucid when John was there.

A couple of days later, and I don't know the date, but you can check that out, LBJ--Vice President Johnson then--flew in and landed
the helicopter on the school grounds, which was across the street from the little hospital in Bonham. He came over there. There were a number of people in Rayburn's room at that particular time. Vice President Johnson went over to the bed, and he took Rayburn's hand in his two hands and he said, "Hello, pardner." Rayburn was in a coma; he didn't respond at all. So the Vice President leaned over very close to him, still holding his hand in his two hands, and said, "Hello, pardner," and Rayburn showed no sign of recognition. LBJ straightened up and he had the most grief-stricken look on his face. He was a shattered man as he straightened up. As I was telling Mrs. Johnson the other night, it was the first time that he had accepted the fact that he had lost Sam Rayburn. The look on his face, I never saw at any other time in his life. But he was a shattered man. He sort of turned on his heel and walked out, got on the helicopter, and went away. That was the last time he saw him alive. He knew he was terminally ill. In fact, the Vice President was the first person that alerted me to the fact that he thought something was materially wrong with Rayburn.

G: What did he say?

H: The Speaker came back from the July 4 vacation and he said, "The damndest thing happened to me while I was at home. I got the worst crick in my back. I went to Dr. [Joe] Risser in Bonham and he gave me some shots and it didn't help any. I went back and I said, 'You got to do better than that. I've got a bad case of lumbago,'" which nobody today ever hears about. But to the old-timers, lumbago
was a big thing. And he said, "I've got this [backache]." Well, those of us on the staff thought it was lumbago or a backache or something.

But I went out to a party at Judge Gene Worley's house. LBJ was at the party. I said something to him. He was telling with great hilarity about getting Rayburn to go to Dr. Janet Travell, Kennedy's back physician, down at the White House. He finally convinced the Speaker that he ought to let Dr. Travell examine him and see what she could do for him. So she started giving him shots in the back. He started putting on his pants standing up, and she bawled him out: "Don't you ever do that! Let me show you how to put your pants on. Sit down and put them on one leg at a time and then stand up and draw them up." That made him mad and he said, "Ain't any woman alive going to tell me how to put my britches on!" (Laughter)

So the Vice President said—I said something about I hope his lumbago gets better or something—"Well, D.B., I think in a week or so we'll know whether it's lumbago or whether it's something much more serious." So he sensed that something was wrong. Well, then he began to lose weight and he couldn't eat; he lost his appetite. Dr. Walter Judd, the Republican congressman from Minnesota, told people, "Of course, I haven't examined him, but I have been a victim of cancer for many years myself." I don't know how many operations he'd had for skin cancer. He said, "All the appearances to me are that he has cancer."
But he went to either Walter Reed or Bethesda, and I've got to check this out. They gave him every kind of exam on earth: X-rays; he took barium, and all this business. He came back and he said that they told him, "We don't know what's wrong with you but we'll tell you one thing, there's nothing organically wrong with you." So I have been told—and this is something else, a little detail to check out—he went out and had supper that night with the Bob Bartleys, his nephew who was on the FCC. I've been told that when he walked in he laid his hat down and he said, "Well, thank God I don't have cancer."

So the staff has never known whether he ever [knew]. He told me one time, "My brother thinks I've got cancer of the gut. Well, Dr. Risser said that all the Rayburns die of cancer at very old ages." Well, they didn't all die of cancer, but many of them died of cancer. Four or five in the family, of his brothers and sisters, did die of cancer at very old ages, up around eighty. So John Holton and myself and H.G. Dulaney, we've talked for hours debating the question as to whether Rayburn ever accepted the fact that he had cancer. We don't know. John Holton says that the only time Rayburn ever referred to it was when he was in Baylor Hospital in Dallas. He said, "John, do you know what's wrong with me?" He said, "No, I don't, Mr. Speaker. Why don't you ask your doctor?" Well, he never asked the doctor.

The best indication, as I was telling Mrs. Johnson the other night, that Rayburn knew he was terminally ill, W.B. Ragsdale,
"Rags" Ragsdale of the U.S. News [and World Report], who was a friend of his of many years standing, made an appointment to go to Bonham and interview him. He had to wait ten days until Rayburn was well enough to see him. So Rayburn was lying on a cot out on the back porch, the sun porch, when the tape recorder was going. Rags got through with his questions and then he said, "Well, now, Mr. Speaker, that's all I have. Is there anything you'd like to say?" He said, "Yes, there is, Rags." Then he spoke a long paragraph, sort of a peroration. This is in U.S. News, January of 1962, I believe. It's a marvelous interview and the last part of it is a distillation of Rayburn's philosophy, in which he said, "98 per cent of the people in this world are mighty good people, and if you'll meet them halfway, they'll meet you halfway." And he went on in that vein. I said, "Rags, did you have the feeling when he was saying that that he knew this was probably his last interview and that this was the end?" Rags said, "There was no question in my mind that he knew what he was doing."

But he never gave us an indication--we were with him every day--of accepting the fact that he was seriously or terminally ill, and I just don't know.

G: Let me ask you one thing about that LBJ visit to the hospital down there. Did LBJ say anything to you on the way in or on the way out expressing his feelings, before or after that visit?

H: When he came in I met him at the door to the hospital. He appeared to me to be emotionally disturbed. He said something that I couldn't
hear distinctly. I thought he just kind of muttered, "God bless you," or something like that, which was quite uncharacteristic of him. When he left, I don't think he said a word to any of us. I think he was so deeply moved that he didn't say anything. [That's] my recollection of it. Of course, it's been fifteen years. But I could very easily forget it. My recollection is that his face was so grief-stricken that he just turned and walked out of the hospital, and nobody tried to interrupt him or stop him. Everybody understood the depth of his feelings. So I don't think he said anything as he left. Coming in he was uncommunicative. He wanted to see Rayburn; that's the reason he was there. So he just kind of stalked into the hospital, went over to Rayburn, and took his hand in his hands. I have the intuition that he knew Rayburn was dying, but it really hadn't hit home until he found that he had had his last word with Rayburn, he would never again have a conversation with Sam Rayburn. Then it really hit.

G: Did Mr. Rayburn have a corresponding mental decline before he went in the hospital? Was he at all senile?

H: He never declined mentally. His mind was just as bright the last time he was lucid. Two days before he died Henry Gonzalez was elected to Congress. I got the Dallas News about six o'clock in the morning, and there was the news of Henry's election. So I went in. The old man had wasted away to nothing. I don't suppose he weighed seventy pounds when he died. To change his bed we'd pick him up in our arms, just like you would a baby, he was that light.
But I went in to him and I said, "Mr. Speaker, Henry Gonzalez was elected yesterday. He won by about ten thousand votes." In his last days Mr. Rayburn would speak very low. He always did speak low. It made him mad to have to repeat himself. That was one of his characteristics, that he'd just puff up when you said, "What did you say, Mr. Speaker?" He'd just kind of puff up in anger. He mumbled something and I said, "I didn't understand you, Mr. Speaker." So he puffed up and he raised his voice, "I said what was the percentage?" Two days before he died he wanted to know what Henry Gonzalez' winning percentage was.

(Interruption)

G: Let's get back to some of the earlier years. One of the things we were talking about before we turned on the machine was Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn as opposites. You mentioned in particular LBJ's love of gadgets versus Mr. Sam's abhorrence of gadgets. Do you want to elaborate on that again?

H: Well, Rayburn really would have been happier in the nineteenth century, when you didn't have all of this impedimenta of modern living. He was totally lacking in mechanical ability. He couldn't even unlock a door. He was a terrible driver; he was a very dangerous driver. He was much more at home on a horse than he was in an automobile. I mentioned the telephones. When they put in the dial phones in the Capitol, he wouldn't let them put a dial phone on his desk. He made them leave the old-style telephone on his desk so he could pick up the phone and talk to the operator and get her to get the
number. He told H.G. Dulaney to have the second phone taken out of the Rayburn Library to save money, and said, "Hell, I can't talk over but one phone at a time." H.G. said, "Mr. Rayburn, you'll be wanting to make a call and somebody will have the phone tied up and then you'll be mad." But Rayburn's idea was to keep life as simple as possible.

I went in a secondhand store there in Bonham and there was a twenty-one-year-old kid in there who went to East Texas [State] University. He said, "I had a famous visitor this morning." I said, "Who was that?" He said, "I was here by myself, and I looked up and this little bald-headed man was walking up the steps. I recognized him. It was Sam Rayburn. He came in and I said, 'What can I do for you?' He said, 'I'm looking for a secondhand stopper for a bathtub. I found one. He said, 'How much?' and I said a quarter. He paid me the quarter and I introduced myself. He knew my father. When my dad got back I said, 'Sam Rayburn was in here and he bought a secondhand stopper for the bathtub, paid me a quarter. But you're not going to get the quarter; I'm saving that for my little boy.'"

But it was that kind of simplicity, where President Johnson loved the grandiose and the spectacular. Mr. Rayburn said he said to LBJ once--and of course, as you well know, he loved LBJ--"Lyndon, I don't run around and yell and wave my arms half as much as you do and I think I get just as much done." (Laughter) So this was the difference in the nature of the men.
But contrasting particularly his attitude toward the telephone with LBJ's.

Well, LBJ was the first man I knew of that had a thirty-two push button thing on his desk, you know, just all sorts [of gadgets]. And LBJ lived to use the phone. One of his assistants was working in the Democratic Policy Committee. He was working on his dissertation, and he was there about midnight one night, he said, and the phone rang. He picked up the phone; it was LBJ in Nevada or someplace, and he said, "What's going on?" You know, there wasn't any business to transact, but he just couldn't resist using that telephone to phone. He couldn't think of anybody else to phone so he phoned the policy committee office and there just happened to be a staff assistant in there.

You know, this love of airplanes--Rayburn didn't like flying. He finally got used to it when his sister, Miss Lou, was dying of cancer. But he had flown with Eisenhower in 1945, right after World War II, when Eisenhower, who didn't know where he was born, finally was convinced that he was born in Denison. He went to Denison for a homecoming. Rayburn flew down with him on a military plane and didn't like it. So he wouldn't fly until Miss Lou got sick, and to see her he had to fly. So he got used to it. But he was disturbed about people drinking on the plane and getting unruly. He's responsible for the CAB putting in the rule limiting alcohol to two drinks. When he got back to Washington, he called them and just raised holy hell about people getting drunk on the
plane. So that rule, that's one of his legacies, the two-drink limit on airplanes today.

But they were different generations. They were just different men. LBJ loved--my experience with him was--the brand-new, the modern. Rayborn loved the old.

G: One more story I want to get you to tell is that story of Speaker Rayburn coming back from the Senate, "that place," and talking about LBJ using two phones.

H: Oh, well, this was very late in his life. Rayburn seldom went over to the Senate. He wouldn't go over there to eat if he could avoid it. He had a disdain for the Senate. He said, "Can you imagine an outfit that doesn't have any rules?" He referred to the Senate as "that place." He thought their legislative workmanship was very poor compared to that of the House. Part of it was the ancient rivalry between the House and the Senate. But nevertheless, on this occasion he went over to the Vice President's office for some reason. He came back and he was really irked. He said, "I'm never going over to that place again. I'm never going to his office again. I went over there to talk to him, and the whole time I was there he had two telephones, one on each shoulder, and he was carrying on two conversations at the same time, and me sitting there, cooling my heels. I went over there, damn it, to talk to him. Why he didn't tell those assistants, 'Don't you put any calls through until I get through with this conversation,' I don't know. But I'm not ever going back over there." But it was that kind of a relationship.
He loved LBJ, but LBJ would irk him with some of his mannerisms.

He told me another story about LBJ going down with Rayburn in Rayburn's car at night, down Pennsylvania Avenue. LBJ had the Washington Star, and he had the light on and was reading it. He said, "Lyndon, turn that light out." And LBJ went on reading. And he said, "Lyndon, turn that light out! It gets in George Donovan's eyes." George Donovan was the chauffeur. "It gets in George's eyes. Makes it hard for him to drive." LBJ kept reading the paper. Rayburn said he said, "Goddamn it, Lyndon, turn that light out!" Johnson flipped the light off. (Laughter) But it was that kind of a relationship.

He was a fierce defender of Johnson. Anybody say anything against Johnson, why, you had to tangle with Rayburn. He might bawl Johnson himself out, but he defended Johnson against one and all.

G: Why do you think he was so loyal to LBJ and thought so highly of him?

H: Well, he admired his mastery. He said, "I love a master of anything." He believed in Johnson's goodness. He knew he was the absolute master of his business.

G: Did he ever talk about LBJ's skill in the Senate or his mastery in the Senate?

H: Oh, I don't think I can talk about it specifically. But LBJ would come over to the Board of Education when he could; I don't know how often because I wasn't there that often myself, but once, twice, maybe three times a week, depending on the business. He kept his
own bottle of Cutty Sark over at the Board of Education. He wouldn't
drink Rayburn's whiskey. He had to have Cutty Sark. So he kept his
bottle of Cutty Sark in a drawer of Rayburn's desk. He would sit
over in the southwest corner of the room in one of these big Turkish
chairs that the Capitol is famous for. Rayburn said one time, "By
God, he tells us every little detail of what went on in the Senate,
and I don't want to hear that much about the Senate." But LBJ would
tell what they'd done, the maneuvers they had. I remember one time
he said, "Jake Javits has the most brilliant mind in the Senate and
he drives everybody up the wall." He would evaluate men and issues.

G: Do you recall any of these evaluations?

H: Well, one time he said that Tom Hennings, a senator from Missouri,
who was, I guess you would have to say, an alcoholic; he was drunk
most of the time, whether he was an alcoholic or not. But when he
was sober, I remember one time that LBJ, who was majority leader
then, said he has the most brilliant constitutional mind in the
Senate. It was Tom Hennings in one of the great shows of mental
brilliance in the history of the Senate [who killed] the Bricker
Amendment [which] had I think sixty-two co-authors, sixty-one
collectors. Tom Hennings sobered up and attacked the Bricker Amend-
ment so brilliantly that he not only killed it, but he killed it
for all time. It was never revised, never reintroduced, and here
it had nearly two-thirds of the Senate as co-authors. But Tom just
stripped all the flesh off of the bones in a brilliant show, one of
the most brilliant exhibitions of mental power, I guess, in the history of the Senate.

G: What about Richard Russell? Did you ever hear LBJ talk about him?

H: No, I never did hear him talk about Richard Russell. I was in the room out at Phoenix; I was the advance man on the Phoenix meeting for LBJ. I was in his room. He got in at night. The next morning I was in his room while he was eating breakfast off a coffee table, and C.R. Smith, the president of American Airlines, came in while LBJ was getting dressed. He said, "Lyndon, I think you and Jack [Kennedy] are making a mistake. You ought to be talking about and taking credit for the Kerr-Mills bill for medical aid for the aged. You're not talking about that but you ought to be." Senator Johnson was walking back and forth in the room buttoning his shirt, and said, "No, C.R. No. Nope. That bill is a fraud. That bill doesn't do anything. That's a fraud, and we oughtn't to brag about it. It's a subterfuge. It won't get the job done." I remember that quite distinctly. Smith was in the room and brought the subject up.

G: Did he say why it didn't do the job?

H: Well, it just didn't.

G: Just not adequate.

H: They had four years of it. It was a window dressing. Johnson recognized it before it even went into operation for what it was. It bought some time. What it did, it bought some time for the medical profession, the Kerr-Mills bill.
G: We were talking about the Johnson-Rayburn friendship and the ingredients for this relationship. Do you think it had much basis in the fact that personally they were close? Rayburn was often a guest in the Johnson home, watched the family grow up and this sort of thing?

H: Well, I interviewed Senator Johnson then. I interviewed him on Rayburn at one time and made some notes of it. In fact I transcribed it, I think. I didn't have a tape recorder but I transcribed it. One of the things he said--I can't remember it; I'll be glad to give you that--"At every critical moment of my mature life, Sam Rayburn has been there." This is subject to correction because I'm working from memory now, but I do have this written down. Don Bacon has it. [He said], "When Lynda was born, the first person we called was Sam Rayburn. Every critical moment of our mature life, he's been first in our thoughts." Rayburn was very much like a father. His attitude toward Johnson was a mixture of one of very mature respect and at the same time, the attitude of a forgiving parent toward Johnson.

In 1959 I drove down here to spend the fall, at his direction, in Bonham. So he told me to bring him half a case of Virginia Gentleman Bourbon, which he couldn't get in Texas, and a half a case of Haig and Haig Pinchbottle Scotch, which he drank. So I had that case of whiskey in my trunk. I came by way of Iowa to see a friend of mine and then on down to Bonham. I drove in the back yard and Rayburn walked out on the little platform, back of the sun porch. I pulled into the back yard and he didn't say, "Hello,
how was your trip, come in." First thing he said to me, "Did you bring the whiskey?" Then he said, "Lyndon Johnson, Homer Thornberry, and Frank Ikard have been here three days and they drank every damn drop of my whiskey." Then he said, "Get out and come in." But the first thing on the top of his mind was the whiskey. The house was dry as a result of Lyndon Johnson, Frank Ikard, and Homer Thornberry.

This to me was an amusing incident. Eisenhower was getting ready to go to India. So Mr. Rayburn told me, "Lyndon Johnson called me and said Eisenhower wants the leaders to come up there. He's going to brief us on the trip to India. I told him, 'I ain't going. He ain't going to tell us a damn thing that ain't been in the newspapers.'" "No, Mr. Speaker, you've got to go. This is a presidential command. You've got to go," so forth. "I've arranged for General Curtis LeMay to send his plane down and they'll take us to Washington. It's got all these gadgets in it, the latest things," so forth, so on. And Rayburn said, "Lyndon, we can fly tourist on Braniff from Dallas for sixty-three dollars." "No. No. No. We're going to have Curtis LeMay's plane."

I don't know whether I drove him. I guess H.G. Dulaney did the driving. Anyhow, I went with him to Carswell Air Base in Fort Worth. We pulled up to the gate and the air force, with the usual caution, didn't have one KC-135 tanker there, they had two of them standing by. Of course, those things are a block long. So as we pulled up there, Rayburn saw those two gigantic planes there. Because Eisenhower had commandeered General LeMay's plane to take it to India,
the Air Force had to fill in. Here were these two gigantic planes there waiting for the Senator and the Speaker. Mr. Rayburn looked at that and said, "Well, I hope they're big enough to suit Mr. Johnson."

(Laughter)

So we got in there and there were colonels all over the place. You couldn't find anything less than a colonel. They were all shaking with apprehension. You had to climb a ladder to get in the tanker. They had some chairs bolted in the middle of the plane. Mr. Rayburn said he climbed up in that thing, and here were these uncomfortable chairs bolted in the middle of this thing. He turned to one of these full colonels and he said, "Where are the cows?"

He said, "Sir, I don't understand you." He said, "This is the biggest goddamned barn I was ever in." (Laughter) So they rode to Washington and he said, "It was cold. The noise was so great you couldn't talk. It was a miserable ride. We could have gone on Braniff." So they went up there and Eisenhower didn't keep them twenty minutes, I don't think.

This has nothing to do with President Johnson, but George Donovan the chauffeur and John Holton went down to the White House with them. They figured he'd be in there with the President for a couple of hours so they went on to get some breakfast. Eisenhower didn't give them any breakfast; he gave them a hot roll and coffee, I think. So he went out. There was no limousine. He was pacing up and down, getting madder by the minute outside the White House. One
of the reporters asked him, "Why do you think your limousine isn't here?" AP made a story out of this; it was published. He said, "Well, maybe they got more to eat for breakfast than we did." (Laughter) So he said Eisenhower asked him, "How was your trip, Mr. Sam?" He said, "Terrible!"

But you know, Rayburn would have gone tourist from Dallas but not Senator Johnson. That was the difference, you know, one of the many differences in the men.

G: Do you think that Mr. Rayburn was more liberal than Lyndon Johnson? You're a great student of Texas liberals and conservatives.

H: Instinctively, I don't think so. The difference in the two men—Rayburn was an ultraconservative when he went to Congress. I mentioned to him one time that his career paralleled that of William E. Gladstone. They arrived at the different levels of their career at almost identical ages. Gladstone's ideological movement was from way over on the right to well over on the left. He moved leftward all of his life. And I said to Mr. Rayburn, "You've done that, too." He said, "Well, I never thought about that." He said, "When I came to Congress I was under the spell of Joseph Weldon Bailey. Bailey was very reactionary, but he was my hero. He was my boyhood hero and I idolized Joe Bailey. He was about the biggest-brained man I ever knew. And about the vainest man I ever knew. It took me several years to get loose from his ideas. But I was very, very conservative when I came to Congress because I was following Joe Bailey's lead."
But Rayburn was never a liberal. John McCormack, you know, would just eat you out if you called him a liberal. "Don't you call me that! Don't you ever call me that! Liberals are those people who want to own your mind. I'm a progressive. I'm not a liberal. Liberals want to control your mind. I'm a progressive." Rayburn said one time, "I don't care what you call me. You can call me conservative-progressive or progressive-conservative, as long as you have the word progressive in it." And that's what he was. Rayburn was not a liberal. He was not an ideologue to start with. He was a pragmatist.

But I think Johnson had a completely different situation. Johnson had to satisfy a very difficult statewide constituency. Rayburn could never have been elected senator, in my judgment, in Texas. Rayburn's district supported him in a way [and] he had a solid constituency in a way that Johnson never had as a senator.

Now Johnson had a solid constituency, in my judgment, in the Austin district at that time. I think Austin has changed a lot; the city of Austin's changed a lot. But the Austin district used to be a very staunchly, sturdily, liberal district, a progressive district. Then when all the lobbyists moved to town, why, it began to change. Then when you get on a statewide basis, Senator Johnson had a very different set of problems. Because after big oil arrived, Texas has become a very sharply divided state, as you know. In my book, Texas is basically a Republican state today, and was during much of his senatorial career. I think it's demonstrated that
Kennedy and Johnson carried the state by only twenty-five thousand votes, a very small margin, with all the appeal that that combination had for Texas. Texas went heavily for Eisenhower, landslided for Eisenhower both times.

So Senator Johnson had a very difficult balancing act. I have always thought that his instinct, his gut instincts, were very much on the populist side. A lot of my friends who didn't like LBJ would never agree to that. They thought he was a pawn of the oil and gas companies, and so forth. Certainly he befriended them. He helped them a whole lot. There's no question about that. But I don't think that he could have remained in the Senate and done otherwise. I don't think he could have been re-elected if he had followed another path.

Rayburn did, too. Rayburn knew what a rapacious bunch of people the big oil companies were, but he looked at it from a different point of view. Too many people in Texas derived their livelihood from oil and gas, from working for the companies, from working for the service companies, banking, selling things to the companies. He wasn't trying to help Sinclair or Gulf or Texaco. He was trying to help the people of Texas who had a livelihood involved, and the landowners and so forth. So that's why Rayburn carried water for the oil and gas people, just as [William] Proxmire carries water or Hubert Humphrey carries water for the dairymen in Minnesota and Wisconsin. Rayburn was doing the same thing, and Johnson was doing the same thing for parochial oil and gas interests.
G: When Lyndon Johnson was majority leader and Mr. Rayburn was speaker during the fifties, did you see any major philosophical differences on pieces of legislation that were considered by both houses that would indicate one was more progressive than the other?

H: Yes, there again I think it was because of the difference in their constituencies.

G: The civil rights legislation?

H: No, I don't think on civil rights. I think, if anything, Johnson was more audacious on civil rights legislation than Rayburn was. I think Johnson sensed the need for action before Rayburn did. I think he convinced Rayburn that we had to act. That's my feeling about it. I can't document it.

G: Well, one of the points that [Alfred] Steinberg has raised in his biography of Rayburn was that in 1956, with the administration bill proposing a civil rights commission, that while Rayburn managed to get it out of Howard Smith's Rules Committee in the House and get it passed by the House, LBJ effectively killed the bill by having it sent to the Judiciary Committee when it came over to the Senate. You know, that was the occasion where Paul Douglas went over to walk the bill over and it was already gone by the time he got there. Do you recall any of these circumstances here?

H: I wasn't there at the time.

G: Really?

H: I didn't get there until 1957. Before 1957 I don't know the maneuvering, so I just don't know anything about that. Now one point of
difference between Rayburn and Johnson was that Rayburn was much
stauncher in his support of a moderate version of the Griffin-Landrum
bill. He went with Stewart Udall and Frank Thompson and the moderate
group. There were three versions of the bill. There was the Griffin-
Landrum substitute. That's Bob Griffin that's in the Senate now,
and Phil Landrum of Georgia; they were both in the House then. This
was written, I always was told, by the National Association of
Manufacturers. It was a puff, gut labor bill. They were trying
to take advantage of the scandals in the Teamsters and other things
that the McClellan Committee had dug up to really land some body
blows on organized labor. There was the AFL version, the [John F.]
Shelley substitute, which was window dressing. It was nothing but
labor trying to sneak by without making any reforms. George Meany
was then and is now, in my book, a gutless wonder. He presides
instead of leads. Then there was the committee version, the
Education and Labor Committee version, of which Frank Thompson and
Stewart Udall were the principal architects.

The Griffin-Landrum amendment was adopted by the House by six-
teen votes, I believe. The mean version was adopted by sixteen votes.
Rayburn laid all of his prestige on the line. There were only four
members from Texas that stayed with Rayburn and voted for the commit-
te version, for the moderate version. They were Jack Brooks, Wright
Patman, Clark Thompson--I don't know, I'd have to go back. But
Frank Ikard and Homer Thornberry that were with Rayburn every night
in the Board of Education, they left him on that vote. He was more
deeply wounded by that than anything that I ever saw in the years that I was around him. He was really [hurt]. He said, "I feel like I've got a dagger in my back. They stabbed me in my back." He didn't know, but he was suspicious that Johnson might have helped to scare those guys into voting for self-preservation reasons, because the thing was very hot. Johnson didn't have a stake in it himself. But he wondered, he expressed this openly, if Johnson had maybe said to Thornberry and Ikard, "You know, you can't vote for that. You've got to vote for the Griffin-Landrum substitute."

Anyhow, that night, he refused to go to the Board of Education. He said, "Let them cool their goddamned heels down there." You know, he was giving them the treatment. He knew Thornberry and Ikard would be down there. He'd just let them sit there and worry as to whether the old man was coming down. He refused to go down there. We had a drink with him upstairs. He refused to go to the Board of Education that night.

G: Could the others get in without him?

H: Oh, they had keys. Some of them had keys. I don't know who had keys and who didn't.

So then the next night he had Lee Metcalf, Frank Thompson, Stewart Udall—I don't know, he had five or six of the guys that had stayed with him, and we had a drink down in the Board of Education. The others, Ikard, Thornberry, and these other people, didn't show up that night. I guess they were going to wait for him to invite them back. I don't know, that's just a surmise on my part. But
Rayburn said to this group, who'd never been in the Board of Education before, "I wanted to have a drink with my real friends. I feel like I've been among the Philippines"--he was talking about Philistines--"I feel like I've been among the Philippines." He said that deliberately, it was a play on words on his part.

So he told Lew Deschler--I happened to be in the room when he was talking about the conference committee--that he wasn't going to put anybody on the conference committee from the House that had voted for the Griffin-Landrum substitute. Lew Deschler said, "You've got to, Mr. Speaker. The House won't back you on that." He said, "Well, then by God, I'm going to have one of my boys on there, regardless of seniority." So he put Frank Thompson on the conference committee. That's when he and Frank became great loyal friends.

Frank would come to him during the prolonged conference committee, and Rayburn said, "Frank, don't you let that conference break up now. Don't you let that conference break up. You keep them talking. Just keep them talking. I don't care if you talk six months. Keep them talking! Something will give. But don't you let it break up, Frank. Make them talk. Just keep them talking. Keep them talking." And so they did.

Of course, Jack Kennedy was on the Senate side. That was one of the most interesting things I ever did in the years I was on the Hill. That was a very complicated bill and Mr. Rayburn didn't know anything about labor law and neither did I. But he said, "Now, I want you to familiarize yourself with the details of this thing. I
want you to get Senator Kennedy to put you in touch with his experts. You be prepared to brief me on the fine points of the controversies in this bill." So the two people that Senator Kennedy designated for me to work with were Ralph Dungan, who was then later in the White House and ambassador to Chile, and Archie [Archibald] Cox. Archie was the real labor expert, you know. The Supreme Court one day cited Archie Cox's articles three times in one day on labor cases. That was long before he was [the Watergate] special prosecutor.

So this thing went on and on and on. They came out of it with a very moderate bill that was acceptable and nobody's every offered to amend it. It's so fair that both labor and management have let it stand without any effort to amend it. But the House version was a very rough version. It was a bust labor version that was adopted in the House. Jim Wright might not be majority leader today; he might very well, probably would be United States senator, but for that bill. Jim had intended to vote against the Griffin-Landrum bill and Craig Raupe, who's Jim's assistant now and was his assistant then--Craig told me this story--made the mistake just before the vote of taking about three hundred angry telegrams from Fort Worth businessmen over to the speaker's lobby and showing them to Jim just before the vote. Well, Jim voted for the tough version. Then when Jim ran for the Senate the next year or the year after, he was narrowly defeated. Labor deserted him. Jim would be senator today. He's much better off where he is, so that was a defeat that was probably very beneficial for him.
I was told by the old-timers that there was more heat generated by the Griffin-Landrum bill than anything since the Marshall Plan maybe. Anyhow they said there was more heat generated by it than even on the Taft-Hartley Bill. The Amarillo Chamber of Commerce, for example, ran radio spots offering to pay for any telegram that people would send to their congressman or senator, urging the adoption of the Griffin-Landrum substitute. The heat was so bad. There was a young fellow from Georgia, first-termer, and the heat was so excruciating that this kid, Erwin Mitchell, a very fine young man, was taken to the hospital one night. They thought he had a heart attack. It was nothing but strain from the pressure he was under, and he developed shingles. The other members of the Georgia delegation led by old Carl Vinson were so unmerciful to this kid because he was voting wrong as they saw it, that he was a one-termer. Very fine young man. But the heat was excruciating. Of course the Teamsters had done everything on earth. The misdoings in the labor movement had been exposed by McClellan and his committee. This was the big push of management to try to really take advantage of labor. They turned [on] all the heat there was. Of course the Eisenhower Administration was in league with them.

That was a point of divergence. I think that Johnson was much more afraid of the heat on that bill than Rayburn was. But Johnson again had a statewide constituency. Labor was not important to Rayburn. Organized labor was not important to Rayburn in his district. The only organized labor of any consequence in his district
were the railroad brotherhoods, with which he had warred at one time, and then later they became his staunchest supporters. Johnson had a statewide constituency that probably was very strongly—as far as it had an opinion—for the Griffin-Laundrum bill.

G: Rayburn seemed to get along much better with [Ralph] Yarborough and other liberals in Texas than LBJ did. Is that accurate, do you think?

H: Yes, that's right. I think a lot of it was personality. Johnson and the liberals—a lot of their fighting, it seemed to me, was not on an ideological basis, but it was over personalities. You know, Senator Johnson made a mortal enemy out of Frankie Randolph over [the 1956 state convention]. You can make more lifelong enemies out of these silly state conventions than any other way, and they're inconsequential. What difference does it make, normally, as to what a state convention does or doesn't do? But you know, she'd been elected national committeewoman and because they wouldn't seat her rump delegation, she stayed with her delegation. There again, instead of reacting like a pro, which she was, she reacted like a woman who had been offended and insulted, and they were lifelong enemies. They need not have been. They were working the same side of the fence.

But yes, Rayburn was much more tolerant. I don't know the origin of the antagonism between Johnson and Yarborough. I talked to Walter Jenkins about this. We talked about it for about two hours one time soon after I went to Washington. He didn't know how
it came up. I think it was two guys in the same back yard. There just wasn't room for both of them. They were both from Austin. They were both ambitious. There was a personality difference there. I don't know. There may very well have been other things.

Go back to this business of Johnson's progressivism. I have never known, but I have always had the belief that Johnson very quietly voted for Dr. Homer Rainey in 1946. I have no proof of that. Lady Bird would know. But I've never followed up. But Paul Bolton and myself [went to see him]. LBJ was in Seton Infirmary one time in early 1946 for I don't know what, pneumonia I guess. He told me that he'd had pneumonia eight times. This was in 1957, I think that he told me he'd had pneumonia so many times. We went out to see him. I was managing the Rainey campaign; I had just taken over the management of the Rainey campaign. We were talking about the campaign in the hospital room. He never did say, "Well, I'm for him," or "I'm going to vote for him," or anything. But I came out of that visit with him with the very strong suspicion that he was going to very quietly vote for Homer Rainey. I've never followed up on it. It's of no consequence. I certainly wouldn't have ever mentioned it while he was alive because there are still people around that hate Rainey even though he's been gone thirty years.

But I think his basic philosophy--leave out what he had to do politically--was best expressed in that "We Shall Overcome" speech to Congress. I think that was the true Johnson. I think his instinct for the little man, his instinct for the liberal or the progressive
approach, was the natural Johnson. The fight on Leland Olds, the things for the oil industry, these were things that people have to do to stay in office. But I think every time he had a chance to put in a lick for the little guy, he did.

G: Let's talk about their relationship with Texas conservatives now, particularly Allan Shivers. Do you think that LBJ was able to get along with Shivers more than Mr. Rayburn was?

H: Well, he made an effort; Rayburn made no effort. Rayburn despised him and I suspect Johnson did, too.

G: What was the genesis of the Rayburn-Shivers conflict?

H: Well, they didn't really know each other but to Rayburn, Shivers was a turncoat and an ingrate. A man that will take all the honors from the Democratic Party and then support the Republican for president in Rayburn's book was a son of a bitch. And he made no bones about it.

G: I've heard that there was some instance of deception, too, where he didn't keep his word.

H: Well, this thing intensified. He told me one time, "You know I'm not going to have a single book in my library that has Allan Shivers' name in it." I said, "Mr. Speaker, you're as bad as the Russians, going around cutting names out of history books." He laughed at that, but he was half serious.

No, Rayburn and all of his family, or most of his family, had voted for Rainey. They didn't make any noise about it, they just went in and voted for him. But it was an instinctive vote, like
Rayburn always voted for Yarborough. He'd get mad as the devil at Ralph Yarborough, just furious at him, but he always voted for him. And Ralph Yarborough told him the time Ralph was elected—Rayburn pulled a cutie on that thing. Bill Blakley had been a long-time friend of Rayburn's and had given a substantial amount of money to the Rayburn Library, and a lot of Rayburn's organization was working for Bill Blakley. But they kept saying in the press that Rayburn was winking at his organization to go for Blakley. Well, Rayburn wasn't; Rayburn was staying neutral, staying out of it completely. He told them, "Now, you cut that out now. Don't get me involved in this race, damn you! I'm staying neutral. They're both my friends. Ralph's my friend and Bill Blakley's my friend, and I'm staying out of it. I'm having no part of it. But you quit trying to involve me." Well, they kept on. The Austin American ran a front-page column that Buster Cole was out working for Blakley [and] Rayburn was secretly. Well, it infuriated Rayburn.

Rayburn was a great friend of Walter Hornaday, the Dallas News correspondent, although he hated the News with a passion. He loved Walter Hornaday and it was mutual. So Sarah McClendon was always lurking around. Rayburn had a very aggressive relationship with Sarah. He didn't hesitate to bawl Sarah out and to tangle with 'Sarah, and yet they were good friends. But when Sarah would get too aggressive, why, he'd let her have it. Well, he was irked at the Blakley people. This was a few days before the election. So he was out in the speaker's lobby talking to Walter Hornaday and he
saw Sarah trying to eavesdrop. Rayburn took advantage of this situation and he said, "Well, Walter, I'm staying out of this race. This is just between you and me. You can't print this. Now, this is q.t. This is just between you and me, but I have already voted absentee for Ralph Yarborough." He said it loud enough to make sure Sarah heard it. Well, Sarah rushed to the telephone and phoned the Austin American. It came out all over the state: Rayburn has voted absentee for Ralph Yarborough. Ralph told him, "That meant 200,000 votes to me." But Rayburn leaked it deliberately and then, of course, at the press conference denounced eavesdroppers and people that were horning in on his private conversation and so forth. But he did it so Sarah could hear it.

G: Did he ever talk to you about that? Did he indicate that that was what he had done?

H: Oh, yes, he told me that. Oh, sure, sure. He told me about it. He told me what he'd done. I wasn't there.

G: Excuse me, I didn't mean to interrupt you.

H: No, he told me what he had done. Sure, because I wasn't there at the time he did this. But he did it deliberately. He trapped Sarah into eavesdropping and printing it. This was his way of getting the message to the people of Texas that he had voted for Ralph Yarborough and still be able to disclaim it, as he was a victim of eavesdropping. But it was just a political finessing that he did. But Ralph said it meant 200,000 votes to him. I don't know whether it did or not.
But the Shivers thing, of course Allan then came along in the fight in 1956, when LBJ finally had his confrontation with him and beat him. I think it was then, or maybe it was in the 1952 campaign, that Allan Shivers compared Sam Rayburn to Santa Anna. Allan Shivers said something about Rayburn always put his party ahead of his country. Well, that put Shivers in the class with Richard Nixon. Allan Shivers and Richard Nixon were the only two people that ever challenged Rayburn's patriotism, and neither one was ever forgiven. You could call him every name in the book, but you could not question his patriotism and ever be forgiven. That's one thing he wouldn't take from anybody. And he never forgave Nixon and he never forgave Shivers. You just don't question a man's patriotism. That's something you don't do in politics. That was the unforgiveable sin. So when he said Rayburn put his party ahead of his country, that was the end of the road.

G: Well, how much of LBJ's favorite son candidacy and showdown with Shivers in 1956 was at Rayburn's urging?

H: Only thing I know about it--I wasn't there, I was in Goliad at the time that this happened. Bob Cantrell is the editor of the Bonham Favorite, a friend of mine since 1929. Bob told me that Mr. Rayburn phoned him one day and said, "Bob, could you come out here? I've got a little squib for you." So he said he went out to the Rayburn home. Rayburn had an old used envelope on which he'd scribbled some things. He said, "I favor Lyndon Johnson for favorite son and head of the Texas delegation," and some other words that are in the
It's fascinating.

Yes, it is fascinating.

Senator Johnson, when I interviewed him, told me that he lived in the basement of the old Dodge Hotel when he was up there as an employee of the House. A bunch of the kids had rooms there because they were cheap and the hotel was close by. I had an office in that same basement after I left the Hill. Senator Johnson said it was damp down there and he said, "I've had pneumonia eight times in my life. I've been susceptible to pneumonia, pulmonary troubles, all my life." So he said, "Some of the kids found me there. I was unconscious, and they got me to the hospital. When I came to after"-- I think he said four days, I've got this written down in the interview; Don Bacon has the transcription of it. "When I came to and opened my eyes a little bit, sitting over in the chair was a dumpy, bald-headed man, had a vest on. He was nodding; he'd dropped off to sleep. He had a cigarette in his hands and ashes were all down his vest." And that was Sam Rayburn. He said, "I had met him with my father a time or two, but I didn't know him. There he was, sitting in my hospital room. He owed me no obligation, but he heard that here I was, a country boy from Texas in Washington with no family, new in Washington, all by myself there. He heard that I was in the hospital and he came over to see after me. That was the formation of our friendship." It went on from there.

Was that characteristic of Mr. Rayburn?

Oh, yes.
G: Really?
H: Oh, yes. He used to say, when he was sworn in as speaker, "I want you to know that my door is open at all hours of the day and night to any one of you on either side of the aisle on any personal problem you may have. My door is open to all Democrats on any political problem you may have." And he meant it.

Ben Jensen was the ranking Republican on the Appropriations Committee, from Iowa. When Rayburn doubled Henry Clay's record, Ben Jensen made a speech to the House. He said when he first came to Congress as a Republican congressman from Iowa, his first public action, he offered an amendment to some bill. He had the thing screwed up. Somebody raised a point of order on him. He realized he had made a fool of himself on his first showing before the House and he knew how important that was. He said he heard a voice to his left side, and he said, "Jensen, Jensen, ask for unanimous consent to withdraw your amendment and we'll help you write it so it will be okay." He looked around and the Speaker had left the chair and come down on the floor to help a freshman Republican out of a hole. That's in the Congressional Record. Jensen said, "That's what I think of the man." He said, "I did that. I didn't know what to do. I asked for unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment. I drew it down and they helped me to rewrite it so it wouldn't be subject to point of order."

My favorite Rayburn story, I think, is a true one. I talked to the father involved. This appeared in Life magazine originally. It
was a New York Times reporter named Deak [?], his nickname was Deak, Lyman, L-Y-M-A-N. He ended up as vice president of Republic Aircraft Company, up in Connecticut. I read this story and then Deak Lyman came in the office one time and I asked him about it and he verified it. Lyman didn't know Mr. Rayburn. He would go to the Speaker's press conferences, but he was a very junior New York Times reporter. He had a thirteen-year-old daughter that died. He said the next morning, the doorbell rang and he went to the door and there was Sam Rayburn. He said, "Of course, I had met Mr. Rayburn, but I didn't know him really." He said, "Mr. Speaker, I'm amazed to see you here." "Well," he said, "I came by to see what I could do." "Well," he said, "Mr. Speaker, I don't think there's anything. I think we have all the arrangements made." "Well," he said, "have you had your morning coffee?" And he said, "No, sir, we've been too busy." He said, "Well, I can at least make the coffee." So he said he came in the house and made the coffee. He said, "Mr. Speaker, I thought you were having a leaders' meeting at the White House this morning." "Well," he said, "we were, but I called them and told them I couldn't come. I had a friend that was in trouble." Deak Lyman said that's exactly accurate.

Certainly I think his greatest quality was compassion. He was a very compassionate man. He was a very sentimental man beneath all that gruffness. He was a very sentimental individual, but he concealed it with that crustiness.

(Interruption)
The extraordinary drive and energy that both Rayburn and Johnson had, that was one of the qualities that Rayburn admired most in Johnson, that Johnson outworked everybody. Rayburn used to say, "If the fellow at the desk next to you outworks you, he's going to beat you." And Rayburn himself--it would be late in the afternoon, we'd all be tired--he'd say, "What you got?" "Well, Mr. Speaker, we've got two or three letters here, but we'll go over them tomorrow." "Let's do it now." He wouldn't put it off till tomorrow. "Let's do it now."

G: Do you think he worked his staff as hard as LBJ worked his?
H: No. Miss [Alla] Clary told me a story. Rayburn used to stop as he would leave in the afternoon. He had two offices: he had the speaker's office over by the House floor; then he had what we call the back office, back next to the Republican leader's office. [He] had a suite back there that took care primarily of his district business and his social affairs. Then I was back there, but I was the only one that shuttled between the two offices.

So Miss Clary told me this story. She and LBJ had a love-hate relationship through the years. She said that LBJ was over there with Mr. Rayburn late one afternoon. Mr. Rayburn used to stop as he went out and turn and face all the staff and say, "Now, I'm leaving, but don't take the skin off my heels getting out behind me." So he did that, and here was tall LBJ and short Sam Rayburn. They stopped at the door and he turned around and said, "Now, I'm leaving for the day, but don't take the skin off my heels getting
out behind me. You go over to Lyndon Johnson's office nine o'clock at night, the whole staff is there working." And that irked Miss Clary. She said, "Yes. If they were as efficient as we are, they could leave at five o'clock, too." LBJ got furious and stormed out. (Laughter)

But the difference I thought--of course, I was not familiar with the working of the Johnson office--Rayburn was a man who would never make work. He had a disdain for congressmen who were always stirring up their districts, sending them questionnaires. He'd say, "Hell, any way a questionnaire comes out, it's going to be sixty-forty. And then you have to vote. You're going to make at least 40 per cent of them mad. You ask for their opinion and then you flaunt it. Hell, I'd rather argue with them after I voted instead of before and after."

He wanted a small staff. I asked Senator Johnson, "What are his limitations? What are Rayburn's faults?" He said, "Well, there are two: number one, he has no idea in this modern world of how to use a staff, no idea. He uses it in a different way from almost everybody in Congress, but I'm not sure he doesn't know how to use it. He runs his office out of his back-ass pocket." And the second thing was, "He never plans ahead and anticipates emergencies and tries to head them off. He takes them as they come down the pike. He doesn't plan way in advance." I thought after that interview, well, he saves a whole lot of time, because a lot of these things never happen.
He wanted a small staff; he kept a small staff. I was talking to somebody not long ago about this. They said, "How many people did he have?" I said, "Well, in the front office he had John Holton and the receptionist." He had two in the front office. In the back office at the time I worked for him, which was at the end of his career, he had Miss Clary, who kept his social engagement book and took care of his academy appointments, the West Point and Annapolis appointments, he had a stenographer and myself in one room. There were three of us in one room. Then there was his office. Behind there was a tiny office and he had two stenographers there. He had three stenographers, Miss Clary, and myself. He had five in the back, and two in front. He had a total staff of seven. I bet the Speaker today has sixty people. And he didn't want any more.

I had a funny experience there. There was a fellow that was in Congress, came to Congress with Hale Boggs in 1940. Both of them were defeated at the end of their first term. The fellow's name was Jake Davis from Ohio. So, Mr. Rayburn got him a job with Jimmy Forrestal in the Navy Department. Jake went on to become president of the Kroger grocery company. Well, I came in one day and in our office there was Mr. Rayburn over in the corner with Hale Boggs and this other fellow. I was introduced to him as Jake Davis. I didn't know him. Hale said, "Could you use a very bright young Princeton graduate to help you on some of your work if he worked here for free this summer, when he gets out of the Navy? Could you
use him?" I said, "I sure could put him to work." So Mr. Rayburn said, "Okay, that's fine. That's fine."

Well, a month or two passed. One of the girls in Hale's office came over and brought this very bright young guy, he was then about twenty-five I guess. It was Jack Davis. He just gotten finished his Navy training and so forth, so he came there to intern in our office. I had a double-desk like this. I put him over here facing me. Well, I introduced him to Mr. Rayburn. He said, "Well, I'm glad to know you," so forth and so on. Well, a couple of days later John Holton came back to our office just dying laughing. He said, "The Speaker came in this morning and he said, 'I'm really disappointed. I just didn't think D.B. would do something like that.' I said, 'What's that, Mr. Speaker?' He said, 'I just didn't think he would do it. He put somebody on my payroll without talking to me about it.'" (Laughter) He said, "Mr. Speaker, that's Jake Davis' boy. You said he could work here for free. Jake's paying all of his expenses. He's working in your office for free. You told Jake you'd be glad to have him." Mr. Rayburn decided I had put him on the payroll without talking to him about it.

Well, he got to be very fond of Jack. When I had to leave for a period, I'd give Mr. Rayburn a daily briefing on the news. He couldn't read. One eye went blind in 1959 and then the other eye got worse and worse. So I'd try to give him a daily briefing. I didn't always succeed. But Jack filled in and gave him the daily briefings while I was out of town. They got to be great friends.
But he didn't want a big staff. The more people you had around you the more likely they were to get you in trouble, he figured.

G: Did he intimidate his staff the way LBJ seems to have intimidated some of the people [who worked for him]?

H: Oh, no. His staff people were his family. He treated them like they were brothers and sisters.

G: Well, am I correct in assuming that LBJ seems to have intimidated some of his?

H: I guess he intimidated some of them. He had a mercurial nature, as I knew him. In fact, Hale Boggs came back from a leadership meeting one time and he said, "You know, I think I've got as mercurial a temperament as that president." Of course, Hale and LBJ were very fond of each other. The families were very intimate friends. I said, "Yes, Hale, you sure do have." And he did have. I told Lindy [Boggs] what he had said. Lindy was out in the other office. Lindy said, "You go back in there and tell him that he's neither rich enough or important enough to afford such a temperament." (Laughter) Then Hale did get mad when I told him what Lindy had said.

I worked with LBJ a number of times through the years. But you would hear these stories about him, you know, getting upset with somebody, and then turn around and they'd find a color television console at home when they got home that night. It was one of those off-and-on relationships, apparently, working for him. My own feeling about him was that the people who stood up to him got along with him best, that he respected the people.
John [Nance] Garner was like that. Garner tested the metal of a man the minute he met him. Lew Deschler was twenty-five years old and he had just come to work as a clerk for Speaker [Nicholas] Longworth. Longworth and Garner were, Mr. Rayburn said, the deepest friendship he ever saw in Congress. Here was Garner, uneducated, rough, uncouth. Longworth was educated in the finest schools and finishing schools, and played the violin in the courts of Europe, an aristocrat from the word go. He and Garner were inseparable. They just adored each other. They never agreed on anything in their lives.

But he said that Garner said to him one morning--[he was] just a kid from Ohio--"Why the hell did you tell Nick Longworth so and so?" He said, "I didn't tell him that, Mr. Congressman." "The hell you didn't! You sure as hell did!" He said, "Mr. Congressman, I did not tell Speaker Longworth that." "Goddamn it, don't you lie to me! I know you told him that!" Deschler said, "I've got a hot German temper. I slammed the desk in front of me. I said, 'Goddamn you, don't you tell me I'm a liar! I didn't tell Nick Longworth that.'" Garner leaned back and said, "Young man, you've got a lot of spunk." He said, "Garner was my greatest supporter from that moment on." There's a letter in the Rayburn files, scribbled in handwriting, in pencil I believe, "Dear Sam, why don't you get Harry Truman to put Lew Deschler on the Supreme Court. Cordially yours, John Garner."
But Garner would test people. That was a mannerism of his. I always had the suspicion that LBJ did that with a lot of people. I can't vouch for it, but I've heard the story that he said to Vance Hartke--maybe the reason I remember it is because I'm so sympathetic to the story. He grabbed Vance Hartke one time. He was mad at him about something. He grabbed him by the shirt. He said, "Vance, don't you ever forget you were in way over your head when you were mayor of Terre Haute!"

(Laughter)

H: If he didn't say that to Hartke, he should have. That was one Democrat I was glad to see defeated. He was a disgrace to the party.

Of course I was never [his employee], except when I was out doing advance work for him in 1960, and he always treated me just fine, aggravating sometimes, but he was never disrespectful in all the dealings I had with him. But he got a delight, it seemed to me, out of coming in and trying to undo your most carefully-laid plans. That was sort of a stratagem of his.

G: Do you have an example here?

H: Well, he'd come in and he'd want to rearrange everything. After you had finally gotten the mayor's wife and the county judge's wife to agree to ride in the same car when they hadn't spoken for ten years, he'd come in and he'd start making [trouble]. "Let's do this, let's do that." You'd have to stand firm with him.

He got into Phoenix. I did advance work for him in El Paso. Kennedy had an advance man out there and I went out there. Well,
first of all in the 1960 campaign I had charge of the state of North Carolina. We had eight stops in North Carolina. I took two carloads of young guys and dropped them off, one at each stop. They started up at the Virginia border and came through the Piedmont and ended up and spent the night in Charlotte. Then I leapfrogged to New Orleans. There was a guy from George Smathers' office there. We handled the arrangements for the end of the train trip and the parade and affairs at the end of the Friday night train trip in New Orleans. Then I went out to El Paso. Kennedy flew in from California and Johnson flew in from the Ranch. They rendezvoused and started on a circle of Texas. Then Kennedy spun off to St. Louis and north, and Johnson went back to New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and on up in the Pacific Northwest.

I might reminisce just a little bit about that. In El Paso Kennedy was late getting in and so was Johnson. It was Sunday night and there were only twelve policemen at the airport so we didn't want a crowd. We didn't try to get a crowd there; we didn't want them. But when the planes were late, it was on the radio and television and everybody in town got their shoes on, put the kids in the car, and went out to the airport. We had an enormous crowd. They almost caved in the roof of the airport. So many people got up on the roof that the police had to clear them off. All they had to restrain them was one rope, this huge crowd.

Senator Johnson arrived first. There was a whole bunch of Texas congressmen and so forth on the plane. To hold the crowd
somebody got a flatbed truck. I never did know who did that. These people got up and made speeches to the crowd just to hold them for Kennedy's arrival. Kennedy finally got in; he was about two hours late. He got in and we had a convertible for him to take him downtown to the hotel.

Tape 2 of 2

H: So, we got Kennedy and started over to his convertible, the Sheriff and the Chief of Police, and I don't know, several people. Kennedy broke loose—the crowd was yelling at him—and started toward the crowd. When they did the crowd surged forward and broke the rope. I think they estimated there were twelve thousand people out there by that time. Well, the Chief of Police grabbed Kennedy bodily and rushed him over, sort of threw him in the convertible, and just bawled the hell out of him: "Don't you ever do that again! You're going to get some children trampled to death, Senator. Now, you do what your managers tell you to do. Don't you ever do that again!" He really bawled the hell out of Kennedy. He said, "The crowd surges forward like that and somebody drops a baby and that baby would be stomped to death. There's no way you can save him." Kennedy said, "Well, you learn as you go along."

So they radioed back that there were about three or four thousand people down in the square in front of the hotel. Got down there—they were holding the elevator—and the police formed a cordon around Kennedy and Johnson, locked arms around them and just pushed them in
through the crowd, into the elevator, and upstairs. Kennedy had the suite at the north end of the hall and Johnson had the suite at the south end of the hall. Rayburn had a suite right under Johnson.

So LBJ said to me, "Go down and tell Jack to come down here; ask him to come down here. The Speaker's coming up and we want to tell him what to say about the oil depletion allowance when he goes to Texas tomorrow."

So I went down to the Kennedy suite. Kenny O'Donnell wasn't there. Somebody told me he had run off to Juarez. So Kennedy was there. He had a guard on the door but he was in there all by himself, sitting in the suite in a chair in the middle of the living room. There was a basket of fruit there. Then what they always had for Kennedy was Heineken beer. I always thought the Wisconsin brewers were going to find out about it and he would lose Wisconsin. But he always had Heineken beer in the room. Kennedy was sitting there reading some clippings. He had a bunch of white grapes in his lap and he'd pluck a grape and eat it, reading this clipping. I said, "Senator, Senator Johnson would like for you to come down to his suite. The Speaker is on the way up and they want to talk to you about what to say about the depletion allowance." He said, "All right. All right," and he went right on eating grapes and reading these clippings.

Well, of course LBJ couldn't stand it. He came loping down the hall in about two minutes. "Come on, Jack. Come on. You can't keep the Speaker waiting. You can't keep the Speaker waiting. We
want to tell you about the oil depletion allowance. Come on." "All right, Lyndon," went right on reading, very lackadaisical, eating grapes. Senator Johnson started walking up and down, throwing his shoulders back, saying, "I've got a crick in my back. I've got a bad crick in my back." Kennedy looked up and said, "I think you're cracking up. If you do, where do you want me to send it?"

(Laughter)

G: Did that amuse LBJ?

H: He just kind of brushed it off. Kennedy, when he got through--he went right on, finished his clipping--then he got up and they went away.

Let's cut this off. I just want to tell you a little background story.

(Interruption)

G: Did they brief Mr. Kennedy on [the oil depletion allowance]?

H: I don't know. I wasn't in the meeting. I assume that Mr. Rayburn and Senator Johnson talked to Kennedy about what to say about the oil depletion allowance the next day.

The second day they started on their circle of Texas. The second night was when Kennedy talked to the preachers in Houston, that very crucial thing.

So then LBJ came back to Arizona. John Holton and myself were at Albuquerque. We were instructed to put the Johnson party up at a very lush motel about twelve miles out from town. It was owned by some of his friends, I don't know, Texas oil people or something.
We did, a beautiful place, but very inconvenient, being that far out. So John was in charge of the Albuquerque meeting but I didn't stay for it. I left early the next morning and I went on to Arizona. John handled the stops in New Mexico. No, it was in Arizona, I think. John told me that one of the parts of the Albuquerque meeting, they were having, I don't know, Pioneer Days or something, a parade, and LBJ was to ride a horse. He jumped on this horse and he split his britches all the way down. Well, they had to rush twelve miles out and twelve miles back to bring him another pair of pants, because he had gashed his britches all the way down. (Laughter)

So he came into Phoenix. We took him to the hotel. I had goofed on that. They were at the Westward Ho Hotel. I simply goofed; I failed to check out whether it was unsegregated or not. That's the first thing an advance man should do, but I had forgotten to do it. I guess in my subconscious I figured in Arizona there was no problem. So the day before they got in, it suddenly dawned on me, "You haven't checked out the segregation problem." So I went to the manager and I said, "Look, I should have done this the day I got here, but it slipped my mind. Are all your facilities unsegregated? Are they all open to blacks in case we have a black in the press corps or a black on the liaison office or something?" He said, "They can stay here. They stay here all the time." I said, "What about your dining room?" "No problem. No problem." I said, "What about the beauty shop and the barber shop?" "No problem." I said, "What about the bar?" "Oh, no! Now they can't use the bar.
They'll be having fist fights in there if you let them go in the bar." "Oh, God," I said, "Well, we're going to have to cancel our reservations. We're going to have to go out and rent a motel. Then we can do what we please in the motel. We'll just rent the whole motel for the night." "Oh, don't do that, don't do that. We've been turning people away." I said, "Well, I can't help it. But you can't have any segregated facilities." "Oh, my God," he said, "I don't think we can let them in the bar. Let me get my directors together." Well, they met and they decided that they could go in the bar.

But we got in there and I made the mistake of--you should never let a candidate see the instructions for the party. They have no business seeing it. You know, you prepare mimeographed instructions for the party with the room assignments, the meals, what time to have your luggage in the lobby the next day, where the cars will be parked for the motorcade, the ABCs of logistics. But Senator Johnson got hold of one of them. He said, "What are these rooms costing?" I said, "I haven't the vaguest idea, Senator. I didn't even ask. It doesn't make any difference. It's the only place we can stay anyhow." "What do you mean?" I said, "Well, I got it unsegregated yesterday. This is the first time they've ever opened up the bar to blacks." "What do you mean? I don't know what you're talking about." I said, "Well, you know, your party can't stay in a hotel that has any segregated facilities." "I never heard of such a thing." I said, "Senator, now you've been around politics. You
know this full well." "That's foolishness. I never heard of such a thing. I never heard of such a thing." Well, I got back to Washington and mentioned this to Jim Rowe, who was his campaign manager. He said, "Oh, good God, if I've been over that with him once, I've been over it twenty times. He just wants to be difficult."

Well, LBJ came in soon after the nomination and he said, "You're going to head up my speech-writing team. I want you to get a bunch of people together. Who are you going to have? Who are you going to have?" I said, "Well, Jack Fischer, the editor of Harper's. I think Jack would be good. And I think Doctor [Walter Prescott] Webb would be good." I mentioned four or five. "That's fine. Get them. Get them alerted." I said, "David Cohen [?] would be great." I called David Cohen. David said, "Oh, great God, why can't Lyndon plan in advance? I'm leaving for Copenhagen tomorrow on a business trip, going to be gone six weeks. I'd love to do this. But damn it, I can't cancel all these engagements I've got at this late date. Why didn't he mention it a couple of weeks ago that he had this in mind?" I said, "I don't know. He just grabbed me in the office and told me this." David said, "Well, it's just too late. I can't do it."

So Jim Rowe came in the office and I told Jim Rowe. [He said], "Oh, why won't he leave this campaign alone? I've already got a speech-writing team set up! It's already functioning! We'll elect him if he'll just leave us alone!" (Laughter) So that never did come into fruition.
G: Some hard feelings developed between Jim Rowe and LBJ in that campaign. Do you know what it was?

H: No, I never heard that. I had never heard that.

   Well, Jim, you know, is a very blunt guy. He probably told him he couldn't do something, and they probably got in an argument. Because Jim is a very forthright guy.

   Jim told me a great story on himself when he was FDR's assistant. He was then with FDR one day. He said, "Mr. President, we've got to do so--and--so. We've got to do so--and--so. We've got to do so--and--so." FDR leaned back and blew a smoke circle and said, "Jim, when did the people elect you president?" A real squelch.

   (Laughter)

H: But no, I had never heard that there was ever any rift between them. They had been friends for so long.

   Now that I'm thinking about it, I seldom ever went over to the Senate. I don't suppose I was in LBJ's office four times. But I went over there for some reason one time. Ronnie Dugger was in town working on his book. LBJ mentioned that to me. I hadn't seen Ronnie. He mentioned that to me. He said, "Here's a report I've just gotten on his interview with Bill Douglas." He had anticipated everything Ronnie was doing and had them reporting to him before Ronnie got out of their office. You know, that planning.

   You know the story about what he did to Coke Stevenson when Coke Stevenson went to see the Secretary of State in 1948, when he was running against Stevenson. I don't know all the details of it,
but it's a matter of public record. But anyhow, LBJ was making a big deal about the fact that he knew about foreign affairs and Coke Stevenson didn't. That was stinging Stevenson so he made an appointment to see the Secretary of State; I think it was General [George] Marshall. It was a secretary of state in 1948. So LBJ was prepared for him. He had photographers; he had timekeepers; he had the whole business.

So Coke Stevenson went in to see the Secretary of State. He was in there, I think it was a minute and forty-seven seconds. It was just to shake hands. But Stevenson was going to play that up, you know, that he had had a briefing on foreign affairs. So LBJ just hammered him over the head. He got briefed on foreign affairs in one minute and forty-seven seconds! Stevenson should have left it alone. He came out the loser on that proposition. But it was this massive attention to detail.

I mentioned this to Harry Middleton and he didn't know anything about it, but he said he would try to find out about it. I don't know whether you've ever run into it. One time, it was soon after he became vice president, Walter Jenkins had a cocktail party. I went out to it, and I had just gone to work for Hale Boggs. The Vice President came across the floor just glowering, and I knew there was trouble ahead. He walked up to me and he said, "I'll kick your ass up between your shoulders." I said, "What have I done this time?" He said, "You wouldn't come to work for me." I said, "You never offered me a job." He said, "Walter Jenkins said you weren't
going to work, you were going to finish the Rayburn biography. And then you go to work for Hale Boggs instead of me." I said, "Senator, you never offered me a job. I didn't plan, but Hale told me he'd give me plenty of time to finish the book." He said, "Well, you could have come to work for me and I would have helped you finish the book. I'll turn Mary Margaret [Wiley Valenti's] diary over to you, about why I took the nomination for vice president." Well, I never followed up on it. I rode back on the plane and sat by Senator Johnson and Douglass Cater from Austin to Washington, a seven-hour trip. I sat by the two of them and heard him give Doug Cater, in play-by-play, his version of taking the vice presidency.

But I never did follow up on the diary and I never asked Mary Margaret whether she kept a diary. She did tell me the last time I saw her that the famous Phil Graham version--she did say that Mr. Rayburn came down to the Johnson suite, which was a madhouse at that moment, and Bobby Kennedy arrived, and that--I think it went this way--Mr. Rayburn said to her, "Who's bedroom is this?" She said, "It's mine." He said, "Can we use it for a few minutes?" So he and Bobby Kennedy went in the room, and just the two of them were together in that room. I heard Mr. Rayburn's version of that.

Bobby Kennedy at the time they talked--and I didn't know at that time where it was. Mr. Rayburn said, "Bobby said to me--he had that hair hanging down in his face--'Oh, it's just terrible upstairs, labor and the liberals. If Senator Johnson is the nominee they're not going to contribute money and they're going to walk out
and they're going to sit on their hands.' I said to him, 'Now, Bobby, we ain't talking to but one person and that's your brother. I told your brother when I talked to him this afternoon that we weren't running for anything. We didn't want anything. We weren't asking for anything. I had been very much opposed to any idea of Lyndon taking the vice presidential nomination. But I told your brother that if he told me that he had to have him on the ticket to win, if he told me that he'd use him every way that he could on the National Security Council and other things he'd give him to do, and if he'd get up and tell the world that Lyndon was his choice and he was willing to fight for his nomination, then I withdraw my objections. Your brother said, "I tell you all those things, and he is my choice and I'm going to see that he's nominated."' He said Bobby slapped his leg and said, "Well, Mr. Speaker, that does it. I'm going back upstairs and tell Jack it's got to be Lyndon."

I never heard him mention what Phil Graham had in his memorandum about Bobby suggesting that Senator Johnson become chairman of the [Democratic] National Committee. That to me is so absurd that it would have been laughed out of court. I think the Phil Graham memorandum is sheer imagination. I don't trust a bit of it.

G: This was supposedly proposed or suggested by Bobby Kennedy in a meeting with Mr. Rayburn, John Connally, and perhaps one other person, maybe Graham or Jim Rowe, someone like that, in, I think, Mrs. Johnson's bedroom.
H: I don't know. I never heard a mention of it from Rayburn. You know, it could have happened and he just never mentioned it. It could have happened, because Rayburn never mentioned to me the call that Johnson made to him the night that Kennedy was nominated. According to Senator Johnson, this thing started with Will Wilson who said to Price Daniel, "If this boy is as smart as I think he is, he's going to ask Lyndon to run on the ticket with him and Lyndon's got to do it." Price said, "I hadn't given it a thought, but I think you're right." So Price then mentioned it to Senator Johnson and Senator Johnson called Sam Rayburn.

Well now, after we got back to the hotel, it was Tiger [Olin E.] Teague, I think, Frank Ikard, Homer Thornberry, and I took to the convention with me Nick Cox, who was then on the Des Moines Register. Nick shared my room. I worked it out with the Speaker that Nick would agree not to do any reporting but that he would see the backstage thing. Nick is now in Washington, won every prize there is to win. He's won the Pulitzer Prize, the Sigma Delta Chi prize, and he's the only man ever to win the Raymond Clapper award twice in a row. Nick was there that night. We were having drinks, one of the few times I ever saw Mr. Rayburn drink after supper. Usually when he had his food that was the end of his drinking. But that night he took a couple of drinks. Nick and myself had the room—he had a bedroom and living room; we couldn't get any interconnecting rooms. He had these two rooms, and Nick and myself had the room next to him. Then John Holton had the room next to us.
John says that that morning they went over to a meeting or a breakfast with all the people from the Fourth Congressional District in another hotel. When they came back there was a great deal of commotion down at LBJ's suite. Mr. Rayburn said, "What the hell is that?" "Oh," he said, "I bet I know what that is." The TV people were there and the newspaper people.

The night before we were sitting around the suite talking. It was the consensus of opinion among the congressmen and others in the room there, it was just unanimously conceded that Stuart Symington was going to be the vice presidential nominee. Rayburn didn't say a word. I don't know at what moment it was, but anyhow, LBJ said that he called Mr. Rayburn and told him what Price Daniel had said. He said, "Now damn it, Lyndon, don't you do anything rash now. Don't you do anything, by God, until we talk again." That was the night before. So then when Kennedy called and said, "I want to come to see you," then LBJ called Sam Rayburn and told him Kennedy was coming to see him and what it was. He said, "Don't you do anything."

So, John said after LBJ called him that morning--no, I guess it wasn't that morning. I guess they came back from the breakfast and Rayburn saw that commotion, then LBJ got him on the phone--it was by then afternoon--and told him what Kennedy had said and said, "I told him he would have to convince you. He'll be coming to see you."

So then Hale Boggs came by and banged on my door. Hale was with Ed Foley, used to be under secretary of the treasury under Truman.
"Where is the boss?" We were still asleep. We had had one of Rayburn's main constituents on our hands, dead drunk, until five in the morning. We finally poured him in a taxi and sent him off. So we were out of it. I said, "I think he's at breakfast. I think he was going to a breakfast." He said, "Breakfast, hell! Do you know what time it is?" I said, "No." He said, "It's quarter after twelve."

Well, Hale's version of it was we got together Arthur Krock, who was tidying up his memoirs or papers to put in the Princeton Library. One time Hale got Arthur Krock, Tommy Corcoran and myself, and he tried to get John Holton, who was going to be out of town, to compare notes on the events surrounding the nomination. Hale said, "Ed [Foley], when the boss finally arrived, was in there with Tommy Corcoran. Tommy Corcoran had been walking the halls for the whole convention. He had come out in an article in Look magazine for Lyndon Johnson. This infuriated Joe Kennedy, who called him an apostate Catholic. So Tommy was walking the halls for a Johnson-Kennedy, or Kennedy-Johnson ticket, either way. So he was, I guess, the happiest man in Washington when the ticket finally worked out. So Hale said he went in there and Tommy was giving the Speaker all the wrong arguments about why Lyndon should take the nomination. So he said, "I finally got Tommy out of there, and Ed started talking the wrong way. I knew how to talk to the Speaker. So I said, 'Ed, I want to talk to him by myself,' and I got Ed out of the room. I turned it on about, 'Mr. Speaker, you just can't stand being responsible
for giving this country eight years of Richard Nixon.' I knew that would sting him worse than anything else."

When Hale left, the Speaker came out and said to John, "John, I want to get off by myself and think a little bit." There wasn't any place to put him except in John's bedroom so he took him down to his bedroom. John said he thinks he was there about twenty minutes. It was sitting in that bedroom that he planned his course of action as to what to tell Kennedy.

Well, Kennedy didn't show up and didn't show up. Hale was back with the Speaker. The Speaker was getting itchy. Kennedy had called him and said, "I'm coming down to see you." He said, "No, I'll come up to see you. You're the nominee." "No, Mr. Speaker, I want to come down and see you. I'm just on the floor just above you." Well, Kennedy didn't show and didn't show. He said to Hale, "Hale, go up there and see if that boy's coming down here." So Hale went up the fire stairs. Here were Joe Rauh and all the liberals, Walter Reuther, Roy Reuther, all screaming and yelling and threatening. He said to Jack Kennedy, "Jack, come on. The Speaker's getting restless. Come on. We'll go down the backstairs here."

So he and Kenny O'Donnell and Hale went down to the Speaker's suite. Kennedy said, "Shall we all talk?" Hale said, "No, why don't you and the Speaker talk and let Kenny and myself get better acquainted." He didn't know O'Donnell well at all then. So they stayed outside while Rayburn was in private with Kennedy. He told Kennedy what I've said, "I've been dead set against this. I knew
how miserable the other people have been in the vice presidency. I've been dead set against it. But if you tell me you've got to have him on the ticket to win, tell me you'll use him all you can, and that you'll tell the world he's your personal choice, and that you're determined to have him nominated, then I'll withdraw my objections."

So that's the combined version from LBJ and from Sam Rayburn of how the thing worked out. But then to follow this up, at a quarter to four the phone rang. I answered the phone in the Speaker's suite. He said, "This is Dave Lawrence." I said, "Yes, Governor." He said, "Is Sam there?" I said, "Yes, sir." "Mr. Speaker, it's Governor Lawrence of Pennsylvania." "Yes, yes, yes, yes." And I could hear Governor Lawrence. He said, "Sam, I need some help on a speech. I'm going to send my man over there to get some help on a speech." He said, "Is that to do with Lyndon?" He said, "Yes, they told me to get a nominating speech ready." Mr. Rayburn said, "Is that thing set?" He said, "Mr. Speaker, I don't know. They just told me to get a speech ready. I don't know whether it's set." Well, about fifteen minutes later Kennedy came on television and said Johnson was his choice. That's how up in the air it was until the last minute.

So they sent a guy over to work with Bill Gibbons, who worked for Johnson's [Democratic] Policy Committee--no, I take it back, Dan McCrary [?], who's now an associate editor of Business Week, who was an intern in Johnson's office. They used our bedroom to write the nominating speech. Then Governor Lawrence was nearsighted or
something, so then they had to find an oversized typewriter and retype the speech so he could see to read it. But that's how up in the air all this was. They met; Kennedy gave his acceptance speech. It was broad open daylight, about five o'clock in the afternoon, when he gave his acceptance speech, because they were catching prime time in the East. It was just a madhouse. Nobody knew what was going on. It was just back and forth.

G: Let me ask you another point here. There's some indication that Sam Rayburn also had links with the Kennedy people through the Massachusetts delegation and his friends in the Congress, particularly McCormack and Tip O'Neill. And that here was another channel for negotiating a possible Kennedy-Johnson ticket. Have you [any recollection of that]?

H: I don't think so. Because there was bad blood between McCormacks and the Kennedys. You see, if I'm not mistaken, they had already defeated the nephew, Eddie McCormack, once or twice. Now, McCormack was very loyal to Kennedy after he was president. Hale said one of the first things I had to learn in politics is that Irish Catholics not only are not natural allies, they usually are mortal enemies. They didn't get along with each other. I think it was sort of the lace curtain-shanty Irish division involved there somewhere. Tip O'Neill, while he had been in Congress twelve years at that time, was not a prominent member of the House at that time, and as far as I know, had no close links to Rayburn. I knew Tip at that time,
but I never remember him having any links to Rayburn other than he knew him and would speak to him.

G: You have no recollection of them sitting down together before the balloting and talking about this possibility?

H: Never, never, never. Now, I don't know. Tip, of course, got along with the Kennedys fine, because he succeeded Jack Kennedy in that district. But McCormack and the Kennedys were not bosom buddies at all. Their friendship, such as it was, developed after McCormack became speaker, and his loyalty to President Kennedy was a party loyalty rather than a personal, I think. I think they got to be good friends, but they were not political allies before.

The Kennedys played a very independent game. The first time I met Jack Kennedy was at the 1956 convention, the night that [Estes] Kefauver defeated him for the vice presidency. Steve Mitchell, the Democratic chairman, was my very close friend. His son was my closest friend. I was with them as we came out of the convention hall. Steve was not national chairman then; he had given it up in 1954. Paul Butler was the chairman. Steve and his wife and his younger son, Tony, and myself, we bumped into Jack Kennedy. Steve said, "Boy, that was a swinger today, Jack. That was really a cliff-hanger today." Kennedy said, "Yes, it sure was. It was awful close. Very confusing." Well, I don't remember the details, but Foster Furcolo was the nominee for governor when Kennedy was running for re-election. He refused to be on a television with Furcolo or something like that. So Steve said, "Jack, do you want some good fatherly advice?" He
said, "I sure do, Steve." He said, "Go back to Massachusetts and try to get some Democrats elected besides yourself." He said, "That's damn good advice, Steve."

But they played a very independent game. It was a personal game that they were playing at that stage.

G: Let me ask you about that occasion in 1956. Speaker Rayburn is credited with having thrown the VP nomination to Kefauver by recognizing Missouri and this sort of thing.

H: Yes, I have read that. I was on the floor at the time. I was with Albert Gore when his name was still [in nomination]. In fact, Texas was going to vote for him, maybe did vote for Albert Gore at first.

G: Gore's people were the ones that were swinging to Kefauver.

H: Well, I remember telling Senator Gore, who was a good friend of mine at that time—we were having a cup of coffee under the stands—"Senator, I don't think you can get the nomination and if you keep Kefauver from having it, I think it's going to hurt you a lot in Tennessee, a great deal in Tennessee." He said, "I think you're probably right." Well, there was so much pandemonium on the stage, and the tally machines broke down so nobody knew who was ahead. The tally machines couldn't keep up with the changes. Tom Hennings was on a chair in the Missouri delegation just screaming his head off, "You can't go for Kennedy. He's voted wrong on every farm bill we've ever had up in the Senate. You can't go for Kennedy." And they swung over.
It was going so fast I don't remember all the moves, but one of the key recognitions, in my mind, was when Mr. Rayburn recognized Governor Raymond Gary of Oklahoma, which I think they swung to Kefauver. Well, I have never taken that as any kind of a design on Rayburn's part. Raymond Gary lived right across Lake Texoma. His home county adjoins Rayburn's district and they had been friends for years. Gary was a good friend of mine. He lived in Madill, Oklahoma. I have always thought that he recognized Raymond Gary because he was a close personal friend. But I have read these stories about John McCormack yelling to Rayburn what to do, this, that or the other. I just don't know. But I have never given much or any credence to the fact that Rayburn deliberately swung it one way or the other. He was not impressed with Kennedy. He was not impressed with Kennedy until the first television debate with Nixon.

G: Really, what was his reaction to that?

H: He said, "He was in the House here and he made absolutely no impression on us. A nice young man, but rumpled suits and hair hanging down in his face that needed cutting, spindly legs, and he had that yellow complexion like he had that Pacific fever. He was running around after the girls all night long. He just made no impression at all on us." But he was loyal. When he was nominated, why, he was going to be for him. But he watched the first television debate. They said he turned off the set and said, "My, God, the things that boy knows." From that time on, why, Kennedy was like a son to him. He had grown up, and Rayburn hadn't realized it. He had matured.
G:  Were you there when he turned off the set and he said that?
H:  No, I was not there. I heard that story. I was not there. He
was in Bonham, I think, at the time.
G:  Do you know who the source was?
H:  I don't know who the source was. You know, I didn't write these
things down a lot of them.
G:  That's fascinating.
H:  But he couldn't have been more solicitous about Kennedy from that
time on. He was much impressed with him, and it was a two-way
street. When Kennedy flew down to see Mr. Rayburn--I was telling
Lady Bird about this the other night--when he came out of the
hospital, one of the news reports said there were tears in his eyes
and his voice was choked up, so uncharacteristic of Kennedy. He
said, "They don't make them like that any more." Quite uncharacter-
istic of Kennedy. But there was a very deep friendship between the
two of them after the thing.

Of course, Rayburn had been a very good friend of Joe Kennedy,
back in the New Deal days. Rayburn went down to the swearing in
of the Kennedy cabinet. Here was Stewart Udall with all of his
children, and Bobby with all of his children, other cabinet members.
So Rayburn said, "I pushed them up to the front so they could see
their daddies take the oath of office. I left. I walked out the
door and somebody said, 'Hello, Sam.'" This eye, I've forgotten
which one it was, but this was the only one he had any sight in
and he couldn't see. He said, "Who's that?" "Joe Kennedy." "Oh,"
he said, "Joe, I didn't see you. Joe, go on in there. I'll tell you one thing, there ain't any race suicide in this outfit." (Laughter) All those kids, fifty kids in the cabinet families. But he really was sold on Jack Kennedy after he got to know him and got to working with him.

He and LBJ went down to Palm Beach in between the election and the taking of office and had a session with Kennedy. Mr. Rayburn said they both told Kennedy to keep his hands off of the fight to enlarge the Rules Committee in the House. That was a family affair and to keep out of it. They'd take care of it. Well, he didn't do it. He just muddied the water up. They had a meeting down at the White House. Rayburn and Johnson again told him to leave it alone. But Kennedy ignored them and he picked up the phone and phoned Harold Cooley, the dean of the North Carolina delegation. We had only one vote out of North Carolina. He called Harold Cooley and said, "Harold, help me out. Get some of those boys and come on over and help me out." Well, he no sooner hung up the phone than Harold Cooley called a meeting of his delegation and said, "The President is putting the heat on me." And it was in the Washington Post the next morning.

Kennedy didn't help a damn bit. He just muddied the water up. Then Stewart Udall started calling western Republicans threatening to cancel out some of their Interior Department projects and that got in the paper. He didn't change a damn vote. They were no help at all. They wouldn't pay any attention to Johnson and Rayburn.
They'll deny that, but in my judgment--I was there step by step; I kept a diary of the thing all the way through--it was something that outsiders couldn't help on. The lobbies couldn't help on it and in my judgment the White House couldn't help.

Nevertheless, Johnson and Rayburn knew this was an internal matter and it was best left alone by the President, by outsiders. Anyway, Rayburn went down there and Caroline was just a little thing. He said, "She's walking around with her hands on her hips, up and down the halls of that baronial mansion there." She waddled up to Rayburn, looked up and said, "You haven't got any hair!" He said, "I sure don't and I'm getting along just fine. How are you getting along?" He said, "I guess growing up with all those hairy Kennedys, she didn't know what a man without any hair looked like." (Laughter)

Jackie took a picture of Mr. Rayburn fishing off the pier that's just a scream. He is the dumpiest, funniest-looking thing. He has a rain hat pulled down over him. He looks like something the dogs dragged in. Jackie slipped up behind him and took a picture of him and then autographed it and had it framed and sent it to him. It's really a treasure.

G: I think the inscription says, "The fish don't have a chance," and then Jack Kennedy added to that, "Neither does the House of Representatives," or something.

H: That's right. They both autographed it.
Well, Rayburn said she impressed him as the most frightened little bird. She seemed so timid, just sort of scared of her shadow. He liked her, but he said she seemed just ill at ease, just sort of staying back in the shadows, which is not the way she came out eventually.

G: Rayburn's increasing liking of Jack Kennedy during the 1960 campaign was paralleled by his dislike for Kennedy's opponent, Richard Nixon.

H: Well, he had a very deep dislike of Nixon personally, as well as an apprehension about him being in the White House.

G: Did he ever talk to you about this?

H: Oh, yes. He talked about Nixon. I made an appointment for Earl Mazo to interview Rayburn when he was writing his Nixon book. You know, the liberals got mad at Earl about that book because it was a fair book. I still think it's the best thing ever done on Nixon. Rayburn didn't go off the record at all. He told Earl--and it's in the book, it's in the 1959 version; I haven't looked at the 1968 version, but it's in the 1959 version of the book--I'm sure Rayburn didn't say off the record because Earl is a very reputable journalist, that Nixon had the cruelest face he'd ever look into. He said, "That ugly jaw sticking out and those little chinkquapin eyes." He said, "I've served with over thirty-five hundred men and women and he has the cruelest face I've ever looked into. When he was elected to the Senate I said, 'Good riddance, I don't want him ever to darken the door of this House again.'" That's in the book.
I saw Nixon at his very best one time. LBJ got an idea. There were forty-seven senators and the Vice President—and at that time you had only ninety-six senators—that had served with Rayburn in the House. So he would have a ceremony and they would give Rayburn a silver tray with his name engraved on it. Each man would have his name engraved on it. He invited me to come to the ceremony in the old Supreme Court chamber. Dick Russell had an artist friend in Atlanta, so they sent him a photograph of Rayburn and he painted a painting of Rayburn, which was pretty good except he got the jaw too long. LBJ had color reproductions made and gave everybody there one of them.

So, I thought this was kind of sadistic of Senator Johnson, but he called on Richard Nixon to speak. Well, everybody knew about the dislike of the two men for each other, but Nixon responded beautifully. He didn't lower himself; he didn't perjure himself; he talked academically about Rayburn's tenure. He set a record that would never be exceeded in all probability, his knowledge of the rules. He never did say "I love him," or "he's my buddy," never any falsity about it. I was standing about four feet from Richard Nixon and I thought he handled himself magnificently. I thought Senator Johnson put him in a very tough spot. But Nixon handled it manfully. My liking for Nixon increased as a result of that experience.

Another little thing as to how confusing this whole game of politics is, with all this uproar going on up in the hotel about the nomination and so forth. Price Daniel had the suite right across
the hall from us, Price and Price Junior. Price said to me, "D.B., I don't think anybody's doing anything about getting seconding speeches lined up for Lyndon. My God, we've just got about an hour. I think the Governor of Virginia ought to make a seconding speech. I think I ought to make one. I think Bill Dawson of Chicago ought to make one." I said, "Go down and see Lyndon and see who he wants to second his nomination." So I went down the hall and here's utter pandemonium in that suite. Senator Johnson's sitting in the chair, just kind of like this, hunched down. I knelt down on the floor beside him. I told him what Price had said. He suggested several names and said, "Now, this is out of my hands. I can't do anything about this. You tell Price he's got to handle it. I don't want to know anything about it. I've got to leave the convention hall. I won't know anything about this, so you tell him to get it all lined up." Well, he did, but then a bunch of people started going up on the platform making seconding speeches that hadn't been invited.

So months passed. The Vice President was in office. Somebody on the staff, I don't remember who it was, called me and asked me if I had a list of the people who seconded his nomination. They wanted to write them a letter in appreciation. I named the ones I could remember, but I said, "I don't know, because there were people that I never heard of getting up there seconding the nomination. I don't know who all seconded it. Why don't you get the transcript from down at the [Democratic] National Committee?" They
had that all taped. He said, "Well, they said it wouldn't be ready for six months. We've already gone several months." This had gone six or eight months then. So I suppose they finally got the list and wrote them all a letter, but that's how loose-jointed these things are.

G: Chaotic.

H: Just chaotic. Senator Johnson didn't know who had seconded the nomination.

G: Did you get the feeling that neither Speaker Rayburn nor Senator Johnson trusted Vice President Nixon?

H: I can't speak for Senator Johnson because I never heard him discuss--well, I take it back. I take it back. One time. I never heard him discuss Richard Nixon before he was nominated for vice president. It just never came up. I didn't see that much of Senator Johnson. I'd go months without seeing Senator Johnson or being around him. But this same night out at Walter Jenkins's house, when he told me, "I'll let you use Mary Margaret's diary about what actually took place that day."

I said, "Mr. Vice President, I sat by you and Doug Cater on the plane coming back from Austin, and I heard you talk about it for hours. But there's one unanswered question that I have that I've never had a chance to ask you and that you didn't touch on in your conversations with Doug Cater. What was the key element in your decision to take the nomination? What was the straw that broke the camel's back?" "Well," he said, "you know I didn't want to be vice
president. I loved being majority leader. That job I knew from stem to stern. I knew how to handle it. I knew how to run the Senate. I enjoyed running the Senate. I had power and I liked to use power. I liked that. And I knew what the vice presidency was, because I had watched John Garner suffer in it for eight years. So I knew what it was. I was able to rule out all the considerations, but there was one I kept bumping up against all that day, and I could never get around that. It boiled down to this. I said to myself, 'All right now, Lyndon, if you do what you want to do and you remain as majority leader after your presidential nominee has told you that he wants you and he's got to have you to win the election, and you turn him down and do what you want to do, and it should turn out that he's right and you're responsible for giving this country eight years of Richard Nixon, I could never live with that.'"

G: Do you think he ever had the consideration that if he declined to go on the ticket and Kennedy won, that Kennedy might have enough power to have him replaced as majority leader? Did he ever express that?

H: That doesn't ring true to me.

G: He never expressed that?

H: I don't think Kennedy would ever have tried it. I think on the other hand Kennedy would be so anxious to have him there as majority leader, because he knew Johnson well enough, they had worked together long enough, that he knew that Johnson would be loyal to a Democratic president and would help him get his programs through the Senate. So I don't think he would ever have tried that.
Remember this, too, there's another side to this now. Mr. Rayburn--I never talked to LBJ about this--told me in 1959 that LBJ said that Joe Kennedy had been sounding him out on the idea of a Johnson-Kennedy ticket. Well, in this meeting with Arthur Krock I raised this point. I mentioned this. Of course, Arthur Krock was close to Joe Kennedy for thirty years. He's the one that twisted arms to get Kennedy the Pulitzer Prize. There was a close family connection there for many years. So I said, "Mr. Krock, Speaker Rayburn told me that LBJ said to him that Joe Kennedy in 1955 was talking to him about the ticket of Lyndon Johnson for president, Kennedy for vice president." He said, "I heard that. Joe Kennedy was on the Riviera. He phoned me about something else during the period when this rumor was around. I mentioned it to him. I said, 'Joe, the rumor's going around Washington that you have been talking to Lyndon about a Johnson for president, Kennedy for vice president ticket. I want to know about it.' He said, 'Arthur, I know that rumor's going around, but there's nothing to it. When it comes to the Kennedys, it's the White House or the shit house and nothing in between.'" So I don't know. I just don't know what the truth of that situation is. Maybe Kennedy was feeling him out or something. I don't know what it is.

G: That's interesting.

H: But, you see, Johnson had also known Joe Kennedy from New Deal days. You know, Johnson was the man who would think of all sorts of possibilities, but if I had been in Johnson's shoes I wouldn't
have worried about Kennedy trying to displace me as majority leader. In the first place, I don't think Kennedy would have had any desire to displace him. In the second place, I think that's, again, outside interference where the Senate would tell him to go jump in the lake. I don't think they would have heeded his wishes. Even a powerful president like FDR was [not?] able to elect Alben Barkley. He really didn't elect Alben Barkley; it was Pat Harrison, of Mississippi, his own stubbornness defeated him for majority leader by one vote. Pat Harrison and Theodore Bilbo hated each other. When this race came up they said to Bilbo, "Come on, vote for your fellow Mississippian, for God's sakes." He said, "Well, I don't want to. He's no good. But I will vote for him if he'll ask me to." And Harrison refused to ask him to. So Bilbo voted for Alben Barkley and elected him. But FDR turned on the heat. [He was] very powerful in office at that time, very powerful. He couldn't swing it.

This is housekeeping. It's like interfering between a man and his wife. You'd better leave it alone. You can't do anything but mess it up.

G: Well, that's really fascinating. I don't want to take up too much of your time today.

[End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview IV]